Reservations to United Nations human rights treaties : is half a loaf better than no bread? by Rosenthal, Indira
  THESES SIS/LIBRARY        TELEPHONE: +61 2 6125 4631 
R.G. MENZIES LIBRARY BUILDING NO:2      FACSIMILE:  +61 2 6125 4063 
THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY      EMAIL: library.theses@anu.edu.au 
CANBERRA ACT 0200 AUSTRALIA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
USE OF THESES 
 
 
This copy is supplied for purposes 
of private study and research only. 
Passages from the thesis may not be  
copied or closely paraphrased without the  
written consent of the author. 
I declare that this sub-thesis is my own work. 
All sources have been fully acknowledged in the footnotes or in the 
bibliography. 
Indira Rosenthal 
2 September 1996 
RESERVATIONS TO UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES: IS 
HALF A LOAF BETTER THAN NO BREAD?* 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment for the degree of Master of Laws of the 
Australian National University 
*G.G. Fitzmaurice 
Reservations to Multilateral Conventions 
( 1953) 2 International & Comparative Law Quarterly, I, 16. 
(30,000 words) 
October 1996 
Indira Rosenthal 
9152430 
.... ________________________ __ 
INTRODUCTION 
CHAPTER 1 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
HISTORY OF RESERVATIONS 
The Unanimity Rule 
The pan-American Reservations Framework 
The ICJ Advisory Opinion on Reservations to the Genocide Convention 
The Universality v. Integrity Dilemma 
Reports of the International Law Commission on the Law of Reservations 
The Regional Human Rights Regimes 
A: Reservations Under the European Convention on Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms 
B: Reservations Under the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights 
Conclusion 
CHAPTER 2 
THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 
Introduction 
The Vienna Convention Definition of 'Reservation' 
Application of the Vienna Convention Reservations Rules 
The Vienna Convention test for Admissibility of Reservations 
The Object and Purpose Test 
Reservations to Non-Derogable Provisions 
Broad and Vague Reservations and Reservations that Invoke National Laws 
Failure of States Parties to Object to Incompatible Reservations 
Failure of Vienna Convention to Accommodate Normative Treaties 
Conclusion 
1 
5 
5 
6 
8 
14 
16 
18 
18 
22 
23 
25 
25 
25 
25 
26 
33 
33 
35 
37 
38 
42 
J...-....... ______ _ 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
CHAPTER 3 
THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE'S GENERAL 
COMMENT 24(52) 
Role of the Human Rights Committee 
Possible Motivating Factors Behind the Comment 
Content of the Comment 
A: Role of States Parties' Objections 
B: Authority of the Committee to Determine the Validity of Reservations 
C: Effect of Making an Incompatible Reservation - Severability 
The US Reservation to Article 6 of the Covenant: A Case Study 
Conclusion 
CHAPTER 4 
SOME REFORM PROPOSALS 
Introduction 
Proposals For Procedural Reform: Role of the Supervisory Bodies 
Proposals For Legislative Reform 
A: J udicialising the System 
B: A Different Regime for Human Rights Treaties? 
C: Model Clauses on Reservations 
The Work of the International Law Association 
The Work of the International Law Commission 
Conclusion 
CONCLUSION 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
43 
43 
46 
48 
49 
54 
56 
63 
68 
69 
69 
70 
71 
71 
72 
77 
78 
79 
82 
84 
2 
.J.-----------------------------
INTRODUCTION 
Much of the enormous volume of literature1 on the law of reservations2 has 
been concerned with human rights treaties. 3 This is not surprising given the 
centrality of the International Court of Justice's Advisory Opinion O!!, 
Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide4 to the law of reservations and the sense that human rights 
objectives are not served by the current law of reservations. The concerns 
raised in this literature include the failure of the law to protect the rights 
expressed in the treaties from the undermining effect of reservations that are 
"incompatible" or otherwise invalid.5 In particular, concern about certain 
reservations made to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women6 (the Women's Convention), to the 
1 For example: D. Greig, "Reservations: Equity as a Balancing Factor" (1995) 16 Australian Yearbook 
of International Law 21; C. Redgwell, "Universality or Integrity? Some Reflections on Reservations to 
General Multilateral Treaties" (1993) 64 British Yearbook of International Law 245 [hereinafter 
Universality]; S. Rosenne, Developments in the Law of Treaties 1945-1986, 1989 [hereinafter 
Developments]; F. Horn, Reservations and Interpretative Declarations to Multilateral Treaties 1988; J. 
K. Koh, "Reservations to Multilateral Treaties: How International Legal Doctrine Reflects World 
Vision" (1982) 23 Harvard Journal of International Law 71; Gamble, "Reservations to Multilateral 
Treaties: A Macroscopic View of State Practice" (1980) 74 American Journal of International Law 372; 
D.W. Bowett, "Reservations to Non-Restricted Multilateral Treaties" (1976-77) 48 British Yearbook of 
International Law 67; J.M. Ruda, "Reservations to treaties" [1975] 146 Recueil des Cours 95; S. 
Rosenne, The Law of Treaties, A Guide to the Legislative History of the Vienna Convention 1970 
[hereinafter Law of Treaties]; W. Bishop, "Reservations to Treaties" [1961] 103 Recueil des Cours 245; 
Fitzmaurice, "Reservations to Multilateral Conventions" [1953] 2 International and Comparative Law 
r;uarterly I; T. 0. Elias, The Modern Law of Treaties 1974. 
"Reservation" is defined in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 (in force 1980 UNTS 
Vol. 1155,page331)asa: 
unilateral statement, however phrased or named, made by a State, when signing, ratifying, 
accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, whereby it purports to exclude or to modify the 
legal effect of certain provisions of a treaty in their application to that State. 
Article 2(1)(d), Vienna Convention. The Vienna Convention, including this definition are discussed in 
more detail in Chapter 2 below. Note that this paper does not address the issue of interpretative 
declarations to treaties notwithstanding its close relation to reservations. On interpretative declarations, 
see Horn, above n. I. 
3For example, J.P. Gardner (ed), Human Rights as General Norms and A State's Right to Opt Out 
(forthcoming 1996); L. Lijnzaad, Reservations to UN Human Rights Treaties: Ratify or Ruin? 1995; 
B. Clark, 'The Vienna Convention Reservations Regime and the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women" (1991) 85 American Journal of International Law 281; R. 
Cook, "Reservations to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women" (1990) 30 Virginia Journal of International Law 643; P.H. Imbert, "Reservations to the 
European Convention on Human Rights Before the Strasbourg Committee: The Temeltasch Case" 
( 1984) 33 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 558 [hereinafter "Temeltasch and the 
Strasbourg Commission"]. 
4 
Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on Reservations to the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, ICJ Rep. 1951, 15 [hereinafter Reservations 
?pinion]. The Opinion is discussed below at pages 8-14. 
· Incompatibility as a ground for invalidating reservations is the focus of the following discussion. 
Reservations may also be invalid if they are expressly prohibited by the treaty to which they are made. 
~ee Article 19 of the Vienna Convention, reproduced below at n. 159. 
Convention on !he Elimination o{All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 1979, reproduced in 
UN Doc. ST/HRl/Rev.5 (Vol.I/Part I) at 150. . 
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Convention on the Rights of the Child7 (the Children's Convention) and to 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR or 
Covenant),8 has prompted considerable discussion of the issue of the 
application of the law of reservations to all human rights treaties.9 
In 1992, the chairs of the international human rights supervisory bodies met 
for the fourth time and discussed, inter alia, reservations to their respective 
treaties. 10 The chair of the Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDA W) reported that CEDA W considered 
that a number of reservations made to its treaty should not have been made 
and are incompatible with the object and purpose of the Women's 
Convention. 11 The Chair of the Committee on the Rights of the Child (CROC) 
gave a similar report in relation to reservations to the Children's Convention. 12 
The meeting expressed the view that the situation facing the Women's and 
Children's Convention was "very alarming"13 given the potential that 
incompatible reservations have "to undermine the goals of the treaty 
system". 14 The meeting also expressed a view, which appears consistently in 
the literature, about the effect of reservations on human rights treaties: 
The chairpersons consider that the number, nature and scope of the reservations that 
have been made to the principal human rights treaties are cause for alarm. While 
recognizing that there is an important and legitimate role for reservations to treaties, 
they note that some of the reservations that have been lodged would appear to give 
7 Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989, reproduced in UN Doc. ST/HRl/Rev.5 (Vol.I/Part 1) 
at 174. 
8 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1969, reproduced in UN Doc. ST/HR 1 /Rev.5 
~Vol.I/Part 1) at 20. 
It is interesting that no one has closely analysed the issue of reservations to these two Conventions 
from a feminist perspective. Especially as the comment has been made repeatedly that more 
reservations are made to the Women's Convention than any other human rights treaty and that a 
considerable number of incompatible reservations have been allowed to be made to them by their States 
parties. Unfortunately, such an analysis is outside the scope of this paper. See Clark, above n. 3; 
Cook, above n. '.3. Also see generally: H. Charlesworth, C. Chinkin, S. Wright, "Feminist 
Approaches to International Law" (1991) 85 American Journal of International Law 613; H. 
Charlesworth, "Worlds Apart: Public/Private Distinctions in International Law" in M. Thornton (ed) 
Public and Private: Feminist Legal Debates 1995; A. Byrnes, "Women, Feminism and International 
Human Rights Law - Methodological Myopia, Fundamental Laws or Meaningful Marginalisation" 
[ 1992] 12 Australian Yearbook of International Law 205; R. Cook, Human Rights of Women: 
National and International Perspectives 1994; J. Peters & A. Wolper (eds) Women's rights, Human 
righrs: International Feminist Perspectives 1995; D. Dallmeyer (ed) Reconceiving Reality: Women and 
{Wemmional Law Studies in Transnational Legal Policy No. 25, 1993, Part 2; Lijnzaad, above n. 3. 
See Report of this meeting in Effective Implementation of Human Rights Instruments, Report of 
the 4th Mtg. Of Chairpersons of the Human Rights Treaty Bodies, UN Doc. A/47/628, IO November 
1
1 (92 l hereinafter Effective lmplemen tat ion]. 
Ibid, at 12, para 36. 
I~ Ibid. 
11 Ibid. 
I~ I . bid. at 17, para 60. 
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rise to serious questions as to their compatibility with the object and purpose of the 
treaties in question. 15 
In 1994, pursuant to Article 40 of the ICCPR, 16 the Human Rights Committee, 
following up on the issues raised at the 1992 meeting, reported to the General 
Assembly its General Comment Number 24(52) on Issues Relating to-
Reservations Made Upon Ratification or Accession to the Treaty and to 
Declarations Made by States Under Article 41 of the Covenant (the 
Comment). 17 In it, the Committee comments on the application of the law of 
reservations to the ICCPR; sets out some examples of reservations that are 
likely to be incompatible with the ICCPR; explains the role States parties have 
in regulating reservations; and gives its opinion on the consequences of 
making an invalid reservation. The Comment is significant and controversial 
both because the Committee took it upon itself to comment on these issues 
and because of what it said about them. 18 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the Comment and to assess it against 
both the law of reservations and human rights policy considerations. 
Principally, it considers the development of the law of reservations and its 
underpinning principles; the meaning and application of the highly technical 
rules on reservations; the tension between the different policy goals that arise 
in the human rights context, i.e., the debate about the respective merits of 
universal participation in human rights treaties and preserving the integrity of 
such treaties; and the possibility for resolution of any of the difficulties 
associated with the law of reservations. 
Accordingly, Chapter 1 examines in some detail the development of the law of 
reservations. Chapter 2 looks at the Vienna Convention and international 
customary rules on reservations, examines the principal criticisms of these rules 
in their application to human rights treaties, and introduces some of the 
doctrinal issues that continue to be the subject of debate. Chapter 3 assesses 
the Comment from an international law and a policy perspective. The 
Comment has been criticised by some States and Chapter 3 appraises the 
worth of these criticisms. Finally, Chapter 4 looks at some of the most 
15 Ibid. 
16 
The roles of the Committee, including its functions under Article 40, are discussed below at pages 
49-5 I. 
17 
General comment 011 issues relating to reservations made upon ratification or accession to the 
Cm·enant or the Optional Protocols thereto, or in relation to declarations under article 41 of the 
Coi·e11a11t, UN GAOR, 50th Sess., Supp. No. 40, UN Doc. A/50/40. Note, Article 41 relates to inter-
State complaints 18 •. 
The Comment is discussed at some length in chapter 3 . 
...L. ........ In•d•i•ra•R--o.se•n•t-h<·tl--------~~~~~~~~~~~~--------------------3--------------
INTRODUCTION 
common suggestions for reform of the law and practice of reservations to 
human rights treaties and concludes by evaluating the likelihood of States 
agreeing to any of these proposals for change. 
4 
CHAPTER 1 - HISTORY OF THE LAW OF RESERVATIONS 
The Unanimity Rule 
The use of reservations can be traced back to the nineteenth century. 19 
Reservations were used sporadically until the 1899 and 1907 Hague 
Conventions on the Laws of War20 which attracted numerous reservations 
from a number of States,21 and marked the beginning of the extensive and 
continued use of reservations to multilateral treaties to which we are now 
accustomed. The growth in multilateral treaties and the concomitant increase 
in the use of reservations22 led, predictably enough, to a recognition of the 
need for rules to govern treaty making, including rules relating to the valid use 
of reservations.23 The unanimity rule or unanimous consent rule, was the first 
such rule to be articulated. Arising out of the Austrian 'reservations' to the 
1925 Opium Convention,24 the unanimity rule was in use (except in relation to 
the pan-American States)25 until the ICJ's Reservations Opinion in 1951.26 
This rule required the acceptance of a reservation by all the contracting parties 
for the reservation to be effective. If any contracting State objected to the 
reservation the reserving State would be excluded from the treaty unless it 
withdrew its reservation. The rule was inflexible and uncompromising. It was 
based on an analogy of treaties with the law of contract, which required an 
offer to be made by one party and an acceptance of that offer by another 
19 I. Sinclair, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (2nd ed.) 1984, at 54; For a history of 
reservations see Malkin, "Reservations to Multilateral Conventions" (1926) 7 British Yearbook of 
International Law 141; D. Miller, Reservations to Treaties 1919. 
20 29 July 1899, 187 Consolidated Treaty Series (CTS) 429; 18 October 1907 205 CTS 216. 
21 For a discussion of some early uses of reservations see Ruda, above n. 1. at 111-115; Horn, above 
n. I at 7-8. 
22 Several writers have commented on the reasons for the increased need for reservations. McNair, Law 
of Treaties (2nd ed.) 1961 at 168; Greig, above n. I at 46-47; Lijnzaad, above n. 3 at I 07-108; also 
ICJ Rep. 1951, 15 at 21-22. 
23 Several disputes which arose in relation to reservations to the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions, 
and to the Treaty of Versailles 1919 brought the issue to the fore. McNair, above n. 22 at 160-163; 
~orn above n. I, at 14-15; also Sinclair, above n. 19 at 54-55; Ruda, above n.I at I I l-115. 4 
McNair, above n. 22 at 162-163. 
25 See below at page 7. Note also that the unanimity rule still applies in relation to treaties that fall 
within the category described in Article 20(2) of the Vienna Convention which is set out below at n. 
160. 
26 
!CJ Rep. 1951, 15. Note that the practice of the depositary, who had previously applied the 
unanimity rule, changed when the General Assembly (GA) passed resolution 598 (VI) and asked the 
depositary to change his practice for the Genocide Convention and treaties concluded after 12 January 
1952. In relation to treaties concluded before this date, the depositary continued to apply the unanimity 
rule. Another GA Resolution ( 1452 B (XIV) on 7 December 1959, requested the depositary to cease to 
apply the unanimity rule and uniformly to apply the rule set out in the Reservations Opinion with 
some limited exceptions relating to treaties concluded under the auspices of the League of Nations. See 
Genera/ Practice of the Secretary-General as Deposita1y of Multilateral Treaties ST!LEG/8 1994 
!hereinafter Depositary Practice!, at 52-53; Ruda, above n. I at 111-115; also discussion below at 
pages 8-9 & n.40. 
CHAPTER 1 
party for the treaty to be valid.27 The unanimity rule viewed the making of a: 
reservation as a counter-offer and not as a form of acceptance of the original 
offer. It therefore required the express consent of every other party to the 
treaty. 
This application of the unanimity rule to reservations is an aspect of the 
unanimous consent rule that applied to the establishment of the text itself. 
Prior to World War One, treaty texts were adopted by unanimous consent 
rather than by majority or consensus.28 This meant that every State 
participating in the treaty negotiations gave its unqualified consent to be 
bound by the treaty. The introduction of majority vote to conclude treaties 
made it "necessary for certain States to make reservations."29 
While the unanimity rule was considered by many to have been a customary 
rule of international law for treaties,30 it did not enjoy universal acceptance as 
such. For example, the socialist States maintained the view that it was the 
right of every State to make reservations of any kind to any treaty and still 
become a party to that treaty. Such States believed that the objection or 
acceptance of a reservation by another State was irrelevant and could not 
interfere with the sovereign right of a State to join a treaty and to make 
reservations to it.31 
The pan-American Reservations Framework 
The regional grouping of American States (Pan-American States) applied a 
different set of rules. The 'pan-American' or 'flexibility' rule relating to the 
admissibility of reservations, although never formally adopted by the Pan-
American Union, was nonetheless relied upon by the Governing Board of the 
Union.32 It comprised three rules: 
27 See Raftopolous, E, The Inadequacy of the Contractual, Analogy in the Law of Treaties 1990 for a 
full discussion about the use of this analogy in treaty law. 
28S" l . bo me air, a ve n. 19, at 56; ICJ Rep. 1951, 15 at 22. 
29 ICJ Rep. 1951, 15 at 22, acknowledging that majority rule leads to an increased need for 
reservations. 
30
Horn, above n. 1, at 14-21; Sinclair, above n. 19, at 55; this rule as custom is discussed below at 
wges 10-12. 
1 
This view was rejected by the ICJ as extremist on the basis that it "could lead to a complete 
d~sregard of the object and purpose of the Convention." ICJ Rep. 1951, 15 at 24. However, it is a 
view that is still held, although not necessarily by the former socialist States. In its Report on the 
work of its 47th session ( 1995), the ILC reported that" [a] number of representatives ... pointed out 
that the right to make reservations and to become a party to multilateral treaties subject to reservations 
derived from the sovereign right of every State." Doc A/CN.4/472/ADD. 1, at 38; also Fitzmaurice, 
~ro~e n .. 1. at 10. 
Smclair, above n. 19 at 57; for a more detailed discussion of this reservations system see Ruda, 
above n. 1 at 115-133; Written Statement of the Organisation of American States, Pleadings, Oral 
Indira Rosenthal 
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(1) the treaty applies in the terms in which it was originally drafted between 
States with no reservations; 
(2) the treaty applies in the form modified by the reservations between the 
reserving States and States that accept the reservations; 
(3) the treaty is not in force between reserving States and States parties that 
do not accept the reservations. 
Like the unanimity rule, the 'flexibility system' involved only a subjective 
assessment by other States of the acceptability and admissibility of a State's 
reservation. The radical element in this system was in (3) above, which 
allowed a reserving State to join the treaty (in relation to States that accepted 
the reservation) provided at least one State accepted the reservation and 
despite any rejection of the reservation by other States. This meant that an 
objecting State could not affect the treaty relations between the reserving 
State and an accepting State. It also meant that two States parties to the same 
treaty might not have treaty relations with each other.33 Rule (2) above made 
it possible for a multilateral treaty to fragment into a series of bilateral 
agreements that might have very little in common with each other except the 
fact that they all emerged from the single instrument to which all the bilateral 
agreement parties are members.34 
The philosophical differences represented by the Soviet absolute sovereignty, 
unanimity and pan-American approaches to reservations, plus the difficulties 
with implementation of the unanimity rule, put pressure on the adherents of 
the rule.35 The rule was criticised for its failure to establish which States 
(treaty parties, signatories, other States entitled to join) were entitled to 
express a view about a reservation and the length of time required to establish 
that a State had tacitly accepted a reservation.36 It was also criticised on the 
ground that it gave a single State enormous power to veto a State's 
instrument of ratification or accession. These criticisms "received slowly but 
steadily a wider and wider endorsement"37 culminating in the General 
Assembly's request for an Advisory Opinion from the International Court of 
Justice on reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment 
of the Crime of Genocide 1948 (the Genocide Convention).38 
Arguments, Documents, Advisory Opinion on Reservations to the Genocide Convention [hereinafter 
Pleadings] at 15-20 11 . 
l.J Koh, above n. I, at 82; Horn above n. I, at 31. 
· Horn , ibid. 
15 Ibid, at 32. 
16 Ibid. 
17 !bid. 
18 
GA Res. I 6(Xl) 1950 of 16 November 1950; Conve11tio11 on the Preve111io11 and P1111is/1111e111 of 1he 
Indira Rosenthal 
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The International Court of Justice: Advisory Opinion on Reservations to the 
Genocide Convention 
The Genocide Convention contains no reservations provision.39 As 
depositary, the Secretary-General was faced with the prospect of determining 
-the number of States which had expressed their consent to be bound by the 
Genocide Convention in order to determine if the twenty ratification required 
for the Convention to enter into force had been received. Thus, the Secretary-
General needed to know if the ratifications with reservations that were the 
subject of objections were to count toward that twenty .40 In an attempt to 
resolve the matter in relation to the Genocide Convention, the General 
Assembly requested an advisory opinion from the International Court of 
Justice and, at the same time, requested that the International Law Commission 
(ILC) examine the question of reservations to multilateral treaties as a matter 
of urgency as part of its work on the codification of the law of treaties.41 The 
questions the General Assembly asked the Court were: 
In so far as concerns the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide in the event of a State ratifying or acceding to the Convention 
subject to a reservation made either in ratification or on accession, or on signature 
followed by ratification: 
I. Can the reserving State be regarded as being a party to the Convention 
while still maintaining its reservation if the reservation is objected to by 
one or more parties to the Convention but not by others? 
II. If the answer to Question I is in the affirmative, what is the effect of the 
reservation as between the reserving State and: 
(a) The parties which object to the reservation? 
(b) Those which accept it? 
III. What would be the legal effect as regards the answer to Question 1 if an 
objection to a reservation is made: 
(a) By a signatory which has not yet ratified? 
(b) By a State entitled to sign or accede but which has not yet done 
so?42 
Crime of Genocide 1948, reproduced in UN Doc. ST/HR/1/Rev.5 (Vol I/Part 2) at 673. [hereinafter the 
~enocid~ Convention]. 
McNatr reports that, although the Secretary-General had drawn the attention of the delegates to the 
issue of reservations, they did not include a provision dealing with reservations in the convention. 
~cNair, above n. 22 at 164 and his n. I; also £CJ Rep. 1951, 15 at 22. 
This history is well documented. See Rosenne, Developments, above n. I at 424-425; Horn, above 
~i I at 16-17; Depositary Practice, above n. 26 at 50-56. 
GA Res. I 6(Xl) 1950 of 16 November 1950; see [CJ Rep. 1951, 15 at 16; Horn above n.1 at his n. 
20. 
42 
ICJ Rep. 1951, 15 at 16. Note that question 3 is not discussed here. The Court's discussion of 
question 3 is at lCJ Rep. 1951, 15, at 27-29, and its answer at 29-30; it is also reproduced below at n. 
45. 
lndira Rosenthal 
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A large number of States submitted statements on these questions to the 
Court, which delivered its opinion in 1951.43 The Court was split 7 to 5 and 
the majority answered the above questions as follows. To question I, it 
answered: 
that a State which has made and maintained a reservation which has been s_bjected to 
by one or more of the parties to the Convention but not by others, can be regarded as 
being a party to the Convention if the reservation is compatible with the object and 
purpose of the Convention; otherwise the State cannot be regarded as being a party 
to the Convention. 44 
To question II the Court answered: 
(a) that if a party to the Convention objects to a reservation which it considers to 
be incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention, it can in fact 
consider that the reserving State is not a party to the Convention; 
(b) that if, on the other hand, a party accepts the reservation as being compatible 
with the object and purpose of the Convention, it can in fact consider that the 
reserving State is a party to the Convention.45 
The Court held that the unanimity rule was not a customary norm,46 and that, 
in relation to the Genocide Convention, "it is proper to refer to a variety of 
circumstances which would lead to a more flexible application"47 of the 
principle on which the unanimity rule was based, namely that no contracting 
party is entitled to frustrate or impair, by way of a reservation, the purpose of 
the treaty. 48 
The Court's answer to the first question gave a new test by which 
admissibility of reservations to the Convention were to be judged. "[T]he 
court, in effect, substituted for the requirement of the unanimous consent to a 
reservation the requirement that it must be 'compatible with the object and 
purpose of the Convention"'.49 The Court justified this new approach on the 
43 For example, the Organisation of American States, Soviet Union, Jordan, USA, & UK. See 
Pleadings, above n. 32 at 15-76. 
44 ICJ Rep. 1951, 15, 29. 
45
Ibid. To question III, the majority answered: 
{a) that an objection to a reservation made by a signatory State which has not yet ratified the 
Convention can have the legal effect indicated in the reply to Question I only upon ratification. 
Until that moment it merely serves as a notice to the other State of the eventual attitude of the 
signatory State; 
{b) that an objection to a reservation made by a State which is entitled to sign or accede but 
which has not yet done so, is without legal effect. 
Ibid, at 15 46 . 
ICJ Rep. 1951, 15 at 24. It referred to the existence of other views (Soviet) and practices (pan-
~merican) on reservations to support this claim, ibid, at 24; Compare Fitzmaurice. He said: ''The 
view embodied in this [unanimity] rule is both traditional and has the entire weight of previous 
~qternational authority behind it'', above n. I at I I. 
ICJ Rep. 1951, 15 at 21. These circumstances are found in the origin and character of the Genocide 
~onvention as a humanitarian treaty, ibid, at 23. 
49 ICJRep.1951, 15at23. 
McNair, above n. 22 at 166. 
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basis of the Genocide Convention's "special characteristics"50 which, in the 
Court's view, derived from the Convention's object (the protection of 
humanitarian rights) and from the intention of the negotiating parties that the 
Convention be universal in nature and attract a "very wide degree of 
participation" .51 It was cognisant of the fact that the Convention, a:s.,.a 
humanitarian multilateral treaty required a sufficiently flexible reservations 
regime to encourage maximum participation, but not at the expense of the 
integrity of the adopted text. The object and purpose test was an attempt to 
effect a compromise between these objectives and to balance the competing 
interests of the treaty parties.52 
Under the new test, the object and purpose of the Convention limited both 
the making of, and the objecting to, a reservation.53 An objecting State could 
not exclude the reserving State from the treaty altogether. Rather, it could 
only prevent the treaty coming into force between itself and the reserving 
State, and then only on the basis of a new, and apparently objective, criterion, 
compatibility.54 Thus, a State now had to justify the withholding of its 
consent according to the object and purpose test, an "external standard" ,55 if 
it wished to prevent the treaty coming into force between itself and the 
reserving State. The Court did accept that States might object to reservations 
on grounds other than incompatibility.56 However, according to the ICJ, 
objections on this ground would not result in the exclusion of treaty relations 
between the two States. Instead, it would result in the treaty coming into 
force between the reserving and objecting States except for the clauses 
affected by the reservation. 57 
Two dissenting opinions were given on the questions asked by the General 
Assembly, one by Judge Alvarez58 and a joint dissenting opinion by Vice-
50 ICJ Rep. 1951, 15 at 23. 
51 
The Court linked the intention of the parties that the Convention be universal in scope to its 
characterisation of the Convention as special because of its humanitarian aims. For the Court, the 
parties had clearly intended that the Convention would be universal because in order to "liberate 
mankind from such an odious scourge"(Preamble to Genocide Convention ) condemnation of, and 
cooperation to eliminate, it had to be undertaken on a universal scale. ICJ Rep. 1951, 15 at 21 & 23; 
~vkNair, above n. 22 at 167. ~~ A discussion of the tension between these two objectives is below at pages 15-17. 
54 ICJ Rep. 1951, 15 at 24; McNair above n. 22 at 176. 
The Court said that " ... compatibility of a reservation with the object and purpose of the Convention 
··· must furnish the criterion for the attitude of a State making the reservation ... as well as for the 
~t~pra1sal by a State in objecting to the reservation." ICJ Rep. 195 l, 15 at 24. 
56 
Koh, above n. l at 87. 
51 ICJ Rep. 1951, 15 at 27. 
58 ICJ Rep. 1951, 15 at 27 . 
. ICJ Rep. 1951, 15 at49. 
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President Guerrero and Judges McNair, Read and Hsu Mo.59 All the dissenters 
criticised the majority opinion and the new compatibility 'rule'. They argued 
that the unanimity rule did represent a rule of customary international law and 
much of their opinion is devoted to demonstrating this point.60 The joint 
dissenters criticised the new rule on the ground that "it was fundam~ntally 
subjective and uncertain in its application and would prove to be unworkable 
in practice".61 They did not think that there was any justification for 
believing that the drafting States had agreed that "object" and "purpose" 
was the correct measure for determining admissibility of reservations to the 
Convention. Nor did they believe that there was any evidence in legal or 
State practice to support the distinction, made by the majority, between 
compatible and incompatible reservations.62 The joint dissent predicted63 that, 
despite the fact that both the General Assembly and the majority sought to 
confine the Opinion to the Genocide Convention, the Opinion would have a 
wider effect than the provision of advice to the General Assembly on 
reservations to the Genocide Convention.64 
Significantly, the joint dissenters also discussed the importance of preserving 
the integrity of the Convention and saw the majority's answer to Question II 
as potentially undermining this integrity. As the majority's Opinion has 
become the basis of the existing reservations regime, and because analysis and 
criticism of the regime is often based on the perception that the regime 
encourages reservations at the expense of the treaty objectives and integrity, 
it is worth while setting out in some detail what the joint dissenters said on 
this point. After asserting that, in their opinion, the integrity of the 
Convention is more important than universal membership, the joint dissent 
continued: 
While it is undoubtedly true that the representatives of the governments, in drafting 
and adopting the Genocide Convention, wished to see as many States become 
parties to it as possible, it was certainly not their intention to achieve universality at 
59 
ICJ Rep. 1951, 15 at 31. 
60 
ICJ Rep. 1951, 15 at 32-42 (joint dissent) & 49-55 (opinion of Alvarez J); Redgwell, "Universality" 
above n. I, at 251-253. She points out that this view was shared by others, particularly Fitzmaurice, 
above n. I & n. 46; Brierly, whose view was expressed in the ILC Reports for which he was Special 
Rapporteur. See Brierly's first and second reports in 1951 Yearbook of the International Law 
Commission Vol. II, UN Doc. NCN.4/Ser. A/1951/Add.l/41 & UN Doc. AfCN.4/Ser. 
~1951/Add.l/43. 
62 ICJ Rep. 1951, 15 at 44; Sinclair, above n. 19 at 58; Lijnzaad, above n. 3 at 23-26. 
61 ICJ Rep. 1951, 15 at 42 . 
. ICJ Rep. 1951, 15 at 31. While the joint dissenting opinion was not expressed as a prediction, this 
aspect __ of their opinion, and many of their criticisms of the majority opinion have proved to be true. 
;hee L_1Jnzaad, above_ n. 3 at 24; discussion below of the application of the Opinion and its successor, 
64e Vienna Convention reservations rules, at Chapter 2. 
ICJ Rep. 1951, 15 at 47. 
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any price ... It is therefore not universality at any price that forms the first 
consideration. It is rather the acceptance of common obligations - keeping step with 
like-minded States - in order to attain a high objective for all humanity, that is of 
paramount importance. Such being the case, the conclusion is irresistible that it is 
necessary to apply to the Genocide Convention with even greater exactitude than 
ever the existing rule which requires consent of all parties to any reservation to a 
multilateral convention. In the interests of the international community, it~ould be 
better to lose as a party to the Convention a State which insists in the face of 
objections on a modification of the terms of the Convention, than to permit it to 
become a party against the wish of a State or States which have irrevocably and 
unconditionally accepted all the obligations of the Convention.65 
Thus, the joint dissenters concluded that the special nature of the Convention 
as a humanitarian treaty, rather than requiring a new rule regarding the 
admissibility of reservations, required a strict application of the prevailing 
rules, that is, the unanimity rule.66 
Although the Court "decided that classic rules derived from the law of 
contract could not easily be applied in the multilateral treaty context",67 it 
affirmed the contractual basis of the law of treaties.68 The need for offer and 
acceptance remained a feature of treaty making but a State could no longer 
exclude another State69 by rejecting a counter offer, or reservation, if other 
treaty parties accepted that counter offer. Thus, the Court upheld the 
fundamental norm that a State cannot be bound by a treaty provision 
(including a provision modified by a reservation) without its consent. 
Moreover, it introduced greater flexibility by allowing a State to determine, in 
accordance with the object and purpose test, whether it considers a reserving 
State to be a party to the treaty vis a vis itself, that is, whether to give its 
consent. In this way, as Koh observes, the Court sought "to reconcile the 
subjective demands of classical treaty doctrine with its new objective 
element.". 10 
65 Ibid. 
66 L .. IJnzaad, above n. 3 at 25; Koh, above n. 1 at 87-88; see discussion on universality below at pages 
15-17. 
67 
ICJ Rep 1951, 15 at 21; Schabas, "Reservations to Human Rights Treaties: Time for Innovation 
and Reform" (1994) 32 Canadian Yearbook of International Law 39, [hereinafter "Reservations 
Reform"] at 45. The Opinion "gives expression to the view, which was [at the time of the Opinion] 
gaining ground, that the principle of unanimous consent to reservations is not well-suited to the 
requirements of international intercourse characterised by multilateral conventions of a general character, 
and that it is impracticable and unwarranted to give one State ... the right to prevent another State from 
becoming a party to a treaty .... " R. Jennings & A Watts (eds), Oppenheim 's /11ternatio11al Law Vol I 
~~th ed) 1992 [hereinafter Oppenheim] at 1245. 
69 
ICJ Rep. 1951, 15 at 21. 
70 Except in relation to itself and then only if it objected on the ground of incompatibility. 
Koh, above n. I at 86. 
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The majority Opinion was a significant departure from the unanimity rule, 
although it shared some features with the pan-American system. It introduced 
a "purposive" element to the previously solely 'subjective' view of treaties 
and reservations.71 However, as we shall see,72 the objective restriction that a 
reservation be compatible with the object and purpose of the treaty i§ 
essentially subjective, as all three terms (object, purpose, compatibility) are to 
be subjectively, and consequently variously, defined by States parties.73 This 
is partly because of the difficulty in definitively determining the object and 
purpose of a treaty or which provisions of a treaty are essential to the 
fulfilment of its object and purpose, and partly because of the absence of any 
supra and authoritative body able to determine objectively the compatibility 
of any reservation to the relevant treaty. This is a fundamental problem of the 
decentralised international order. Nonetheless, it remains entirely a matter for 
the State parties (reserving, objecting and accepting) to determine, with little 
or no guidance, what the object and purpose test requires. 
The Genocide Convention is a single issue human rights treaty, whose object 
and purpose, "the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide",74 is 
relatively easily identifiable, and as such it contrasts sharply with the more 
common "multi-purpose" human rights treaties.75 Therefore, it is not entirely 
comparable to these other human rights treaties. Nonetheless, the impact of 
the Opinion on the law of treaties and on the law of reservations to human 
rights treaties cannot be underestimated. As the joint dissenting opinion 
warned, the Advisory Opinion has had a wider effect than was originally 
intended.76 It "must be considered as having a distinct bearing on the general 
rules of customary international law relating to reservations"77 and is the basis 
from which much of the principles relating to reservations in the Vienna 
Convention derive.78 
71 
This shift from a purely subjective rule, where States decide for themselves whether to accept 
reservations, to the objective test, albeit with subjective elements, devised by the Court, is discussed 
below at Chapter 2. 
72 Ibid. 
n Ibid. 
7~ 
Genocide Convention, above n. 39, Article I states: 
"[t]he Contracting Parties confirm that genocide ... is a crime under international law which they 
¥~dertake to prevent and punish." 
76 For example, the ICCPR, above n. 8. 
77 ICJ Rep. 1951, 15 at 31. 
78 Ot>/>enheim, above n. 67 at 1245. 
Principally Articles 19 -21 of the Vienna Convention, above n. 2. 
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The Universality v. Integrity Dilemma 
The compatibility test was devised in an attempt to introduce an element of 
flexibility into the rules for making reservations. The ICJ believed that the 
unanimity rule was not flexible enough to accommodate the new universalist 
aspirations of UN contracting parties. However, it was mindful that allowing 
States to make any reservations they wished would present a real threat to the 
integrity of the treaty, to its raison d'etre. 79 The view held by the Court, and 
by many others since, was that allowing reservations to be made favoured 
universality, while limiting or prohibiting the making of reservations protected 
the integrity of the treaty by avoiding subsequent, and possibly numerous, 
modifications of the text. The new test was supposed to strike a balance 
between these aims, between the competing interests of reserving and non 
reserving States parties. However, as we shall see,80 there is a considerable 
body of opinion which holds that the Court's compatibility/flexibility test 
dismally fails to achieve any balance between universality and integrity. 
There are two main points to be made in relation to the presumption in the test 
that flexible reservations systems encourage ratifications. The first relates to 
what is meant by 'universality'. Lijnzaad states that the "assumption of the 
universality of human rights is inspired by the conviction that these rights 
should be available for all. To ensure this, human rights instruments should be 
binding at a global level."81 Hence the ICJ's conclusion that, because the 
contracting parties intended the Convention "to condemn and punish 
genocide 'as a crime under international law"',82 their correlative intention 
was that the Convention "be definitely universal in scope".83 However, 
Lijnzaad asserts that assuming that global adherence to human rights treaties 
would lead to universal protection of human rights is naive.84 She 
distinguishes between formal and substantive universality and concludes that 
"the desire for human rights to be available for all would seem to stretch well 
7'I The Court said that the "contracting parties [to the Genocide Convention could not] have intended to 
sacrifice the very object of the Convention in favour of a vain desire to secure as many participants as 
possible." ICJ Rep. 1951, 15 at 24. Acknowledging that the origin of the Convention was a desire to 
·~condemn and punish genocide" the Court identified two principles underlying this original aim. The 
first was that the principles "underlying the Convention are principles which are recognized by civilized 
nations as binding on States, even without any conventional obligation." The second is the "universal 
character both of the condemnation of genocide and of the co-operation required 'in order to liberate 
!~~ankin? fro~ such an odious scourge"'. !CJ Rep 1951, 15 at 23. 
See d1scuss1on below at Chapter 2. 
:: Lijnzaad, above n. 3 at 104 . 
• 
·, ICJ Rep. 1951, 15 at 23. 
· Ibid. 
"'Lijnzaad, above n. 3 at 104. 
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beyond the simple adherence to a human rights treaty",85 beyond formal 
universality. It requires substantive universality; that is "integral 
acceptance"86 of the treaty as well as "global adherence."87 Not only does a 
flexible reservations framework fail to achieve integral acceptance of a treaty, 
it probably prevents it by encouraging fragmentation of the treaty relations 
and obligations. Lijnzaad states: 
Both requirements of the broader concept of universality ... conflict with the basic 
premises of the law of treaties, the fact that states can only be bound by what they 
explicitly agree to. This is grecisely were [sic] the quest for universality and the 
issue of reservations meet. 
The second issue relates to the claim that reservations actually increase 
ratifications. As the argument that reservations encourage participation was 
the justification for abandoning the unanimity rule it is important to test the 
veracity of this claim. Horn 89 states that the "propagators90 of the universality 
argument have never tried to prove the tenability of their assertions."91 In 
fact, some members of the Pan-American grouping92 were critical of the pan-
American reservations regime because they believed that Pan-American 
conventions had not enjoyed a wider participation despite the 'liberal' 
regime.93 Likewise, in the UN system, Lijnzaad reports that the figures of 
ratifications of UN treaties reveal that "adherence is far from universal"94 
notwithstanding the liberal reservations regime. 95 In any event, by the time 
the Court gave its Opinion, the belief about the role reservations play in 
encouraging ratifications was well on the way to being treated as axiomatic. 
X5 Ibid. 
x
6 Ibid at 105. 
X? Ibid. 
xx Ibid. 
xy Horn, above n. l at 24-28. 
YO F 
or example, the socialist and Afro-Asian States who believe that "all States should have the right to 
~articipate in conventions creating norms of general international law and which were therefore of 
~~terest to the whole of international society." Horn, ibid at 26. 
Ibid, at 27. 
lf2 . 
Brazil, Panama and Mexico· Horn ibid 
93 Ibid. ' ' . 
::: Lijnzaad, above n. 3 at I 06. 
· See also Clark, above n. 3 at 282-283 & 316; Horn also asserts that under the unanimity test, 
~elteve.d t~ have favoured preservation of the integrity of the treaty at the expense of ratifications, very 
ew 0 bJect1ons to reservations were made. Horn, above n. I at 24. 
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Reports of the International Law Commission on the Law of Reservations 
In response to the 1950 General Assembly resolution,96 the ILC reported to 
the General Assembly in 1951 soon after the Court had given its Advisory 
Opinion. The Commission reported that: 
in the absence of contrary provisions in any multilateral convention ... [a] State 
which tenders a ratification or acceptance with a reservation may become a party to 
the convention only in the absence of objection by any other State, which, at the time 
the tender is made, has signed, or ratified ... 97 
The Commission, like the dissenters and other critics, 98 believed that the new 
test formulated by the majority of the ICJ was too subjective and ill-defined, 
and so was unsuitable for application to multilateral treaties generally .99 For 
example, the ILC believed that it was reasonable to assume that parties to a 
treaty generally regard the treaty as a whole, with each provision an integral 
part of that whole. 100 On this basis a reservation to any provision may 
undermine the object and purpose of the treaty. The Commission 
recommended a return to the traditional or unanimous consent rule. 101 The 
ILC was concerned that the subjective application of the compatibility test 
would result in confusion about the status of treaty relations between 
reserving States and other States, both accepting and objecting. It might also 
lead to questions about the status of ratification or accession instruments to 
which a reservation had been attached for the purposes of determining if the 
instrument should count towards the number of such instruments required to 
bring the convention into force. 102 
"Faced with these two mutually contradictory opinions, both emanating from 
highly authoritative organs, ... the General Assembly found itself in something 
of a quandary." 103 It accepted the Court's Opinion in relation to the 
Genocide Convention and decided to alter UN practice so that the rule from 
the Opinion applied to future treaties concluded under the auspices of the UN 
96 
GA Res. 16(XI) 1950 of 16 November 1950. 
97 
Yearbook of the International Law Commission, ( 1951-II), reproduced in Rosenne, Developments, 
~fove n. I at 428-429; Sinclair, above n.19 at 58-59. 
For example, Fitzmaurice, above n. I. 
99 s· 1 . 
me air, above n. 19 at 58-59. 
ioo Ibid. 
\(}\ 
The ILC also recommended some minor amendments to the unanimous consent rule. See 
X/~arb_ook of the International Law Commission, ( 1951-II), 130-1. 
Ibid; McNair, above n. 22 at 59; This question arose in the context of the Inter-American 
Convention on Human Rights 1969, reproduced in ( 1970) 9 ILM 673. The Inter-American Court of 
~uman Rights gave an advisory opinion on the matter. See Effect of Reservations on the Entry illfo 
1-orce of"the American Convention, OC-2/82 ( 1982) 22 ILM 37 [hereinafter American Reservations 
8~inion I; a brief discussion of this Opinion is below at pages 22-23. 
Rosenne, Developments, above n. 1 at 429. 
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and for which the Secretary-General was depositary. 104 The depositary was to 
continue to apply the unanimity rule to all other treaties. 105 In relation to the 
new test, the depositary was requested not to judge the legal effect of such 
instruments, but to communicate them to States and leave States to draw their 
own legal conclusions from these communications. 106 
Between 1951 and 1966 the Commission examined the question of 
reservations in its work on the codification of the law of treaties and 
developed a series of draft articles that could be adopted as a convention on 
treaties. 107 In this period the Commission gradually changed its position and 
moved away from its support for the unanimity rule and began to endorse the 
principles enunciated in the Advisory Opinion. 108 The result of this gradual 
change of approach is seen in the provisions of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties 1969 which was adopted by a Conference of over 100 
States109 on the basis of the draft text proposed by the Commission in its 1966 
Report. 110 
Rosenne111 comments that: 
If the current law as finally formulated in the Vienna Conventions contains a highly 
subjective element not itself given to much in the way of third-party control for the 
104 GA Res. 598 (VI), 12 January 1952; Depositary Practice, above n. 26, at 53 and accompanying 
text. 
105 Ibid; Rosenne, Developments, above n. 1at430; Depositary Practice, above n. 26 at 52 and 
accompanying text. 
106 Sinclair, above n.19 at 59; GA Res 598 (VI) of 12 January 1952; Depositary Practice, above n. 26 
at 53 and accompanying text. 
107 See Yearbooks of the International Law Commission, 1951 (Vol II, Docs. A/CN.4/Ser. A/1951141 
& 43) (the "Brierly" Reports), 1953 (Vol II, Doc. A/CN.4/Ser. A/1953/Add. 1) & 1954 (Vol II, Doc. 
A/CN.4/Ser. A/1954/ Add.1/87) (the "Lauterpacht" Reports), 1956 (Vol II, Doc.A/CN.4/101), 1957 
(Vol II, Doc.A/CN.4/107), 1958 (Vol II, Doc.A/CN.4/115), 1959 (Vol II, Doc.A/CN.4/120), & 1960 
(Vol II, Doc. A/CN.4/130) (the "Fitzmaurice" Reports) and 1962 (Vol II, Doc.A/CN.4/44), 1963 (Vol 
II, Doc. A/CN.4/156), 1964 (Vol II, Doc.A/CN.4/167), 1965 (Vol II, Doc. A/CN.4/177) (the 
"Waldock" Reports), 1965 (Vol II) & 1966 (Vol II) (Report of the ILC to UNGA, hereinafter the "ILC 
~~ort"); also Raftopolous, above n. 27 at 220-238; Horn, above n. 1. 
1 
For a description of the evolution of the work of the ILC on reservations see Ruda, above n. l at 
156-179; D. Hylton, "Default Breakdown: The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties' Inadequate 
Framework on Reservations" (1994) 27 Vanderbilt Journal of International Law 419 at 424-429; "First 
Report on the Law and Practice Relating to Reservations to Treaties", Preliminary Report by Alain 
Pellet, Special Rapporteur, UN Doc. A/CN.4/470 & Corr. I, at 7-21. [hereinafter SR Preliminary 
Reoort]. 
I 09', 
For a summary of the background to the Conference see Sinclair, ( 1970) 19 International 
Comparative Law Quarterly 50 ; for a description of the conference itself see Rosenne, Developments 
?R?ve n. I at 364-390; Oppenheim above n. 67 at 1198, their n. 4. 
The Vienna Convention regime on reservations is discussed in Chapter 2. Vienna Convention on 
the Succession of States in respect of Treaties 1978 (( 1978) 14 ILM 1478 ) and the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties Between States and International Organisations or Between International 
Organisations 1986 ((1986) 25 ILM 543) are based on work of the ILC. The Conventions have similar 
reserv.ati~ns provisions. The 1986 Convention designates agreements between States and international 
W¥anisat1ons as "treaties"; Oppenheim, above n. 67 at 1198. 
Rosenne, Developments, above n.1. 
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purposes of dispute-settlement, it remains nevertheless a fact that since l ?52 the 
question of reservations to multilateral conventions, and the related question of the 
legal nature and charaterization of the functions of the depositary ... have both 
ceased to be sources of irritation and annoyance in the conduct of international 
affairs. That is worth more than any contribution to legal theory that can be found in 
the Vienna Conventions and their antecedents. 112 
This statement reflects Rosenne' s sympathy for the view that the problem of 
reservations to multilateral treaties lay in the issue of the duties of the 
depositary rather than in the issue of admissibility. 113 While it might be true 
that developments in the law of reservations may have avoided "annoyance", 
this should not obscure the basic issue of whether the compromise between 
integrity and universalism, struck in the Reservations Opinion and later in the 
Vienna Convention, is successful. In fact, the remainder of this paper reveals 
that it has not been successful and that consequently, "irritation" with the 
unresolved issues relating to the admissibility of reservations is flourishing. 
To complete the scene in which the Vienna Convention rules on reservations 
operate, it is useful to examine the reservations practice under the European 
and Inter-American Conventions on Human Rights. 114 Such examination is 
also important because these regional human rights regimes provide the only 
examples of judicial consideration, in both contentious and advisory 
capacities, of the admissibility of reservations to human rights treaties since the 
Reservations Opinion. 
The Regional Human Rights Regimes 
A: Reservations Under the European Convention on Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms 
While the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 was being 
concluded in the UN, steps were being taken in Europe to establish a regional 
body and a human rights charter. 115 In 1950 the European Convention on 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms was concluded. 116 It has its own 
reservations provision, Article 64, which provides: 
112 Ib"d I , at 434-435. 
113 Ib"d I , at 430. 
114 
For a brief discussion of the reservations regime under the African Charter on Human and Peoples' 
Rights see Susan Marks, "Three Regional Human Rights Treaties and their Experience of 
~~servations" [hereinafter "Regional Treaties"] in Gardner above n. 3 at 60. 
· P. van Dijk & G.J.H. van Hoof, Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human 
~ir,hts (2nd ed) 1990 at I. 
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 213 UN Treaty Series 221 
I hereinafter the European Convention]. It entered into force on 3 September 1953. The Convention 
provides for two principal organs to supervise implementation of Convention obligations by States 
parties: the European Commission of Human Rights and the European Court on Human Rights which 
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1. Any State may, when signing this Convention or when depositing its instrument 
of ratification, make a reservation in respect of any particular provision of the 
Convention to the extent that any law then in force in its territory is not in 
conformity with the provision. Reservations of a general character shall not be 
permitted under this Article. 
2. Any reservation made under this Article shall contain a brief statement of the law 
concerned. 
In the recent decisions of Temeltasch v Switzerland, 111 Belilos v 
Switzerland, 118 Weber v Switzerland119 and Chorherr v Austria, 120 the 
respondent States sought to rely on their statements made upon joining to 
avoid scrutiny of the alleged breaches of the Convention. In each case, the 
applicant challenged the validity of these statements. In Temeltasch and 
Belilos it was necessary first to determine the status of the Swiss statements. 
At the time of its ratification of the Convention the Swiss made two 
are established by Article 19. The Committee of Ministers and the Secretary-General of the Council of 
Europe also participate in the supervision of the Convention. However, neither is established by the 
Convention, but rather under Articles 13-21 of the Statute of the Council of Europe. For its role under 
the European Convention see Article 32 of the Convention. The principal role of the Secretary-General 
is given by Article 57 of the Convention. Under this Article, the Secretary-General may request 
information from States parties on their implementation of the Convention. For a detailed discussion 
of the role of these two bodies, see P. van Dijk above n. 115 at 191-204 & 207-209. Any State party 
may refer alleged breaches of, or non-compliance with, the Convention by another party to the 
Commission (Article 24). Article 25 allows the Commission to receive complaints from individuals, 
non-government organisations or groups of individuals who are victims of the violation alleged in the 
petition. This power is subject to the defendant State having accepted the Commission's competence 
to receive such petitions. The Commission must first consider the admissibility of the petition and, if 
admissible, investigate the complaint. If a friendly settlement of the complaint is reached (Article 
28(l)(b), the Commission reports the facts and the solution to the States concerned, the Committee of 
Ministers and the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe (Article 30). If no solution is reached, the 
Committee still reports on the facts to the above, but also states whether, in its opinion, the facts 
disclose a violation of the Convention (Article 31 ). It may also make any proposals it wishes. See van 
Dijk for a detailed discussion of the procedure before the European Commission, above n. 115 at 61-
118. Note that, if the question in issue is not referred to the Court within three months, the 
Committee of Ministers must decide by majority whether there has been a violation of the Convention. 
It may also prescribe measures which the Contracting Party that is the subject of a complaint must 
take within a prescribed period (Article 32). In the latter case, the matter may be referred to the 
European Court. Only the Commission, a State of which the author of the petition is a national, a 
State which referred the matter to the Commission or a State against which the complaint has been 
made, can bring the case before the Court (Article 48). The Court can only deal with a complaint if the 
allegedly violating State has accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court under Article 46, or if it 
accepts ad hoc the Court's jurisdiction. Importantly, the decision of the Court is binding on the parties 
(Article 53). In certain circumstances, the Court may "afford just satisfaction to the injured party" 
(Article 50). On the European Convention see van Dijk, ibid, generally; H. Bourguignon, "The 
Belilos Case: New Light on Reservations to Multilateral Treaties" ( 1989) 29 Virginia Journal of 
International Law 348; J. Frowein, "Reservations to the European Convention on Human Rights", in 
Matscher & Petzold (eds) Protecting Human Rights: The European Dimension, Studies in Honour of 
Gerard J. Wiarda 1988; S. Marks, "Civil Liberties at the Margin: The UK Derogation and the European 
Convention on Human Rights" ( 1995) 15 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 69 [hereinafter "Civil 
Liberties"] I 17 . 
Temeltasch v Switzerland European Commission of Human Rights, 5 May 1982, 5 EHRR 417 
\?~reinafter Temeltasch]. 
Belilos v Switzerland European Court of Human Rights, 29 April 1988, 10 EHRR 466 [hereinafter 
Be/i los J. 
llCJ 
120 Weber v Switzerland ( 1990) ECHR Ser. A, No. 177. 
Chorherr v Austria ( 1993) ECHR Ser. A, No. 266-B. 
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reservations and two interpretative declarations. The interpretative 
declarations related to Article 6(3 )( c) and ( e) (rights to free legal assistance 
and free assistance of an interpreter), which was in issue in Temeltasch, and 
Article 6(1) (right to a fair hearing)121 which was in issue in Belilos. The 
applicants argued that, because Switzerland had described these sta~ments as 
interpretative declarations, it could not rely on them as reservations to shield it 
from a finding that it was in breach of the Convention. The European 
Commission and Court disagreed and found that these 'declarations' were 
reservations. 122 They accepted the Vienna Convention definition of 
'reservation' in Article 2(l)(d). 123 In Belilos, the Court said "[i]n order to 
establish the legal character of such a declaration, one must look behind the 
title given to it and seek to determine the substantive content." 124 It 
concluded that evidence of Switzerland's intentions at the time of its 
ratification, revealed that it intended to exclude certain interpretations of the 
relevant articles. 125 
None of these cases presented a real challenge to the competence of the 
European Commission or Court to judge the validity of reservations, 126 but in 
Temeltasch and Belilos the Commission took the opportunity to confirm this 
competence. It found that it had such competence by virtue of " the very 
system of the Convention itself'. 127 The Court in Belilos also found that its 
competence was derived from the Convention, in particular Articles 45, 128 
49 129 and 19,130 and from the Court's case law. 131 
In Belilos and Temeltasch, and later in Weber and Chorherr, the focus was 
on the issue of the admissibility of the reservations. Admissibility had to be 
determined in accordance with Article 64. Article 64 makes no mention of 
compatibility with the object and purpose of the Convention. Rather, it 
121 Article 6(1) provides: 
In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, 
everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and 
122 impartial tribunal established by law ... 
123 Temeltasch above n. 117 at 434, para 82; Belilos above n. 118 at 483, para 49. 
See above at n.2 for the text of this Article. I 24 . 
Beltlos, above n. 1I8 at 483, para 50. 125 
Temeltasch, above n. 117 at 433-434, paras 75-81; Belilos, ibid. Greig criticises this aspect of the 
~~~gement. See Greig, above n. l at 33 for example. 
127 Marks, "Regional Treaties" above n.114, at 41. 
128 Temeltasch, above n.117 at 431, para 65, and generally at 430-431, paras 59- 67. 
129 Establishes jurisdiction of the Court in relation to interpretation and application of the Convention. 
States: "In the event of a dispute as to whether the Court has jurisdiction, the matter shall be settled 
P~i the decision of the Court." Article 49, European Convention above n. 116. 
1 ~ 1 Establishes the supervisory organs, the Commission and the Court. 
Belilos, above n. 118 at 483, para 49. 
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requires compliance with formal conditions. 132 Reservations must be specific 
and they must state the relevant domestic law that requires the reservation. In 
these cases the European Commission and Court found the 'reservations' 
failed to comply with the Article 64 requirements. 
In Temeltasch, the Commission found that the Swiss reservation did iiot fulfil 
the requirement in Article 64(2) as it did not contain a brief statement of the 
law concerned. However, the Commission also found that the lack of 
compliance with Article 64 was not fatal to Switzerland's 'reservation' which 
was held to be effective. 133 By contrast, the European Court held in Belilos 
that Switzerland's 'reservation' to Article 6(1) breached Article 64 as it was of 
a "general character"134 and failed to state the law concerned. 135 The Court 
concluded that the reservation was invalid. The Court then held that it was 
"beyond doubt that Switzerland is, and regards itself as, bound by the 
Convention irrespective of the validity of the declaration."136 For this reason 
the Court effectively treated the Swiss declaration as severable; severed it 
from its instrument of ratification; and held that Switzerland had violated 
Article 6(1). 137 
132 
Article 64 is unique in this regard. 
133 7' l 
, eme tasch, above n. 117 at 437, para 92. 
1348["[ e 1 os, above n. 118 at 485, para 55. 
135 Ib"d 1 , at 487, para 60. 136 Ibid. 
137 Ib"d 
1 • at 491, para 73. For a further discussion of these cases see Marks, "Regional Treaties", above 
n .. 114; S. Marks "Reservations Unhinged: The Belilos Case Before the European Court of Human 
Rights", (1990) 39 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 300; Lijnzaad, above n. 3 at 112-121; 
van Dijk, above n. 116 at 606-615; H. Bourguignon, above n.116; Greig, above n. I at 31-34; I. 
Cameron & F. Horn, "Reservations to the European Convention on Human Rights" (1990) 33 German 
Yearbook of International Law, 69; P. H. Imbert, 'Temeltasch and the Strasbourg Commission", 
~bove n.3. On reservations and the European Convention generally see R. St. J. MacDonald, 
Reservations under the European Convention on Human Rights" ( 1988) 21 Revue de Beige de Droit 
;.tem~tional 4~9; Ma~ks, "Civil Liberties" above n. 116; P.H. Imbert, "Reservations and Human 
l~ghts Conv~nt1ons", m I. Maier (ed) Protection of Human Rights in Europe: Limits and Effects 
82; Frowem, above n. I 16. 
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B: Reservations Under the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights138 
Unlike the European Court, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has 
competence to give advisory opinions on the interpretation of the 
Convention, 139 and it is in this context that it has considered the adm~sibility 
of reservations. The American Convention has a reservations provision, but it 
merely refers to the Vienna Convention as the benchmark for valid 
reservations. Article 75 states: "This Convention shall be subject to 
reservations only in conformity with the provisions of the Vienna Convention 
" 
The Inter-American Court has given two advisory opinions on reservations. 
The first concerned the effect of reservations on the entry into force of the 
Convention. 140 In this case the Court discussed the application of the Vienna 
Convention rules to the American Convention, in particular the 12 month tacit 
consent rule in Article 20(5). 141 The Court was asked whether a ratification 
with a reservation only became effective once the 12 month period for 
objection had expired. The issue was important as the requisite number of 
138 American Convention on Human Rights 1969, (1970) 9 ILM 673. The American Convention 
establishes a Commission and a Court with competence to hear matters relating to implementation of 
the Convention by member States (Article 33). The Commission may receive complaints from 
individuals in respect of violations of the Convention (Article 44). Once the petition has been 
determined admissible by the Commission (Articles 46 and 47 set out requirements for admissibility), 
it investigates the complaint and attempts a friendly solution of the matter (Article 48). If successful, 
the Commission reports to the States concerned and to the other States parties, as well as to the 
Secretary General of the Organisation of American States (Article 49). If unsuccessful, the 
Commission reports to the concerned States with any recommendations that the Commission wishes 
to make (Article 50). If neither the parties nor the Commission refer the matter to the Court within 3 
months of the Commission's Report (Article 51), the Commission may make a concluding report with 
recommendations and may prescribe a period within which the offending State concerned is to take 
measures necessary to remedy the situation complained of. Under Article 45, the Commission also has 
the power to receive inter-State complaints where both the respondent and applicant States have 
accepted the jurisdiction of the Committee to do so under the American Convention. States parties and 
the Commission may submit cases to the Court after the Commission has completed its consideration 
of the case (Article 61). Consideration of cases by the Court is limited to those involving States parties 
that have accepted the Court's binding jurisdiction under Article 62. Once accepted, the Court has the 
power to find that a State party has violated the Convention, and if appropriate, can rule that "the 
consequences of the measure or situation that constituted the breach ... be remedied and that fair 
compensation be paid to the injured party." (Article 63( I)). In grave circumstances, the Court can also 
order provisional measures to be taken by the respondent State to "avoid irreparable damage to persons" 
(Article 63(2)). There is no appeal from a decision of the Court (Article 67), and States parties pr9dertake to comply with judgements of the Court in cases in which they are a party (Article 68). 
It can also give Opinions on the interpretation of other human rights treaties applicable to the 
American States and, at the request of a member State, on the compatibility of the State's domestic 
laws with its human rights obligations under the Convention and other applicable human rights 
treaties 
14() . 
1 ~ 1 American Reservations Opinion, above n. I 02 . 
. This Article requires States parties to object to reservations within a period of 12 months or they 
will_ be taken to have given their tacit acceptance. Discussed below at Chapter 2, & for the text of this 
Article see n. 160 below. 
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ratifications for the treaty to enter into force were slow in coming. 142 The 
Court found that such ratifications could be effective before the expiry of the 
12 month period. It found that Article 75 expressly authorised reservations 
that are compatible with the object and purpose of the treaty and, thus, under 
Article 20( 1) of the Vienna Convention, did not require subsequent 
acceptance by the other States parties to be effecti ve. 143 
The second Opinion concerned a reservation made by Guatemala to Article 4 
of the American Convention, which concerns the right to life. 144 The Court 
firstly considered if any reservations could be made to Article 4 as it is listed as 
a non-derogable provision under Article 27(2). The Court said that a 
reservation to a non-derogable provision would be invalid as incompatible if it 
sought wholly to exclude the operation of that article. 145 In this case, the 
Guatemalan reservation did not go so far and thus was valid. 146 
Conclusion 
As we shall see, the UN reservations regime suffers from the lack of a body like 
the regional human rights commissions and courts. The subjective element of 
the operative test for admissibility of reservations, 147 compatibility, has a 
greater impact on the practice of reservations in the UN human rights regime 
than its objective aspects. 148 The presence of an authoritative body, with the 
competence to determine the admissibility of reservations and their effect on 
treaty relations, might lead to a less fractured and uncertain framework. 
However, the Vienna Convention negotiating parties did not establish such a 
body and the ICJ is unlikely to be called upon to determine this issue in a 
contentious case. 149 As a prelude to the discussion of the Human Rights 
142 Marks, "Regional Treaties", above n. 114 at 57. 
143 
Ibid at 49, paras 35-37. That is, that because reservations that comply with the Vienna Convention 
are "authorised" and thus do not require subsequent acceptance by the other States parties. The text of 
Article 20(1) is at n. 160 below. 
144 
Restrictions to the Death Penalty (articles 4(2) and (4) of the American Convention on Human 
Rights, OC-3/83 (1983) 23 ILM 320 [hereinafter Restrictions to the Death Penalty Opinion]. 
Guatemala's reservation sought to extend its use of the death penalty to certain crimes. See discussion 
of reservations to non-derogable provisions below at pages 33-34. 
14S lb' 
· 1d at para 61. 
146 
Although it also found that the Guatemalan reservation did not succeed in its objective of extending 
the death penalty to common crimes related to political crimes which were not punishable by death at 
the time of the Guatemalan ratification. ibid at paras 67-74; Marks, "Regional Treaties", above n. 114 
at 60; Thomas Buergenthal, 'The Advisory Practice of the Inter-American Human Rights Court" 
~ l{ 85) '.9 American Journal of International Law I, at 23-25. 
148 Derived from the Reservations Opinion, ICJ Rep. 1951, 15. 
149 See further discussion of this test below at Chapter 2. 
There have been suggestions that another advisory opinion be sought from the Court but they have 
been met with mixed reactions. See below at n. 404. 
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Committee's attempt to fill in this void, the next chapter discusses the Vienna 
Convention reservations regime. 
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CHAPTER 2 - THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF 
TREATIES 
Introduction 
Following the ICJ's Reservations Opinion and the work of the ILC~n the 
codification of treaty law, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties was 
adopted in 1969. 
The Vienna Convention Definition Of Reservation 
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 150 generally considered as 
codifying the rules of customary international law on treaties, 151 defines 
reservations in Article 2(1)(d) as a: 
unilateral statement, however phrased or named, made by a State, when signing, 
ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, whereby it purports to 
exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of a treaty in their 
application to that State. 
It is important to note that under this definition the fact that a State calls its 
statement an interpretative declaration, an understanding or a reservation does 
not affect the status of the statement. If it "purports to exclude or to modify 
the legal effect of certain provisions of a treaty" then it is a reservation for the 
purposes of the Vienna Convention. 152 It is the substance of the statement 
that is determinative of its status and therefore each statement must be judged 
on its merits. 153 
Application of the Vienna Convention Reservations Rules 
It is important to remember that the Vienna Convention applies only to treaties 
concluded after the Convention came into force in 1980, 154 and then only in 
relation to States that are parties to it. However, as much of the Convention 
1511 Vienna Convention, above n. 2. 
151 Schabas, "Reservations Reform" above n. 67 at 46. Compare discussion at pages 49-55 below. 
152 Although the name given to such a statement is not conclusive, there are many cases of reservations 
masquerading as interpretative declarations and vice versa. For example Switzerland's interpretative 
declarations to the European Convention, see above at pages 19-21. There are also many borderline 
cases where it is difficult to assess the effect of the statement and therefore its nature. The ILC and 
States' representatives have always been aware of the difficulty in distinguishing between reservations 
and interpretative declarations. For example see 1966 Yearbook of the ILC Vol II pl89. States 
participating in the 1968 and 1969 Conferences to draft the Vienna Convention also considered this 
issue. Some thought was given to the use of the term "reservation" in Articles 19-23 while excluding 
"interpretative declarations". See statements by Japan and the UK in, Wetzel and Rauschning (eds)The 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: Travaux Preparatoires ( 1978) at 178, 180, and generally 
186-199. Also Bowett, above n. I at 68-70. For a comprehensive discussion of the Vienna 
Convention definition of "reservation" see Horn above n. I Chapter 6 
l ~ 1 ' ' . 
See Oppenheim above n. 67 at 1242 l~J . • 
The Vienna Convention is not retroactive, see Article 4, Vienna Convention, above n. 2. 
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was a codification of customary international law, many of the rules therein 
are generally applicable. Further, a number of the Convention's provisions 
may have since developed into rules of custom and so, for the same reason, 
apply to treaties generally and to States that have not ratified or acceded to it. 
It appears that States, 155 human rights treaty supervisory bodies156 and 
-
regional human rights treaty organs157 view the definition of reservation in 
Article 2 and the object and purpose test in Article 19(c) as a rule of customary 
international law, although the status of the remainder of the reservations rules 
in the Vienna Convention is not so clear. 158 
The Vienna Convention Test For Admissibility Of Reservations 
Articles 19159 and 20160 comprise the test for admissibility of reservations. 
Article 21 spells out the legal effects of reservations and objections to them. 161 
155 For example, the US and the UK appear to accept the compatibility test as a rule of custom in their 
discussion of the Human Rights Committee's Comment, above n. 17. Observations by the United 
Kingdom on General Comment No. 24 [hereinafter UK Observations], and Observations by the United 
States of America on General Comment No. 24 [hereinafter US Observations], ibid, at Annex VI. 
156 See discussion of the Human Rights Committee's Comment (ibid); below at Chapter 3. 
157 For example the European Court of Human Rights in Belilos above n. 118 and Loizidou v. Turkey 
20 EHRR 99. Loizidou is discussed briefly below at pages 61-61. 
158 A discussion on the extent to which Articles 19-21 represent international customary norms in the 
context of the ICCPR is at pages 49-55 below. 
159 Article 19 allows a State to formulate a reservation when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving 
or acceding to a treaty unless any of the following occur. 
(a) the reservation is prohibited by the treaty; 
(b) the treaty provides that only specified reservations, which do not include the reservation 
in question, may be made, or; 
(c) in cases not falling under sub-paragraphs (a) or (b), the reservation is incompatible with 
the object and purpose of the treaty. 
160 Article 20 provides: 
1. A reservation expressly authorised by a treaty does not require any subsequent acceptance by 
the other contracting States unless the treaty so provides. 
2. When it appears from the limited number of the negotiating States and the object and purpose 
of a treaty that the application of the treaty in its entirety between all the parties is an essential 
condition of the consent of each one to be bound by the treaty, a reservation requires acceptance 
by all the parties. 
3. When a treaty is a constituent instrument of an international organisation and unless it 
otherwise provides, a reservation requires the acceptance of the competent organ of that 
organisation. 
4. In cases not falling under the preceding paragraphs and unless the treaty otherwise provides: 
(a) acceptance by another contracting State of a reservation constitutes the reserving State 
a party to the treaty in relation to that other State if or when the treaty is in force 
for those States; 
(b) an objection by another contracting State to a reservation does not preclude the entry 
into force of the treaty as between the objecting and reserving States unless a 
contrary intention is definitely expressed by the objecting State; 
(c) an act expressing a State's consent to be bound by the treaty and containing a 
reservation is effective as soon as at least one other contracting State has accepted 
the reservation. 
5. For the purposes of paragraphs 2 and 4 and unless the treaty otherwise provides a reservation 
is considered to have been accepted by a State if it shall have raised no objection to the 
reservation by the end of the period of twelve months after it was noti tied of the reservation or 
by the date on which it expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty, whichever is later. 
Indira Rosenthal 
26 
CHAPTER2 
Paragraphs l 9(a) and (b) cover those treaties that have a specific reservations 
provision. 162 These paragraphs are generally considered to be relatively 
unproblematic compared with paragraph (c), 163 and for this reason the 
following discussion will focus on reservations covered by paragraph 19( c ), 
that is reservations must be compatible with the object and purpose of the 
treaty to which they are made. 
Taken directly from the Reservations Opinion, the compatibility test in 
paragraph 19( c) contains many of the problems that the joint dissent and the 
1951 Report of the ILC had identified: the difficulties of interpreting the terms 
"object', "purpose" and "compatibility"; the assumption that a treaty will 
have only one object and purpose and that it will be easily identifiable; and 
the inherent subjectivity of the test. Nonetheless, it is clear that the States 
negotiating the Vienna Convention did not want to adopt the unanimity 
principle in relation to the admissibility of reservations in the Vienna 
Convention. 164 
Article 20 provides three ways in which a State party may respond to a 
reservation that it has decided is permissible under Article 19. 165 States may 
explicitly or tacitly 166 accept a reservation; object to a reservation but consider 
the treaty to be in force between itself and the reserving State; or object to a 
reservation with an express statement precluding the entry into force of the 
161 Article 21 states: 
l. A reservation established with regard to another party in accordance with Articles 19, 20 and 
23: 
(a) modifies for the reserving State in its relations with that other party the provisions of 
the treaty to which the reservation relates to the extent of the reservation; and 
(b) modifies those provisions to the same extent for that other party in its relations with 
the reserving State. 
2. The reservation does not modify the provisions if the treaty for the other parties to the treaty 
inter se. 
3. When a State objecting to a reservation has not opposed the entry into force of the treaty 
between itself and the reserving State, the provisions to which the reservation relates do not 
apply as between the two States to the extent of the reservation. 
162 An example of a provision that would fall under paragraph (a) can be found in Protocol 6 to the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms Concerning the 
Abolition of the Death Penalty, which prohibits reservations. 28 April 1983, Eur. T.S. No. 114, 
Article 4. An example of a provision that would fall under paragraph (b) can be found in the Second 
Optional Protocol to the ICCPR Aimed at Abolition of the Death Penalty, which allows reservations 
providing for use of the death penalty for the most serious military crimes committed during wartime. 
29 ILM 1464, Article 2. Note, Spain is the only party to the Protocol to have made such a 
rn~ervation. Also Schabas, "Reservations Reform" above n. 67 at 46. 
Although, note that Greig stresses that the belief that these paragraphs are unproblematic is ?:4erstated and unfounded. Greig, above n. I, for example at 84. 
See, for example, Rosenne, Lnw of Treaties, above n.1; Ruda, above n. I at pages 161-190; 
}¥~tzel, above n. 152. 
I · Note the two exceptions to the following rules in paragraphs 19(2) and (3) set out above at n. 159. 66 
Under Article 20(5), above at 11. 160. 
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treaty between itself and the reserving State. Thus the treaty relations 
between the reserving, accepting and objecting States vary. If a State, 
whether expressly or tacitly, accepts the reservation then the treaty is in force 
between it and the reserving State in the form modified by the reservation. If 
a State objects to the reservation the treaty will be in force between _i!: and the 
reserving State unless it declares that the treaty is not in force between it and 
the reserving State. 
Articles 19 and 20 govern what reservations can be made to treaties and the 
role that States parties play in 'regulating' the making of reservations. As we 
have seen, under the unanimity rule, there was only one way to determine 
which reservations were admissible, unanimous consent of all the treaty 
parties. The role of States parties was clear. Under the Reservations Opinion, 
it is clear what reservations are allowed to be made to the Genocide 
Convention: those that are compatible with the Convention's object and 
purpose. The role States play in determining the admissibility of a reservation 
is also reasonably certain. States can accept an admissible reservation, object 
on the ground of incompatibility167 and decide for themselves the extent of 
treaty relations they have with the reserving State. 168 The application and 
meaning of the Vienna Convention provisions are less certain and are the 
subject of an ongoing doctrinal debate comprising two schools of thought, 
those that favour an 'opposability' interpretation and those that prefer a 
'permissibility' interpretation. At the crux of the debate is the question of 
whether or not a reservation which is incompatible but is accepted by all the 
other States parties, expressly or tacitly, can be considered admissible. 
Underlying this question is the issue of the role States parties have in 
determining the validity of reservations made by their co-contracting States. 
According to the permissibility school, the test in Articles 19 and 20 is a two-
tier one. Under the two-tier test, the reservation must satisfy two steps, 
permissibility and acceptability, before it is admissible. The permissibility of a 
reservation is the first step and is determined in accordance with Article 19; 
that is, in accordance with the terms of the treaty 169 or if the treaty is silent, 170 
167 
States can object on other grounds as well, but it will be recalled that then it will not be open to 
the objecting State to prevent the Convention entering into force between them. ICJ Rep. 1951, 15 at 
27. 
168 Th . 
at is, whether to consider the treaty in force between itself and reserving State. See Greig, above 
n. I. at 82. In the case of an objection to an incompatible reservation, it is likely that a State can only 
so determine until the issue of the incompatible reservation is decided on the "jurisdictional plane". 
I~/ Rep. 1951, 15 at 26. See above discussion of the Reservations Opinion at pages 8-14. 
170 In which case paragraphs 19(a) and (b) apply. 
Paragraph 19(c). For examples of such treaties see the ICCPR and arguably Article 28(2) of the 
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in accordance with the !CJ-devised object and purpose test. In the latter case, 
a State must decide for itself if the reservation is compatible with the object 
and purpose of the treaty and must do so solely by reference to the text of the 
treaty. Only after a State has determined that a reservation is compatible with 
the object and purpose of the treaty can it consider what action to t¥.e under 
Article 20. 
Article 20 is the acceptability arm of the test. If a reservation is found by a 
treaty party to be incompatible, and therefore inadmissible, it cannot accept it 
under Article 20. However, "[i]t is implicit in the distinction between 
permissibility and opposability"171 that a State can reject a reservation on 
grounds other than incompatibility with object and purpose. 172 Otherwise, 
under this analysis, Article 20 would serve no function. Under the two-tier 
test, the role of treaty parties in determining the effect of an impermissible 
reservation is limited. They determine the permissibility of a reservation for 
themselves, but having found a reservation to be impermissible, their 
acceptance or rejection of it is of no consequence. The permissibility school's 
position is well expressed by Bowett. 173 He said: 
The issue of 'permissibility' is the preliminary issue. It must be resolved by 
reference to the treaty and is essentially an issue of treaty interpretation; it has 
nothing to do with the question of whether, as a matter of policy, other Parties find 
the reservations acceptable or not. 174 
By contrast, the 'opposability' school claims that "there is nothing to prevent 
a State accepting a reservation, even if such a reservation is intrinsically 
incompatible to the object and purpose of the treaty." 175 For adherents of this 
view, acceptance and admissibility go hand in hand and the validity of a 
reservation depends solely on the acceptance of the reservation by another 
contracting State. Article 19( c) is seen "as a mere doctrinal assertion, which 
may serve as a basis for guidance to States regarding acceptance of 
reservations, but no more than that." 176 Thus, States parties are the sole 
Women's Convention. The latter merely re-states paragraph (c) of Article 19. 
171 Clark, above n. 3 at 303. 
172 This was also the view taken by the majority of the ICJ in the Reservations Opinion. ICJ Rep. 
1951, 15 at 27. Note also that an objection by a State party to a type of reservation that is expressly 
allowed by the treaty usually has no effect (Art 20 (I)) and a State party cannot accept a reservation that 
is expressly prohibited by the treaty (Art I 9(a)). Clark, above n. 3 at 303-306 for a summary of the 
~{~ws of Sinclair, Ruda and Bowett on this point. 
· Bowett, above n. I at 68-70; Oppenheim, above n. 67 at 1247. 
174 lb" 1d, at 88. 
17S 
· Ruda, above n. I at 190. Greig shares this view. He says that: "Although it is sometimes argued 
that reservations can only be accepted if they are permissible and that the concept of acceptability is 
~~stinct from that of permissibility, these contentions are flawed ... ". Greig, above n. I at I 18. 6 Ibid. 
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determinants of the admissibility of a reservation. An objection does not 
preclude the reserving State from joining the treaty, but the objecting State 
may decide that the treaty does not come into force between itself and the 
reserving State. 177 
One could conclude that, despite the differences between the permisstbility 
and opposability analyses, they share some commonalities. 178 For example, 
according to both, "the will of the contracting State must prevail" .179 It has 
been suggested that the difference between the two lies in whether the 
"emphasis is to be placed in the initial will of the negotiators or on the 
subsequent will of the States making reservations or objections."180 The 
difference is apparent when these two theses are followed to their logical 
conclusions. They lead to very different consequences. 
For example, according to the 'opposability' thesis, it could be argued that dispute 
settlement organs, whether jurisdictional or not, ought to refrain from rulin~ on the 
permissibility of a reservation if there is no objection by the other parties." 1 
Whereas, for the permissibility school, 
the consequence of finding a reservation 'impermissible' may be either that the 
reservation alone is a nullity (which means that the reservation cannot be accepted by 
a Party holding it to be impermissible) or that the impermissible reservation nullifies 
the State's acceptance of the treaty as a whole. 182 
[The permissibility school] might give the impression that an objection to a 
reservation which is incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty or is 
prohibited by the treaty has no particular effect, since the reservation is in any event 
null and void. 183 
States belief as to the correct interpretation of the test is difficult to discern. 
Clark reports contradictory State practice, at least in relation to the Women's 
Convention, 184 in her analysis of the paltry and inadequate responses given by 
States parties to the Secretary-General's survey of attitudes to reservations to 
the Convention. 185 Eight States186 implied that, in relation to the Women's 
177 
Ibid, at 191. Note that some commentators believe that the ICJ gave an 'opposability' test in its 
Reservations Opinion, on the basis that it allows States parties to determine the extent of their treaty 
relations even with reserving States that have made incompatible reservations, until there is a 
determination on the "jurisdictional plane". ICJ Rep. 1951, 15 at 26. For example, Greig, above n. I; 
D. P. O'Connell, International Law, (2nd ed) 1970; I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law 
~4th ed) 1990 at 610-611. 
78 SR Preliminary Report, above n. 108 at 50. 
179 Ibid. 
180 Ibid. 
181 Ibid. 
182 
Bowett, above n. I at 88. 
is1SRP .. 
rel 11111 nary Report, above n. I 08 at 50. 
184 
Clark, above n.3 at 304. 
185 lb" 
· id, at 21. 
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Convention, incompatible reservations cannot be accepted. The remainder of 
the respondents gave mixed comments. Some States indicated that 
incompatible reservations could be made in limited circumstances, 187 and 
others, 188 that there is no bar on the making of incompatible reservations. The 
replies to the Secretary-General's request "leave the impression of h_aving 
been formed in a vacuum, with no regard paid to the desirability of placing a 
consistent, if not universal, construction on Articles 19 and 20 of the Vienna 
Convention" .189 The inconsistency in the responses of the few States that 
made comments provides no clear picture as to whether States favour a 
opposability, or a permissibility interpretation of Articles 19 and 20. The lack 
of response to the Secretary-General's request and the paucity of objections 
to reservations that are clearly incompatible with the Women's Convention190 
are open to varying interpretations. They may indicate that most States 
believe that the reservations made to that treaty are not incompatible, that 
objecting is an empty gesture191 or that it is open to them to accept an 
incompatible reservation. 192 
Regardless of their position on which interpretation is the correct one, most 
States are likely to agree that they can object to compatible reservations, and 
circumstances in which a need to object for other reasons are easy to imagine. 
For example, a State may only agree to join a treaty because of the inclusion 
of certain provisions. Consequently, a reservation to those provisions by 
another State is likely to be unacceptable to the first State notwithstanding 
186 Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Mexico, Portugal, Spain and 
Sweden. UN Doc. A/411608. at 6; UN Doc. A/411608 Add. 1 at 1; & UN Doc. A/411608. at 7, 8, 10, 
111 13 and 14 respectively. 18 For example, Japan and the USSR. UN Doc. A/411608, at 9 and 16 respectively. 
188 For example, France and Turkey, both implicitly defending incompatible reservations and States' 
oower to accept them. See UN Doc. A/411608, at 16 & 8 respectively. 
189 Clark, above n. 3 at 285. 
19
° For example Bangladesh's reservation to the Women's Convention which states: "The Government 
of the People's Republic of Bangladesh does not consider as binding upon itself the provisions of 
articles 2 ... as they conflict with the Sharia law based on Holy Quran and Sunna." Multilateral 
Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, UN Doc. ST/LEG/SER.FJ1996. [hereinafter Multilateral 
Treaties ]. Note that the 1996 edition is only available on internet and that the internet version does 
not have page numbers. (The cite is http:/www.un.org/Depts/Treaty/). Article 2 of the Women's 
Convention requires States parties to" ... condemn discrimination against women in all its forms, agree 
to pursue by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating discrimination against 
women and to this end undertake to take, inter alia, all appropriate measures, including legislation, to 
modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and practices that constitute discrimination 
against women". Article 2(t). This article clearly states the fundamental obligation imposed by the 
treaty of its States parties. Therefore, reservations to it are highly questionable. See Chin kin, 
"Reservations and Objections to the Women's Convention" in Gardner, above n. 3, [hereinafter 
;·~eservations to the Women's Convention"] at 65. 
This point is discussed below at pages 37-38 192 . 
Compare Ruda on this point above n. I at 85. 
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that the reservation is not incompatible with the object and purpose of the 
treaty. 193 
Arguably, there is enough doubt about the meaning of the test in Articles 19 
and 20 to support both an opposability and a permissibility interpretation. A 
one-tier view is supportable on the basis that Article 19 speaks to reserving 
States formulating reservations and Article 20 relates to the other contracting 
parties and says nothing about Article 19 or compatibility. They appear to 
operate independently of each other, suggesting that Article 19 is irrelevant to 
non-reserving States. Further, as the Vienna Convention is silent as to the 
consequences of making an inadmissible reservation, it is arguable that this 
matter is to be determined by the States parties. However, to interpret Articles 
19 and 20 in this way "would entirely defeat the purpose of the compatibility 
criteria and the establishment of an agreed treaty text in the first place."194 It 
would also thwart the international community's attempts to balance the 
rights of all treaty parties by regulating the making of reservations. It offers 
no protection to the integrity of a treaty, subordinating the treaty objectives 
to an increasingly outdated view of the role of consent in treaty making, 
particularly in human rights treaties. 
The debate about the relationship between Articles 19 and 20 clearly cannot 
be dismissed as a matter of mere semantics. In the absence of any guidance 
from the Vienna Convention text (including Article 21 which, arguably, 
applies only to compatible reservations) and without consensus amongst 
States and commentators on the implications of an acceptance of, or objection 
to, an incompatible reservation for treaty membership and relations, it is 
impossible to determine what effect an incompatible reservation might have. 
Conversely, one cannot determine the status of the ratification or accession of 
a State that has made an incompatible reservation unless one knows whether 
acceptance or objection of a reservation has any role to play in such a 
193 Clark, above n. 3, at 304; Another reason States may wish to object to compatible reservations 
might involve an assessment by objecting States that the reservation to which they are objecting is a 
type that should be discouraged. For example, Belgium and the Netherlands objected to a reservation 
made by the Congo to Article I I, a non-derogabie provision of the ICCPR. Although it is arguable 
that reservations to non-derogable provisions of human rights treaties may also be incompatible, these 
States did not object on this ground but because they did not want a precedent set whereby reservations 
to non-derogable provisions of the Covenant were tolerated. See discussion of reservations to non-
?frogable rights below at pages 33-35. 
4 Clark, above n. 3 at 306; Greig suggests that these Articles are complementary and not intended to 
operate in isolation from each other. In support, he refers to paragraphs 20(4) and (5), indicating that 
they should be interpreted as applying only to Article l 9(c) because of the presence in those paragraphs 
?f "unless the treaty otherwise provides". Thus, it is logical that they be read as excluding an 
Interpretation that would apply them to Articles l 9(a) and (b ). Greig, above n. I at 83; Multilateral 
Treaties, above n. 190. 
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determination. Clarification is necessary to provide a consistent and coherent 
normative regime that adequately protects the interests of all treaty parties. 
The Object And Purpose Test 
One of the most obvious difficulties with the reservations regime is that its 
operation is dependent on a subjective assessment of objective rules. No 
guidance is offered to help parties determine the object and purpose of a 
treaty, 195 or identify those provisions which are crucial to that object and 
purpose, so it is left to States to make their own subjective determination. This 
means that there are potentially as many different versions of the object and 
purpose of the treaty as there are treaty parties, and no limit to the subjective 
factors States may rely upon in assessing the compatibility or otherwise of a 
reservation. 196 Further, determining which provisions are central to the object 
and purpose of the treaty and therefore cannot be reserved is essentially a 
matter for States to decide, either at the time the treaty is concluded, or if the 
treaty is silent on this matter, when confronted with reservations. If the treaty 
is silent it will be a matter of interpretation by States parties of the text to 
determine if particular reservations can be made. Thus, there is potential for 
many different versions of the object and purpose of a single treaty. 
Reservations to Non-Derogable Provisions 
The matter may be further complicated if the treaty is silent on reservations but 
has a provision setting out certain obligations as non-derogable. Non-
derogable provisions may be non-derogable for reasons other than their 
centrality to the object and purpose of the treaty further obscuring the object 
and purpose. For example, the Human Rights Committee identified Article 11 
of the ICCPR (imprisonment for debt) as a provision that is non-derogable 
because its "suspension is irrelevant to the legitimate control of the State of 
emergency" 197 in which States may derogate from certain obligations under 
the Covenant. On the other hand there may be provisions which are not 
included amongst the non-derogable provisions but which are central to the 
object and purpose of the treaty. 
195 Nor, if there are many objects and purposes, the principal one. Greig, above n. I at 7 I; See above 
yomments on the compatibility test devised in the Reservations Opinion, at pages 8-14. 96 See Zemanek K, "Some Unresolved Questions Concerning Reservations in the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties", in Essays in International Law in Honour of Judge Manfred lachs, 232, 
(I 984 ), re unilateral right of states to object and accept reservations; Hylton, above n. 108 at 438, & his 
n. 135. 
197 
General Comment, above n. 17 at 126. For a discussion about the link between non-derogability 
and reservations see Clark, above n. 3 at 319-320; Schabas, "Reservations Reform", above n. 67 at 50-
53; Buergenthal, above n. 146 at 24-25. 
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It is not clear whether States can make reservations to non-derogable Articles. 
Again, State practice suggests that there is little consensus on this issue. 198 
However, given that in the context of human rights treaties there "seems to be 
an almost universal consensus about rights that are considered the most 
fundamental and these, in general, are the rights from which no dero~ation is 
permitted"199 the importance of having the matter clarified, and knowing if 
States can avoid their obligations to guarantee the most basic rights by 
making reservations to non-derogable provisions, cannot be overstated. 
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights considered this issue in its 
Advisory Opinion on Restrictions on the Death Penalty200 and decided that 
reservations that exclude non-derogable provisions are incompatible with the 
American Convention. The Court said: 
Article 27 of the Convention allows State parties to suspend, in time of war ... the 
obligations they assumed by ratifying the Convention, provided that in doing so they 
do not suspend or derogate from certain basic or essential rights, among them the 
right to life guaranteed in Article 4. It would follow therefrom that a reservation 
which was designed to enable a State to suspend any of the non-derogable 
fundamental rights must be deemed to be incompatible with the object and purpose 
of the Convention and, consequently, not permitted by it.201 
Determining the issue of the object and purpose of a human rights treaty raises 
other questions about the extent to which States can make reservations to 
provisions, often non-derogable, that reflect peremptory norms. It is clear that 
States cannot avoid their obligations under a peremptory norm by making a 
reservation, but whether a reservation to such a provision was incompatible 
with the object and purpose of the treaty has not yet been determined.202 
198 There is some precedent for States reserving non-derogable provisions. For example, the reservation 
of the Congo to Article 11 of the ICCPR. See above n. 193. The Netherlands and Belgium objected 
on this ground to the reservation of the Congo. Also Reservations of the US to Articles 6 and 7 of the 
ICCPR. Eleven European States objected to the US reservations to Articles 6 and a similar number 
objected to the reservation to Article 7. The US reservation to Article 6 is discussed in some detail 
below at pages 63-68. 
199 Buergenthal, above n. 146 at 24. 
200 Restrictions to the Death Penalty Opinion, above n. 144. 
201 Ibid, at para 61. However, the reservation in question, made by Guatemala, was considered to be 
effective by the Court as it did not seek to exclude the entire operation of the non-derogable provision. 
See above page 23. 
202 There is no consensus on what norms fall into the category of peremptory norms. Given the 
norms that regularly appear on the list as peremptory, such as the right to self-determination, it is also 
likely that reservations to a treaty provision that represents such a norm would also be incompatible 
with the object and purpose of the treaty in question. The problem may arise in the context of 
emergingjus cogens. Buergenthal, in relation to this Inter-American Court Advisory Opinion, said the 
Opinion: 
constitutes the first unambiguous international judicial articulation of a principle basic to the 
application of human rights treaties, that non-derogability and incompatibility are linked. The 
nexus between non-derogability and incompatibility derives from and adds force to the 
conceptual interrelationship which exists between certain fundamental human rights and 
emerging jus cog ens. 
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Broad and Vague Reservations and Reservations that Invoke National Laws 
Reservations to human rights treaties to which States most commonly object 
fall into the category of reservations that are so broad and general that it is 
impossible to determine their effect. Typically, these reservations also 
subordinate treaty obligations to national laws, customs or religion.2trr Unlike 
the European Convention,204 the Vienna Convention does not specify any 
form or content requirements for reservations. Nevertheless, reservations that 
are vague and general may constitute "sufficient grounds for failing the 
Article 19( c) test". 205 In any event, they are increasingly attracting objections. 
There are two reasons why such reservations draw objections. The first is 
their generality. This type of reservation is commonly criticised on the ground 
that it does not make it possible to know what obligations the State has 
undertaken. For example, the first Tunisian declaration to the Children's 
Convention declares that " ... Tunisia ... shall not, in implementation of this 
Convention, adopt any legislative or statutory decision that conflicts with the 
Tunisian Constitution."206 The vagueness of this reservation207 makes it 
difficult for States to assess the compatibility of Tunisia's declaration with the 
object and purpose of the Children's Convention. It also limits States' ability 
to determine the extent to which Tunisia is bound by the Convention. States 
might be able to decipher the effect of the reservation by observing Tunisian 
practice in relation to the Convention, but this would be a resource intensive 
exercise and thus a great burden for Tunisia's co-contracting States.208 
The second ground for objection is that the reservation indicates that the 
State is less than committed to implementing its treaty obligations, even on a 
progressive basis, and does so by invoking its domestic legislation, customs or 
Buergenthal, above n. 146 at 25; Also on this issue see Schabas, "Reservations Reform", above n.67 
at 49-53; The Comment, above n. 17 at 125-6 paras 8, 9 & 11. 
20
' There are exceptions to this. Some reservations that invoke national laws etc are reasonably 
specific. For example, Algeria's reservation to the Children's Convention asserts that certain Articles 
of the Convention "shall be interpreted ... in compliance with the basic foundations of the Algerian 
legal system" Multilateral Treaties, above n. 190. However the Articles are specified (Articles 13, 14, 
16 & 17) as are the relevant provisions of its domestic law. Ibid. 
20
.i See Article 64, European Convention, above at pages 18-19; also discussion of this Article above 
at {'ages 18-21. 
20
- Clark, above n.3 at 310-312; Schabas, "Reservations to the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child" ( 1996) 18(2) Human Rights Quarterly, 472 [hereinafter "Reservations to CROC"] at 477-479. 
206 Multilateral Treaties, above n. 190. 
207 Germany stated in its objection to this declaration, the declaration seeks to exclude unspecified 
interpretations to the Convention, and so is really a reservation for the purposes of the Vienna 
Convention. Germany objected to the declaration because it considered it to be too general. Multilateral 
Treaties above n. 190. 
20S ' 
Clark, above n.3 at 31 I_ 
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religion to limit its obligations under the treaty. In the most extreme cases, 
such reservations arguably also render ratification by the reserving State 
meaningless.209 Thus, the most common objection is that these reservations 
"may raise doubts as to the commitment of these States to the object and 
purpose of the Convention, and ... contribute to undermining the bas.b; of 
international treaty law."21° For example, Indonesia's reservation to the 
Children's Convention has been the subject of a number of objections on this 
ground. The Reservation states that its "ratification of the Convention ... 
does not imply the acceptance of obligations beyond the Constitutional limits 
nor the acceptance of any obligation to introduce any right beyond those 
prescribed under the Constitution."211 
Another form of objection to this kind of reservation derives from Article 27 of 
the Vienna Convention which prohibits treaty parties from invoking "the 
provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a 
treaty" .212 Although the sentiment expressed in these objections and in 
Article 27 is the same (States should not be able to rely on their internal laws 
to justify evading treaty obligations) Article 27 probably does not apply to 
reservations. It applies at a later stage, when a State party's obligations under 
a treaty have been determined. Nonetheless, such reservations may be 
incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty to which they are 
made on the first ground discussed, that they are wholly indeterminable.213 
209 For example, the Iranian reservation to the Children's Convention is such an example. It states 
that "the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran reserves the right not to apply any provisions or 
articles of the Convention that are incompatible with Islamic Laws and the internal legislation in 
effect." This reservation reveals a total lack of commitment to implementing Iran's Convention 
obligations. Multilateral Treaties, above n. 190. Some States parties have objected to this reservation 
on this ground. Eg: Germany & Ireland, ibid. 
210 Objection by the Netherlands to the Iranian reservation to the Children's Convention, ibid. This 
formula has been used by other objecting States in relation to reservations to the Children's 
Convention, eg: Germany (Qatar and Malaysia); Ireland (Bangladesh, Djibouti, Indonesia, Jordan, 
Kuwait, Tunisia, Myanmar, Thailand, Pakistan and Turkey); Norway (Djibouti, Indonesia, Pakistan, 
Syria, Iran); Portugal (Myanmar, Bangladesh, Djibouti, Indonesia, Kuwait, Pakistan, Turkey, Iran, 
Malaysia, Qatar); Sweden (Indonesia, Pakistan, Jordan, Syria, Iran, Thailand, Myanmar, Bangladesh, 
Djibouti, Qatar), ibid. 
211 This reservation has been objected to. See below n. 212. 
212 Article 27, Vienna Convention, above n.2. Article 27 is expressed not to prejudice Article 46 
(provisions of internal law regarding competence to conclude treaties) of the Vienna Convention. This 
was the substance of the objection by Finland to reservations made by Jordan, Indonesia, Pakistan, 
Qatar, Syria, Iran) to the Children's Convention. Multilateral Treaties, above n. 190. This formula 
also has been used by other objecting States in relation to reservations to the Children's Convention, 
Ifi Germa.ny c9atar, Malaysia); Slovakia (Q~tar); Czecho.slov~kia (K~wait), ibid. . 
· This view 1s also taken by the Human Rights Committee m relation to reservations to the ICCPR. 
In General Comment 24(52) it said: "Reservations must be specific and transparent..." The Comment, 
above n. 17 at paragraph 19. It also said that "widely formulated reservations" are of particular concern 
as they "essentially render ineffective all Covenant rights which would require any change in national 
law to ensure compliance with Covenant obligations. No real international rights or obligations have 
thus been accepted." Ibid, at para 12; See discussion of the Comment below at Chapter 3; Reservations 
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Failure of States Parties to Object to Incompatible Reservations 
Another serious problem for the application of the rules to human rights 
treaties is that States do not use the rules in the manner intended. Principally, 
they appear reluctant to object to incompatible reservations. The dearth of 
objections made to reservations that are clearly incompatible with th~ treaty214 
and to reservations whose admissibility on the ground of compatibility with 
the object and purpose of the treaty is doubtful, is testament to this. The 
reluctance of States to object to such reservations, with some notable 
exceptions,215 may be attributable to a number of factors, including a belief 
that States are able to make incompatible reservations. More often they may 
tacitly accept incompatible reservations through inertia or inattention. They 
may lack sufficient resources or administrative will to ensure that objections 
are made within time.216 This factor cannot be overstated. Many States 
cannot or do not prioritise consideration of reservations and for this reason it 
is necessary to be cautious in concluding that States do not object because of 
a belief that incompatible reservations are not prohibited under the Vienna 
Convention.217 In fact, the opposite might be the case; that States generally 
believe that they do not need to object to an incompatible reservation as it is 
null and void.218 
The infrequency with which objections to reservations are made may make 
them appear to be acts of hostility. Even objecting States that do not feel any 
vulnerability vis a vis the reserving State would wish to avoid appearing 
hostile. It has been argued that States may be reluctant to object to 
Opinion where the IO refers to comments by the Secretary-General, and debates in the Sixth 
Committee of the General Assembly, on the draft Genocide Convention. ICJ Rep. 1950, 15 at 22 
214 For example, the reservation by Bangladesh to the Women's Convention, above n. 190; Chinkin, 
"Reservations to the Women's Convention" above n. 190 at 65. 
215 Mexico, Germany, Denmark and Sweden are amongst the States that most frequently object to 
reservations they consider to be incompatible with the treaty in question. Multilateral Treaties, above 
n. 190. 
216 For example, Clark reports that Sweden would have objected to Egypt's reservation to the 
Women's convention but ran out of time. Nonetheless, Sweden included in its objections to the 
reservations of various states that, "as a matter of principle, the same objection could be made to the 
reservations made by Egypt" et al. Clark goes on to say that the UN secretariat appears not to 
distinguish the two categories of objections and in its report to the General Assembly on reservations 
and objections the Swedish "objection" to the Egyptian reservation is included in the list of objections 
to reservations made by other states to which Sweden had objected in time. See Clark, above n. 3 at 
313-314; Also Greig, above n. I at 90 & 132 & also at 23 & 129 on the position of States eligible to 
~oin a treaty but not yet a party and objections to reservations. 
17 
That is, in accordance with the analysis made by Bowett (above n. I), above page 33. This 
conclusion is also made by the Human Rights Committee in its General Comment, above n. 17 at 
J28. para 19. 
-18 F 
·or example, the UK. See UK Observations, above n. 155 at 138, para 13. 
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reservations made by States with whom they have regional alliances.219 An 
example given relates to Mexico, which has entered objections to reservations 
made to the Women's Convention by a number of States220 but has not 
objected to Brazil's reservation which is in substantially the same terms as 
those reservations to which Mexico has objected. 
When States do expressly object to a reservation on the ground that it is 
incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty, they almost invariably 
also state that the treaty remains in force between it and the reserving State 
notwithstanding the objection.221 The effect of this is that the objection to the 
reservation has the same effect as acceptance of it. Although the provisions 
subject to the reservation are probably not in force between the reserving and 
objecting States, the reserving State still achieves its objective, which is to 
exclude or modify the relevant treaty provisions. Given the "little practical 
difference"222 between the effect of an objection to, and an acceptance of, the 
reservation, there is little incentive for States to take the "politically 
unfriendly"223 act of making an objection. 
Failure Of Vienna Convention To Accommodate Normative Treaties 
The Vienna Convention reservations rules make no distinction between 
treaties that establish reciprocal rights and duties and treaties, like human 
rights treaties, that are essentially normative.224 This means that the 
reservations regime is imposed on all treaties without distinction.225 
219 Schabas, "Reservations Reform", above n. 67 at 68. 
220 Ibid. 
221 UK and Israeli objections to a Burundian reservations to the 1973 Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, are exceptions. Both the UK and 
Israel stipulate that they are "unable to consider Burundi as having validly acceded to the Convention 
until such time as the reservation is withdrawn." Multilateral Treaties, above n. 190 at 83. 
222 Chinkin, "Reservations to the Women's Convention", above n. 190 at 78. Note that this may not 
be the case if the reservation is a modifying rather than an excluding one. 
223 Ibid. See also the UK Channel Arbitration Case 54 International Law Reports (1977) 6. The 
Court of Arbitration held that this was the effect envisaged by Article 21 (3) of the Vienna Convention 
(which is reproduced above at n. 161). Ibid at pages 44-45. Further, that the effect of the UK's 
rejection of France's reservation to Article 6 of the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf I 958 
was to "render the Article inapplicable as between the two countries to the extent, but only to the 
extent, of the reservation". ibid. 
224 Brownlie suggests that law making treaties "create legal obligations the observance of which does 
not dissolve the treaty obligations" Brownlie, above n. I 77 at 12. Schacter refers to the North Sea 
Continental Shelf Case, ICJ Rep. 1969, for a definition of law-making treaties as treaties: " ... of a 
fundamentally norm-creating character such as could be regarded as forming the basis of a general rule 
of law."; 0. Schacter, International law in Theory and Practice I 99 I at 72 & 74. Note that there is no 
af:reement on whether this is a valid or useful distinction. On this point see Schacter ibid at 75. 
2 5 Hylton states that this "artificial framework ... inadequately serves the needs of the different types of 
international agreements." Hylton, above n. 108 at 434. He identifies three main types of treaty; 
Bilateral Reciprocal Rights Agreements, Multilateral Reciprocal Rights Agreements and Legislative 
Treaties. He further identifies three types of Legislative Agreements: treaties that codify customary 
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Many aspects of the law of treaties as set out in the Vienna Convention and in 
customary international law are based on an assumption that States regulate 
their relations on a bilateral or contractual basis. Even in the absence of any 
reservations, the relationships between treaty parties are treated primarily as 
bilateral, fragmenting multilateral treaties into a series of coexisting bilateral 
agreements. In practice, each State party enters into the agreement with every 
other treaty party individually and is considered to have the obligations 
imposed, and rights conferred, on it by the treaty reciprocally. This becomes 
evident when a dispute arises out of the treaty relationship. For example, a 
dispute as to the correct interpretation of the treaty, or of a breach, may be of 
relevance to every treaty member. Theoretically all States parties can seek 
resolution of the dispute provided they have accepted the jurisdiction of the 
relevant judicial authority. But is it usual that the claim will be specific to 
particular parties and its outcome will bind only those parties.226 The States 
and the relevant international legal rules thus assume that the obligations 
owed by States to each other are also bilateral. 
Chinkin asserts that "bilateralism is no longer appropriate as the paradigm 
model for the regulation of activities in the international arena. "227 Looking at 
international law as it relates to third parties, she views the bilateral model as 
inappropriate, both in fact and in law, as it ignores the reality that the actions 
of States invariably affect the interests of other States, even actions taken 
under a bilateral treaty. She cites the allocation of natural resources and their 
exploitation as an example and refers to the impact that State action has on 
non-State party actors such as individuals, international bodies, and on the 
international community as a whole. 228 
As the Vienna Convention assumes a bilateral model of treaties, 229 the effective 
operation of the reservations framework is dependent on States acting as if 
they were parties to bilateral treaties of multilateral reciprocal rights treaties. 
"A basically bilateral system is used to realize multilateral interests."230 But, 
international law, regulate international conduct and those that are the constituent documents of 
international organisations. He suggests that separate, specially tailored frameworks are needed for each 
type of international agreement to ensure that the individual objectives of each agreement, and therefore 
the needs of the community that has negotiated the agreement, are met, ibid at 446. Hylton's 
~roposals for reform are discussed in greater detail below at pages 72-73. 
26 See C. Chinkin, Third Parties in International Law 1993. She points out that attempts to resolve 
differences and disputes arising out of treaty relations through diplomatic channels "accentuates the 
bilateral character" of State interrelations, ibid, at 2. 
227 Ibid, at 3. 
228 Ibid, at 2-5. 
229 Lijnzaad, above n. 3 at 400. 
230 Ibid. 
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"standard-setting human rights treaties" 231 are not reciprocal, obligations 
under them are owed by the State to its individual inhabitants not to other 
States parties. Nor do they establish rights and obligations to promote the self 
interests of their States parties. Instead, they represent the international 
community's attempts to advance altruistic objectives to improve th~lot of 
humankind.232 
This fact has been recognised by the ICJ, the European Commission on 
Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.233 In its 
Reservations Opinion,234 the ICJ relied on this and the other distinguishing 
features of the humanitarian Genocide Convention to justify abandoning the 
unanimity rule in relation to it and formulating the new test. The Court stated 
that because the contracting parties to human rights treaties such as the 
Genocide Convention adopt such conventions for: 
a purely humanitarian and civilizing purpose, ... in a convention of this type [the 
Genocide Convention] one cannot speak of individual advantages or disadvantages 
to States, or the maintenance of a perfect contractual balance between rights and 
duties.235 
Likewise, the European Commission on Human Rights declared that the 
obligations of the contracting states to the European Convention are "of an 
objective character, being designed rather to protect the fundamental rights of 
individual human beings from infringement by any of the High Contracting 
Parties than to create subjective and reciprocal rights for the High Contracting 
Parties themselves" .236 The Inter-American Court of Human Rights, in its 1982 
American Reservations Opinion,237 took a similar view, emphasising that: 
modern human rights treaties in general, and the American Convention in particular, 
are not multilateral treaties of the traditional type concluded to accomplish the 
reciprocal exchange of rights for the mutual benefit of the contracting States. Their 
object and purpose is the protection of the basic rights of individual human beings 
.. .. In concluding these human rights treaties, contracting States can be deemed to 
submit themselves to a legal order within which they, for the common good, assume 
various obligations, not in relation to other States, but towards all individuals within 
their jurisdiction. 238 
231 Chinkin, "Reservations to the Women's Convention" above n. 190, at 65. 
232 See American Reservations Opinion, above n. 102 at para 29. 
m Although it is not without its sceptics. See Greig, above n. I at 168. 
234 !CJ Rep. 1951, 15; for a discussion of this issue see Greig, above n. I at 48. 
235 Ibid, at 23. 
236 Austria v. Italy 4 European Yearbook of Human Rights, ( 1960) I 16 at 140. 
237 A · R . 0 . . b 102 mencan eservatums pinion, a ove n. . 
238 Ibid, at para. 29. 
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The fact that human rights treaties are non-reciprocal may contribute to the 
lack of incentive to object to incompatible reservations.239 Reciprocity in 
domestic contracts operates as a check on unilateral action, protecting the 
interests provided for in the contract from such action and thus operating as 
an important enforcement mechanism.240 Given the absence of a corupulsory 
international judicial system or other international law enforcer, reciprocity has 
an importance in treaties not matched in the domestic sphere. In the case of 
human rights treaties this check is virtually non-existent. States' do not view 
their interests as directly affected by an unauthorised unilateral act, and 
indeed the obligations are owed to individuals not to other States parties. The 
Vienna Convention, based on a contractual model, assumes that the principle 
of reciprocity applies to ensure that States parties will enforce the treaty 
themselves. But this presupposes that breaches or the making of incompatible 
reservations cause direct harm to the interests of other States parties 
prompting them to retaliate in some way. If States' interests are unaffected by 
the observance or breach of a treaty obligation it is unlikely that they will take 
action against a defaulting State party. Yet Articles 19 and 20 provide no 
mechanism to protect treaties from invalid reservations other than action by 
other States parties. This begs the question what outcome would make it 
worthwhile for a State to object? Should a State be able to join a treaty with a 
reservation which indicates that it has little or no intention of complying?241 
The Vienna Convention already provides an objecting State with the option 
of stating in its objection that the treaty is not in force as between itself and 
the reserving State,242 but objecting States have rarely relied on this243 and it is 
doubtful that use of it would lead to a more satisfactory result. Reserving 
States would still avoid being bound by the provision they have reserved and 
avoid being called to account by objecting States for any breach they might 
commit in relation to non-reserved provisions of the treaty. In either case the 
objective of universal protection of human rights is thwarted. 
239 See Lijnzaad, above n.3 at 111-112 & 402; and discussion on States failure to object to 
reservations at pages 37-38 above. 
240 Ibid, at 65-72. 
241 One must query why such a State would want to join treaties to which they make reservations that 
have the effect of rendering their ratification meaningless. Political benefits are the most obvious 
reason. For example Iran and its ratification of the Women's Convention. See above n. 209. 
242 Article 21(3) in effect provides this. It states: 
When a State objecting to a reservation has not opposed the entry into force of the treaty 
between itself and the reserving State, the provisions to which the reservations relates do not 
? apply as between the two States to the extent of the reservation. -~ 3 The exception is the objections of the UK and Israel to the Burundian reservation to the Convention 
on the 1973 Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons. Above 
n. 221; Multilateral Treaties, above n. 190. 
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Conclusion 
The above "examination of the effects of the Convention's provisions on 
different types of treaties ... illuminates the shortcomings"244 of the Vienna 
Convention reservations provisions. The rules clearly favour reserving States, 
which, Hylton states, "undermines the negotiated balance of rights and duties 
••• " •
245 Further, the unresolved doctrinal debate about the extent of States 
parties' power to determine the admissibility of reservations has caused much 
confusion amongst States about the content of the law. Even in the absence 
of this confusion, there is little incentive for States to use whatever power is 
conferred on them by the Vienna Convention reservations regime to regulate 
adequately the making of reservations. The result is that in human rights 
treaties with over one hundred members, only a handful of States object to the 
increasing number of reservations made to core provisions of human rights 
treaties and reservations that are arguably so broad as to exclude any 
operation of the treaty in the reserving State.246 It may be that" ... the core 
problem is that the law of treaties is inappropriate for solving the new 
challenge of international law, the aim of creating obligations other than 
strictly reciprocal obligations. "247 
244 Hylton above n.108 at 434. 
245 Ibid, at 437. 
~46 For example, Iran's reservation to the Children's Convention, set out above n. 209. 47 
R. Higgins, 'The United Nations, Still a Force for Peace" (1989) 52 Modern Law Review I, at 11. 
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CHAPTER 3 - THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE'S GENERAL 
COMMENT 24(52) 
At its fifty second session, the Human Rights Committee, the body established 
to supervise the International Covenant on Civil and Political Right&.,(the 
ICCPR),248 discussed the preparation of a general comment249 that would 
address issues relating to reservations made to the ICCPR, or its Optional 
Protocols,250 upon ratification or accession. On 2 November 1994 the 
Committee adopted General Comment No. 24 (52).251 As the only statement 
of its kind from a UN human rights treaty supervisory body, the Comment is a 
very important part of any discussion of reservations to human rights treaties. 
It deals with a number of matters that are central to the debate about the law 
of reservations and, therefore, is of relevance to other human rights treaties. 
Unsurprisingly, these matters are also the most controversial aspects of the law 
of reservations. 
The Comment purports to set out the relevant international law governing the 
making of reservations to the Covenant, principally the Vienna Convention 
articles on reservations, and seeks to clarify the application of those articles to 
reservations to the ICCPR.252 It spells out what kinds of reservations the 
Committee considers would be incompatible with the Covenant as well as the 
effect of making an incompatible reservation.253 Every aspect of the Comment 
has been criticised,254 but its most controversial feature relates to the role the 
Committee has suggested for itself in relation to determining the compatibility 
of reservations to the Covenant. 
Role of the Human Rights Committee 
The Human Rights Committee is a supervisory body comprised of 18 elected 
members who are nationals of the States parties to the Covenant. Members 
248 The ICCPR above n. 8. The Human Rights Committee is established by Article 28. 
249 A discussion of the Committee's role is below at page 43. 
250 (First) Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Polirical Rights, adopted and 
opened for signature on 16 December 1966. Entered into force on 23 March 1976. Reproduced in 
ST/HR/I/Rev. 5 (Vol. I/Part I) at 41. [Hereinafter the First Optional Protocol]. 
Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political rights, Aiming at the 
Abolition of the Death Penalty, adopted and proclaimed by the General Assembly on 15 December 
1989. Reproduced in UN Doc. ST/HR/Rev. 5 (Vol I/Part I) at 46. [hereinafter the Second Optional 
Prorocol]. 
251 The Comment, above n. 17. 
252 
The following discussion is limited to examining only those aspects of the Comment that are 
relevant to UN human rights treaties generally. A thorough analysis of the whole of the Comment is 
outside the scope of this paper. See Greig, above n. I; Gardner, above n. 3. 
2
5:
1 
The Comment is discussed at length below at pages 48-68. 
25 ~ See Greig, above n. I. 
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serve in their personal capacity and are supposed to be persons "of high 
moral character and [of] recognized competence in the field of human 
rights" .255 The Committee has a limited role and no authority to make binding 
declarations or decisions. Thus, the Comment, and any other pronouncements 
it makes while exercising its functions under the Covenant, are mere,!y 
recommendatory, aimed at assisting States parties to prepare their periodic 
reports and to comply with their Covenant obligations. The Committee's 
principal task is to supervise implementation of the Covenant and, to this end, 
it receives the periodic reports States are required to submit to the Secretary-
General under Article 40. Article 40 requires States parties to prepare and 
submit periodic reports on "measures they have adopted which give effect to 
the rights recognized [in the Covenant] and on the progress made in the 
enjoyment of those rights"256 The extent of the Committee's role in relation 
to this Article is to consider the reports submitted, seek further information 
from States in relation to their implementation of the Covenant, and to transmit 
its own report to the States parties, and to the Economic and Social Council 
(ECOSOC), together with any comments it may wish to make.257 The 
Committee's reports to ECOSOC provide it with an opportunity to detail the 
extent to which States have implemented the Covenant and any difficulties 
States may have in complying with their obligations under the Covenant. 
The requirement to submit an annual report to the General Assembly258 
provides another avenue for reporting on the pace of implementation of the 
Covenant by member States.259 Increasingly, the Committee is using its annual 
report to relay information about implementation directly to the General 
Assembly. "In 1994, as part of its assertion of a more judgemental role",260 the 
Committee altered the structure of its annual reports to "give greater emphasis 
to the Committee's views on the degree of compliance by individual States 
with Covenant norms".261 It omitted from the annual reports "'summaries of 
255 Article 28, ICCPR, above n. 8. 
256 (Article 40( 1 )). The Secretary-General then transmits them to the Committee for its consideration 
(Article 40(2)). Under Article 40(4), the Committee must examine these reports, and forward its 
comments to the States parties and, if it wants, to the Economic and Social Council. 
257 Article 40(4), ICCPR, above n. 8. 
258 Article 45, ICCPR, above n. 8. 
259 For a critical analysis of the value of the State periodic reporting requirement under UN human 
rights treaties see A. Bayefsky, "Implementing Human Rights Treaties: The Prognosis After Vienna" 
1994 American Society of International Law Proceedings, 428. 
260 . Greig, above n. I at 96. 
261 Ibid. 
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the consideration of States parties' reports"', 262 providing instead the text of 
the Committee's comments on these Reports. 
The power of the Committee to receive communications from States parties 
alleging violation of the Covenant by other States parties under Article 41 has 
never been used.263 This power is limited to communications from and about 
State parties that have expressly accepted the Committee's competence to 
receive inter State communications under Article 41. The Committee's power 
to resolve such disputes is limited to making "available its good offices to the 
States parties concerned with a view to a friendly solution of the matter".264 If 
no friendly solution of the matter is reached, the Committee can establish an 
ad hoc Conciliation Commission to assist the parties to reach an "amicable 
solution" .265 The authority of the Committee is limited to submitting a report 
on the outcome and attaching the written, and a record of the oral, 
submissions it received.266 The ad hoc Commission's authority is similarly 
restricted.267 Neither the Committee nor the Commission has the power to 
compel States parties to resolve the dispute or to make binding decisions as to 
the merits of the complaint or any other aspect of the dispute. 
Another role of significance ascribed to the Committee268 is under the First 
Optional Protocol to the Covenant. Article 5 requires the Committee to 
receive and consider communications from individuals who claim to be victims 
of a violation of the Covenant by a State party that has accepted the 
Committee's competence under Article 1 of the Protocol. Again, the 
Committee's findings and comments made in relation to a communication are 
recommendatory and, although there may be some political incentive for 
States parties to adopt the recommendations made by the Committee in the 
context of an individual complaint, they are not bound to do so. 269 The 
262 Ibid. 
263 Clearly the political costs are too high, and the gains not great enough, for States to consider using 
such a mechanism in the human rights field. 
264 Article 4l(l)(e), ICCPR, above n.8. 
265 Article 42(l)(a), ICCPR, above n.8. 
266 Article 41 (I )(h), ICCPR, above n.8. 
267 Article 42(7)(b) and (c), ICCPR, above n. 8. 
268 Note also that under Article 3 of the Second Optional Protocol, States parties must provide periodic 
reports to the Committee on the progress made to implement the Protocol. Article 4 allows the 
Committee to receive and consider interstate communications about alleged breaches of the Protocol if 
the alleged violator and the complainant have accepted the Committee's competence to do so under 
Article 41 of the Covenant. Second Optional Protocol, above n. 250, Articles 3 and 4. 
269 See Greig, above n. l at 94-101. For example, the former Australian Labor Government responded 
to the report of the Committee in the Toonen communication by passing the Human Rights (Sexual 
Conduct) Act 1994. Toonen made an individual complaint to the Committee under the First Optional 
Protocol alleging that some provisions of the Tasmanian Criminal Code which outlawed certain sexual 
acts violated Australia's obligations under the Covenant. The Committee agreed, stating that Article 
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Committee must include in its annual report to the General Assembly a 
summary of its activities under the First Optional Protocol.270 
Possible Motivating Factors Behind the Comment 
In the first paragraphs of the Comment, the Committee sets out its reasons for 
making the Comment. It states that "[a]s of 1 November 1994, 46 of the 127 
States parties to the [ICCPR] had, between them, entered 150 reservations of 
varying significance to their acceptance of the obligations of the Covenant." 
271 The Committee expresses concern that the "number of reservations, their 
content and their scope may undermine the effective implementation of the 
Covenant and tend to weaken respect for the obligations of the States 
parties."272 The Committee points out that they also make it extremely 
difficult for States parties to determine what obligations reserving States have 
undertaken and the extent of treaty relations between themselves and other 
States parties. They also hinder the performance of the Committee's duties 
under Articles 40273 and 41 274 of the Covenant and under the Optional 
Protocols.275 As the Committee said, "[i]n order to know the scope of its duty 
to examine a State's compliance under Article 40 ... "276 the Committee must 
17, which sets out a privacy guarantee, was breached by these Criminal Code Provisions. (HRC 
Report, CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992). Much has been written concerning this complaint and analysing 
the HRC's report. For example, see generally: Sarah Pritchard, "Gay Rights Victory at the UN" 
(1994) 3(2) Human Rights Defender 13; R. Croome, "Australian gay rights case goes before the UN" 
(1992) 2 Australian Gay and Lesbian Law Journal 55; and I. A. Shearer, "Human Rights Committee -
The Toon en Case" ( 1995) 69(8) Australian Law Journal 600. For an analysis of the Act as a response 
to the HRC report, see generally: W. Morgan, "Identifying evil for what it is: Tasmania, sexual 
perversity and the UN" (1994) 19(3) Melbourne University Law Review 740; W. Morgan, "Protecting 
Rights or Just Passing the Buck? The Human Rights (Sexual Conduct) Bill 1994" (1994) 1(1) 
Australian Journal of Human Rights 409; and S. Bronitt, "Protecting sexual privacy under Criminal 
law: the Human Rights (Sexual Conduct) Act 1994" (1995) 19(4) Criminal Law Journal 222. 
270 Article 6, First Optional Protocol above n. 250. 
271 The Comment, above n. 17 at 124. Note this is a scenario common to all UN human rights 
treaties. The Women's Convention fares the worst, "with at least 23 of 100 states parties making a 
total of 88 substantive reservations"( as of February 1990). Cook, above n. 3 at 643-644. Clark 
reports that "Eighty five percent of multilateral agreements have no reservations entered, and of the 15 
percent that do, most do not relate to substantive provisions but to dispute resolution provisions.", 
ibid. The picture is completely different in relation to human rights treaties. Ibid at 282-283 & 316; 
Lijnzaad, above n.3; at 106; W. Schabas, "Invalid Reservations to the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights: Is the United States Still a Party?" ( 1995) 21 (2) Brooklyn Journal of International 
Law 277, at 288, [hereinafter "Invalid Reservations"]. 
272 Ibid. 
273 See above page 44. 
274 Section 41 allows for inter-State complaints. 
275 The First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR provides for individual communications to be made to, 
and determined by, the Committee on alleged breaches or non-implementation of Covenant obligations 
by those States parties that have ratified or acceded to this Protocol. The Committee may need to 
determine the effect and validity of a reservation to the Covenant or to the Protocol in order to fulfil its 
role under this Protocol. Under Article 4 of the Second Optional Protocol the Committee may consider 
2inter-State complaints of breach of the Protocol. 76 The Comment, above n. 17 at 129. 
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examine a State's reservations and interpretative declarations to determine 
their effect (if any) on the obligations undertaken by that State. The need to 
determine the effect of a reservation is perhaps even more important in the 
context of the Committee examining an individual communication under the 
first Optional Protocol. If the reservation has been made in relation ~ the 
provision or provisions allegedly breached by the applicant, a determination 
of its effect must be made before the merits of the communication can be 
considered. A valid, effective reservation will preclude the Committee from 
further considering the communication. 
The Committee has been concerned about the undermining effect of 
reservations on the Covenant for some time,277 but, after a history of less than 
effective action in relation to reservations,278 it only began to take a more 
aggressive role with States parties in relation to their reservations in the years 
immediately preceding 1994. For example, former Committee member Roslyn 
Higgins, in questioning Austria about possible withdrawal of its 
reservations,279 observed that relying on States to regulate the making of 
reservations sufficiently to protect the integrity of the Covenant had not 
worked. Therefore, the Committee was required to take up the slack, and in 
fact, was best placed to deal with reservations as " ... for the most part, States 
did not recognise their mutuality of interests in the field of human rights and 
failed to monitor reservations.280 The General Comment No. 24 reaffirms this 
position. 281 
In 1992, the US ratified the Covenant with several reservations and 
interpretative declarations.282 These reservations were the subject of much 
academic debate and criticism. It is likely that the reservations and the 
controversy they generated, provided further motivation to the Committee to 
277 The meetings of the Chairs of the human rights supervisory bodies have been discussing the issue 
of reservations to their treaties for a number of years. For example, see Effective Implementation, 
above n. 10. 
278 Lijnzaad observes that all the supervisory bodies failed adequately to regulate the making of 
reservations to their respective treaties, principally by failing to take a comprehensive and consistent 
approach to questioning States parties about their reservations. For example, she reports that 
commitments made by State representatives to the Committees were not always followed up by 
Committees when they were considering that State's next Report. Nor did they follow up their line of 
questioning on reservations when considering subsequent Reports. Lijnzaad, above n. 3 at 412-416. 
See also Bayefsky, above n. 259 at 431. 
279 CCPR/C/SR/1982. 1167, para 67; Lijnzaad, above n.3 at 413. 
280 Ibid. 
281 The Comment, above n. 17 at 129. 
282 
The US made five reservations, four interpretative declarations and five "understandings". 
M11/tilateral Treaties above n. 190. 
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prepare a General Comment on this topic. Since preparing the Comment283 the 
Committee has had occasion to examine for itself the US reservations284 and to 
apply the assertions it made in the Comment to the US in its consideration of 
the US initial report. For this reason, and by way of a case study, I propose to 
examine one of the US reservations, 285 and reactions to it, in some detail after 
-
examining the Comment itself. 
Content of the Comment 
The General Comment attempts to clarify what kinds of reservations can be 
made to the Covenant on the basis of the application of the object and 
purpose test set out in the Vienna Convention. It also addresses the gaps in 
the Vienna Convention rules relating to the effect of objections made under 
Article 20 and the making of incompatible reservations. The Comment has 
been welcomed as an important step in overcoming some of the inherent 
problems in the rules relating to reservations, at least in relation to the ICCPR, 
but possibly also in relation to human rights treaties generally. For example, 
Roslyn Higgins286 sees the Comment as a useful guide to States considering 
ratifying the Convention with reservations287 and believes it to signal the 
Committee's willingness to push the debate on reservations to human rights 
"in a realistic and consensus-building manner."288 By contrast, the UK and 
the US289 have criticised what they see as the Committee's mis-statement of 
the relevant international law and its attempt to assert a role for itself that was 
neither envisaged nor authorised by the treaty parties and that is contrary to 
established rules of international law. While these States agree that there is 
much confusion about the law of reservations and that certain reservations 
may be problematic,290 neither of them believe that the position taken by the 
283 November 1994. 
284 Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the /CCPR, Comments 
of the Human Rights Committee on the Initial Report of the United States of America, UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/79/Add. 50, 7 April 1995 [hereinafter Consideration of /st US Report]. 
285 The reservation to be discussed below relates to Articles 6 of the ICCPR, see page 71. 
286 Roslyn Higgins was a member of the Committee at the time the Comment was prepared. 
287 H. . . G d b 3 1ggms, m ar ner, a ove n. . 
288 Ibid. 
289 France has also been critical. France's observations are reproduced in Gardner, above n. 3 at Annex; 
also Greig above n. 1. 
290 The UK said that it "shares the Committee's concern that the integrity of the Covenant's treaty 
regime should not be undermined by too extensive a practice of reservations formulated by States on 
becoming Party to them. UK Ohservations above n. 155, at para 3. Similarly the US said that "[t]here 
can be no serious question about the propriety of the Committee's concern about the possible effect of 
excessively broad reservations ... nor any reasonable doubt regarding the general desirability of 
reservations that are specific, transparent and subject to review ... ". US Observations above n. 155, at 
introduction. 
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Committee to address these issues is justifiable or consistent with international 
legal principles. 
A: Role of States Parties' Objections 
The Covenant has no reservations provision.291 However, as we hav~seen, 
this does not mean that any reservation may be made to the Covenant.292 As 
the Covenant was concluded prior to the Vienna Convention, it is subject to 
the relevant rules of customary international law relating to reservations to 
multilateral treaties rather than the Vienna Convention rules in the strict sense. 
However, to the extent that the Vienna Convention represents the relevant 
customary norms, it applies to the Covenant. 
The Committee treats the admissibility rule in Article 19(c), relating to 
compatibility with the object and purpose, as a rule of customary international 
law that therefore applies to the ICCPR. 293 It said: "[t]he matter of 
reservations under the Covenant and the first Optional Protocol is governed 
by international law. Article 19(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties provides relevant guidance." 294 Thus, States parties may make 
reservations to the Covenant only if they are compatible with its object and 
purpose. 295 The Committee did not expressly state its views on the applicable 
law governing State party objections to reservations. It did not comment on 
the status of the Vienna Convention rules on objections in Articles 20 and 21 
as rules of customary law, nor did it enter the doctrinal debate about the 
correct interpretation of these rules. Rather, it asserts the view that these 
provisions are ill-suited to human rights and other normative treaties.296 It said 
that they "are inappropriate to address the problem of reservations to human 
rights treaties."297 
291 Lijnzaad reports that, although the Covenant is silent on reservations, the matter was discussed 
extensively during drafting. She says that no agreement could be reached on the content of such a 
~rovision so none was included. Lijnzaad, above n. 3 at 186. 
-
92 The Comment, above n. 17 at para 6. There is support for the view that the object and purpose 
test is a customary norm. See Elias who said: " [i]t seems best to accept the ... principle that 
compatibility with the object and purpose of the treaty is a suitable general criterion for determining 
the legitimacy of the reservations to multilateral treaties ... ",above n. 1 at 32. 
293 Ibid. 
294 For example, the European Court of Human Rights has used the test of compatibility 
notwithstanding that the European Convention on Human Rights is not subject to the Vienna 
Convention and has its own reservations provision that makes no reference to compatibility. See 
Loi::Jdou. above n. 157. 
295 The Committee goes to some lengths to spell out what sort of reservations, in its opinion, would 
fail to satisfy the admissibility requirement. The Comment, above n. 17. 
HJ(, I' . d" . b 
- ,efer 1scuss1011 a ove at pages 38-41. 
)'J7 
- The Comment, above n. 17 at 128. 
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The Committee's principal concern is the failure of States parties to object to 
incompatible reservations. In explaining the causes for this failure, the 
Committee, like many commentators before it, noted that because human 
rights treaties do not create "a web of inter-State exchanges of mutual 
obligations"298 and "concern the endowment of individuals with rig!its", 299 
the objections rules in the Vienna Convention are inadequate to govern 
reservations to human rights treaties. According to the Committee, these 
factors combine to act as a disincentive for States to object to reservations 
they consider to be inadmissible or otherwise unacceptable. 300 Those that do 
object, the Committee points out, do not always state the reason for the 
objection and even less frequently state what consequence they expect to 
flow from the objection. For these reasons, the Committee concludes, there is 
no discernible pattern of State practice on objections and therefore "it is not 
safe to assume that a non-objecting party thinks that a reservation is 
acceptable. "301 Finally, the Committee goes on to say that the special 
characteristics of the Covenant as a human rights treaty raises doubt about 
"what effect objections to reservations have between States inter se."302 All 
these factors lead the Committee to conclude that it "necessarily falls to [it] to 
determine whether a specific reservation is compatible with the object and 
purpose of the Covenant'',303 with any objections to reservations made by 
States parties to serve as "guidance to the Committee in its interpretation as to 
[the reservation's] compatibility ... ".304 
The US and the UK, in responding to the Committee,305 argue that the 
Committee has mis-stated the law applicable to objections to reservations 
made to the Covenant. The US said that the "Committee appears to dispense 
with the established procedures for determining the permissibility of 
reservations ... " .306 The US does not say what it considers the "established 
procedures" to be, but it observes that the Committee's conclusion that 
"[t]he absence of protest by States cannot imply that a reservation is either 
compatible or incompatible with the object and purpose of the Covenant"307 
298 Ibid. 
299 Ibid at para 17. 
300 Ibid. 
301 Ibid. See also above discussion at pages 40-42. 
302 Ibid. 
303 Ibid. at para. 18. 
30 ~ Ibid. 
305 See US Ohsen1atio11s and UK Observations, above n.155. 
106 . US Observatwns, above n. 155 at 132. 
107 . 
The Comment, above n. 17 at 128, para. 17. The Committee then goes on to suggest that 
reservations to human rights treaties must be evaluated on an objective basis and that States parties are 
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is "interesting, [but] contrary to the Covenant scheme and international 
law. "308 From this it could be assumed that the US sees the relevant 
international law at least as based on the opposability/subjective 
interpretation of Article 19( c) of the Vienna Convention. 
The UK assumes that the relevant law, presumably applicable as custom, 
derives from the Reservations Opinion and the Vienna Convention.309 It 
dismisses the Committee's assumption that human rights treaties are 
"different"310 and the Committee's conclusion that because of this difference, 
the "existing rules of international law are inadequate to cope" 311 with 
human rights treaties. The UK believes that "[t]he correct approach is rather 
to apply the general rules relating to reservations laid down in the Vienna 
Convention in a manner which takes full account of the particular 
characteristics of the treaty in question."312 The UK concludes on this point: 
Given, therefore, that the bilateral rights and general interests of other Parties are as 
indicated, directly affected, the United Kingdom regards it as a self-evident 
proposition that the reaction of those Parties to a reservation formulated by one of 
them is of direct significance both in law and in practice. 313 
Despite the fact that the US and the UK seem to indicate that there are rules, 
probably derived from Articles 20 and 21, relating to objections applicable to 
the ICCPR as customary norms, it is arguable that the lack of agreement about 
the meaning of the Vienna Convention rules and their practical application in 
the general international community,314 means that their content is too 
uncertain for them to be customary norms. Greig argues variously that Article 
20( 4) applies to Article 19( c ), that is, in favour of the opposability 
interpretation as custom,315 or, at least, that this interpretation is a plausible 
one.316 But given the doubt and the importance of determining whether the 
law as stated by the Committee, the US or the UK is accurate, it is necessary to 
not in a position to judge the compatibility of reservations on this basis. Ibid, at 128, para 18. 
308 US Observations, above n. 155 at 132. 
309 UK Observations, above n. 155 at 135, para 4. 
310 Ibid. 
311 It refers to the fact that the modern law of reservations to multilateral treaties is derived from the 
ICJ Reservations Opinion, and that the ICJ devised this law precisely because of the perceived need to 
take into account the special characteristics of human rights treaties like the Genocide Convention. See 
UK Observations, above n. 155 at 135, para 4. 
31 2 Ibid. Note that the UK does not suggest how the Vienna Convention rules can be applied flexibly 
to take account of the particular characteristics of the treaty in question. See also Greig, above n. I at 
93 & his n. 287. He asserts that the pattern of objections to human rights treaties does not differ 
greatly from the position under other types of treaty. Compare Lijnzaad, above n. 3 at 106; Clark, 
above n.3 at 282-283 & 316, who assert the opposite. 
31 3 Ibid at 136, para 5. See also the French reaction in Gardner, above n. I at Annex, para 5. 
314 See above discussion of the content of the admissibility test is at pages 26-33. 
·
11
' Greig, above n. I at 97 & 118. 
w. Ibid at I 12. 
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re-examine the Reservations Opinion317 and the Vienna Convention 
provisions on objections. 
Turning first to the Reservations Opinion, it will be recalled that, after 
establishing compatibility with the object and purpose as the admissibility test 
for reservations to the Genocide Convention, the ICJ went on to discuss the 
effect of objections on reservations.318 The Court said that an objection to a 
reservation would not result in the exclusion of the reserving State from the 
Convention. However, an objecting State could prevent the treaty coming 
into force between itself and the reserving State if it found the reservation to 
be incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention. In relation to 
permissible reservations, a State could object to a reservation and decide for 
itself the effect such an objection would have on its treaty relations with the 
reserving State.319 The ICJ said that: 
each State which is a party to the [Genocide] Convention is entitled to appraise the 
validity of the reservation, and it exercises this right individually and from its own 
standpoint. As no State can be bound by a reservation to which it has not 
consented, it necessarily follows that each State party objecting to [the reservation] 
will or will not, on the basis of its individual appraisal within the limits of the 
criterion of the object and purpose ... consider the reserving State to be a party to the 
Convention. 320 
There can be no doubt about the intention of the ICJ in relation to the role 
States parties play in negotiating the extent of their treaty relations with 
reserving States parties. The only fetter on States determining the extent of 
their treaty relations in this way is the compatibility with the object and 
purpose of the Convention test. 
This part of the Opinion found its way, in modified form, into Articles 20 and 
21 of the Vienna Convention. Article 20(4) of the Vienna Convention 
provides that the treaty parties will determine the effect that reservations shall 
have on their treaty relations with a reserving State party. While there is 
debate about the extent to which a State can accept a reservation that is 
inadmissible under Article 19, 321 there is little doubt that Article 20( 4) allows 
317 See above at pages 8-14 for a discussion of the ICJ Opinion. 
318 Ibid. 
319 Ibid, at 29-30. 
320 ICJ Rep. 1951, 15. 
321 UK Observation, above n. 155 at para 13. The UK points out that it is questionable whether 
Articles 20 and 21 were intended to cover inadmissible reservations. The UK is of the view that it was 
not so intended. It observes that it "is highly improbable that a reservation expressly prohibited by the 
treaty (the case in Article I 9(a) ... ) is open to acceptance by another Contracting State. And, if so, 
there is no clear reason why the same should not apply to the other cases enumerated in Article 19, 
including incompatibility with the object and purpose under 19(c)." ibid. 
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the States parties to decide, on the basis of their own policy interests, the 
extent of their treaty relations with reserving States. In this regard, Article 
20(4) closely follows the Reservations Opinion. 
Roslyn Higgins comments that the UK's concern322 at what it sees as an 
attempt by the Committee to do away with the role assigned to States parties 
in relation to reservations and to establish "a different legal regime to regulate 
reservations to human rights treaties",323 may "state the issue too broadly".324 
She asserts that the Comment does not ignore the Vienna Convention but 
rather, "seeks to provide an answer to the issue that neither the Court in the 
[Reservations Opinion], nor the Vienna Convention, ever addressed."325 On 
her analysis, the Committee may not be abandoning the existing legal regime 
but rather, seeking to provide answers to the unresolved issues related to the 
making of an incompatible reservation. 
However, the Committee is mistaken in its assumption that the doubtful effect 
of States' objections to reservations is the result of the special nature of 
human rights treaties. The Committee said that "because of the special 
characteristics of the Covenant as a human rights treaty, it is open to question 
what effect objections have between States inter se. "326 Non-reciprocity and 
the other unique features of human rights treaties identified by the Committee, 
might highlight the failings of the reservations rules,327 but they are not 
necessarily the cause of this doubtful effect. Rather, it is the fault of the 
Vienna Convention, which fails to adequately cover all, or even the most 
likely, eventualities, and to state the law unambiguously .328 Thus, it is not the 
case that only human rights treaties suffer from the lack of consensus about 
the role of objections to reservations. The problem is endemic to multilateral 
treaties. Nonetheless, in the context of the ongoing debate about the correct 
interpretation and application of the reservations rules, it is possible to 
interpret the above statement by the Committee, not as a radical deviation 
from accepted legal principles, but rather as an expression of the commonly 
322 Her comment applies equally to the US. 
323 UK Observations, above n. 155 at 135, para 3. 
124 H. . . G d b 3 
· 1ggms, m ar ner, a oven. , at xv. 
325 Ibid. 
326 The Comment, above n. 17 at 129, para 20. 
327 At least in regard to the rules in Section 2 of the Vienna Convention, but query whether there is 
some other version of rules more applicable, such as customary international legal norms that are not 
identical to the Vienna Convention rules. 
328 See above discussion on flaws in the Vienna Convention reservations rules, Chapter 2. See 
Lijnzaad for a discussion of the failure of the Reservations Opinion to establish working and fair rules 
on reservations. Lijnzaad, above n. 3 at 26-28 & 403-404. 
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held view that the meaning of the rules relating to objections are obscure and 
consequently it is truly "open to question what effect objections have 
between States inter se. "329 
B: Authority of the Committee to Determine the Validity of Reservations 
Much of the commentary on the Comment has focussed on the Committee's 
claim that it is best placed to determine the validity of reservations. In this 
regard, the Committee said that it "necessarily falls to [it] to determine 
whether a specific reservation is compatible with the object and purpose of 
the Covenant".330 While the authority of the Committee to comment on the 
law of reservations as it relates to the ICCPR is not questioned, its competence 
to do so in any authoritative manner is. The UK accepted that the 
"Committee must necessarily be able to take a view of the status and effect of 
a reservation where this is required to permit the Committee to carry out its 
substantive functions under the Covenant",331 but it expresses concern that 
the Committee purports to go beyond this. The UK focuses on the 
Committee's use of the word "determine"332 in the Committee's consideration 
of the status of reservations to the Covenant. Moreover, according to the UK, 
it uses 'determine' "in the context of its dictum that the task in question is 
inappropriate for the States Parties."333 The UK concludes that: 
[e]ven if it were the case (as the General Comment argues but the United Kingdom 
doubts ... ) that the law of reservations is inappropriate to address the problem of 
reservations to human rights treaties, this would not of itself give rise to a 
competence or power in the Committee except to the extent provided for in the 
Covenant; any new competence could only be created by amendment to the 
Covenant, and would then be exercisable on such terms as were laid down. 
The US expressed similar sentiments. It said that the General Comment 
"appears to go too far" 334 in its efforts to address the possible effects of 
"excessively broad reservations on the general protection and promotion of 
the rights reflected in the Covenant."335 The US states that the Covenant 
scheme "does not impose on States Parties an obligation to give effect to the 
329 The Comment, above n. 17 at para 17. 
330 Ibid, at 129, para 21. 
331 UK Observations above n. 155, at para 11. 
332 See the Comment, above n. 17 at 18; UK Observations, above n. 155 at para. I I; Higgins 
suggests that "too much is not to be read into the verb 'determine'.", in Gardner, above n.3 at xvi, her 
n. 7. 
333 UK Observations, above n. 155 at 137, para 11. 
33 ~ US Observations, above n. 155 at 131. 
33
S Ibid. 
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Committee's interpretations [of the Covenant] or confer on the Committee the 
power to render definitive or binding interpretations of the Covenant."336 
The US and the UK are careful not to accuse the Committee of assuming a 
competence to make binding determinations on matters relating to 
interpretation of the Covenant, including the effect of reservations. 'Ihe US 
confines itself to pointing out the absence of such competence in the 
Committee, and the UK merely expresses concern and calls for further 
discussion of the matter. Clearly, the Committee's intentions are not obvious 
to these States. However, Higgins suggests that the inference drawn by the 
US and the UK confuses "a competence to do something with the binding 
effect of that which is done."337 She is of the view that the Committee has not 
asserted that it has binding authority, but nonetheless, that it is able to 
consider reservations and express its 'opinion' on their validity. But it is 
whether the Committee is claiming an expanded power that is in contention. 
Thus, Higgins seems to mis-state the position of the US and the UK. While she 
is in no doubt as to the limits of the Committee's implicit338 and explicit 
powers, acknowledging that "[t]he Committee cannot compel a State to 
accept its view as to a reservation" ,339 Higgins suggests that there is room for 
the Committee to fill in the void in the Vienna Convention rules. She argues 
in support of the Committee that the objections rules are inappropriate for 
human rights treaties, and asserts that the application of the object and 
purpose test, while originally conceived as "an objective task, subjectively 
defined" ,340 need not "continue to be subjectively defined where a 
mechanism for 'objective' appraisal now exists."341 The objective mechanism, 
is, of course, the Committee. From the perspectives of the US, the UK, and 
other like minded States parties, it is difficult to see how the latter view can be 
consistent with the former, and avoid usurping the part played by States in 
determining acceptability of reservations. From their perspective, Higgins' 
defence of the Committee is too close to a claim for the Committee to provide 
the "jurisdictional plane" referred to in the Reservations Opinion.342 If, on the 
other hand, the Committee is only seen as expressing a non-authoritative 
'view' for the guidance of States parties, it should be less problematic. 
336 Ibid. 
337 H. . . G d b 3 1ggms, m ar ner, a ove n. at xx. 
338 
For a discussion of the extent of the Committee's implicit powers under the Covenant, see Greig, 
above 11. I at 94. 
339 
Higgins, above n. 3 at xxvii. 
340 Ibid. 
341 
Ibid. 
·'
42 !CJ Rep. 1951, 15 at 26. 
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C: Effect of Making an Incompatible Reservation - Severability 
It is essential to determine the intentions of the Committee in the Comment in 
order to assess the impact the suggestions in the Comment will have on the 
making of reservations to the Covenant. An important part of its suggestions 
relate to the effect on the treaty obligations of a State that has made an 
incompatible reservation. The Committee's conclusions on this point, while 
reflective of recent European Court practice, are radical as they appear to 
disregard the fundamental principle of treaty-making that States cannot be 
bound without their consent. The Committee commented that in the normal 
course of events, an off ending reservation would be severed from the 
reserving State's instrument of ratification or accession,343 with the result that 
"the Covenant will be operative for the reserving party without the benefit of 
the reservation."344 From the point of view of protecting the integrity of the 
ICCPR, and thus its efficacy, such an outcome seems reasonable. It is 
unacceptable for an incompatible reservation to have the same effect as a 
valid reservation.345 And, it is equally unsatisfactory for such a State to be 
excluded from the Covenant as long as universal participation in human rights 
treaties remains a principal aim. Yet these are the outcomes that the US 
proposes as the only viable options. 
The US refers to Article 20(4)346 as containing the relevant rule.347 According 
to it, this paragraph provides only two possible consequences for reserving 
States whose reservations have been the subject of objections on the ground 
of incompatibility.348 The first is that the "remainder" of the treaty enters into 
force for the two parties. The second is that it does not enter into force 
between the two parties. The US asserts that the third possibility suggested 
by the Committee, the treaty entering into force in its entirety after the 
reservation has been severed, is unlawful.349 The US said: 
The general view of the academic literature is that reservations are an essential part of 
a State's consent to be bound. They cannot simply be erased. This reflects the 
fundamental principle of the law of treaties: obligation is based on consent. A State 
which does not consent to a treaty is not bound by that treaty. A State which 
343 The Vienna Convention does not offer the option of severing an invalid reservation, although 
Article 44 refers to "separability" in relation to a ground for termination or suspension of, withdrawal 
from, specific provisions of a treaty. 
344 The Comment, above n.17 at 129. This reflects the outcome of the Belilos case before the 
European Court, above n. 118; See also Bowett, above n. I. 
345 On this point see Greig, above n. l at 52. 
346 Text is above at n. 160. 
347 US Observations, above n. I 55 at 134. 
348 Ibid. 
349 Ibid. 
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expressly withholds its consent from a ~rovision cannot be presumed, on the basis 
of some legal fiction, to be bound by it.- 50 
However, the application of paragraph 20(4) is uncertain and the US' view 
may not be correct. State practice offers little assistance. As the Committee 
noted, objections to reservations on the ground of incompatibility usually do 
-
not set out the objecting State's intention vis a vis its treaty relations with the 
reserving State. At best it may state that the objection is not intended to 
preclude the entry into force of the treaty between itself and the reserving 
State.351 Thus, one must speculate as to whether the objecting State considers 
its objection to have the effect of binding the reserving State to the whole of 
the treaty. However, the only conclusion to be drawn is that the objecting 
State's intention is that the treaty is in force as a whole. Otherwise, the 
outcome would be the same as if the objecting State had accepted the 
reservation,352 defeating any practical purpose of objecting. 
The second option outlined by the US (that the treaty does not enter into 
force) is also inadequate in the context of a human rights treaty. Presumably, 
an objecting State does not want to exclude a reserving State from all of its 
treaty obligations as this may leave the individuals in the reserving State's 
jurisdiction without any of the protections afforded by the treaty in question. 
The fact that many objectors make the point that the objection does not affect 
the treaty coming into force for it and the reserving State, may be evidence of 
a desire to avoid such an outcome.353 States appear still to be genuinely 
committed to universal participation in human rights treaties. The second 
option proposed by the US would undermine this commitment. 
As the Committee has subsequently expressed the view that the US 
reservations to Article 6 and 7 are incompatible,354 the US must feel 
350 Ibid, at 134-5. 
351 Norway's objection to the reservation made by Djibouti to the Children's Convention. Multilateral 
Treaties, above n. 190. 
352 See MacDonald, above n. 137 at 449. 
353 For example, Germany's objections to reservations made to the Children's Convention. 
Multilateral Treaties, above n. 190. 
354 Consideration of I st US Report above n. 284 at 3, paragraph 14. Note that the Comment was 
prepared 5 months before the Committee considered the initial report of the US; See below discussion 
of the reservation to Article 6 at pages 71-76. The US reservation to Article 7 (right to be free from 
torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment) states: 
The United States considers itself bound by Article 7 to the extent that "cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment" means the cruel and unusual treatment or punishment 
prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United 
States. 
Multilateral Treaties, above n. 190; A number of States have objected to this reservation on the ground 
that it is incompatible with the object and purpose of the Covenant or that it is made to a non-
derogable provision, ibid. For a discussion of reservations to non-derogable provisions see above pages 
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particularly vulnerable to suggestions that incompatible reservations are to be 
severed from ratification and the US bound by Articles 6 and 7 as set out in 
the Covenant. The UK expressed concern that the Committee's approach to 
incompatible reservations "would risk discouraging States from ratifying 
human rights conventions".355 It seems the US would not have ratifled the 
Covenant in the absence of its reservation to Article 6.356 The statement by 
the US in its Observations is unequivocal. It said the 
... reservations contained in the United States' instrument of ratification are integral 
parts of its consent to be bound by the Covenant and are not severable. If it were to 
be determined that any one or more of them were ineffective, the ratification as a 
whole could thereby be nullified. 357 
While agreeing that severing an incompatible reservation from ratification may 
be appropriate in limited circumstances,358 the UK strongly opposed the 
Committee's conclusion that severance would result in the party concerned 
being bound by those provisions that were the subject of its reservation. The 
UK agreed with the US that this would be contrary to the fundamental 
principle that a State cannot be bound by a treaty provision without giving its 
consent. It reiterated its support for the approach adopted by the ICJ in the 
Reservations Opinion that the maker of an incompatible reservation cannot be 
regarded as a party to the treaty unless it withdraws its reservation (at least 
until there is a determination on the "jurisdictional plane", ie., by an 
authoritative judicial body). 359 
The difficulty of reconciling the making of an invalid reservation with a 
States' ratification was considered by Bowett.360 In answering the question 
of what effect an impermissible reservation has, Bowett said that the making 
of the impermissible reservation reveals a "patent contradiction in the 
expression of will by the State."361 On the one hand there is the expression of 
36-38. Also Soering v UK, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) (1989). 
355 UK Observations, above n. 155 at para 14. 
356 Schabas, "Invalid Reservations" above n. 271 at 324. 
357 Ibid. In support of this view, Stewart, speaking of the death penalty, said" ... one could not 
realistically expect adoption of the Covenant to overrule the democratically expressed desires of a 
majority of citizens in a majority of states." D. Stewart, "US Ratification of the ICCPR: The 
Significance of the Reservations, Understandings and Declarations" ( 1993) 14 Human Rights Law 
Journal 77, at 83. Compare Schabas, "Invalid Reservations'', above n. 271 Schabas examines other 
US state practice, such as its signing of the Children's Convention without reservations, and concludes 
that the US intention is that it be bound by the Covenant in the event of its reservation to Article 6 
being determined illegal. Schabas, ibid. Of course the US may formulate reservations if and when it 
ratifies the Children's Convention. 
358 UK Observations, above n. 155 at para 14. 
359 Ib"d 1 , at para 14 & 15; US Observations, above n. 155 at para 5; ICJ Rep. 1951, 15 at 26. 
360 Bowett, above at n. I. 
361 Ibid, at 75. Bowett says that this contradiction does not occur when the reservation is formulated at 
the time of signing a treaty if the signing was insufficient to make the State a party to the treaty. The 
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the State's will to be bound by the treaty, as evidenced by its act of joining 
(ratification or accession). On the other hand there is the expression of the 
State's will to limit its consent to be bound by imposing conditions 
(reservations etc.) which are inconsistent with the intention to be bound 
because they are impermissible under the treaty itself. Bowett suggests that, 
-in principle, the former intention should prevail as it is the "overriding, the 
primary intention of the State" .362 The result is that the reservation is a 
nullity.363 He supports this view by suggesting that it is unlikely that States 
knowingly make impermissible reservations, but they fully understand the 
effect of giving consent to be bound by a treaty.364 However, he observes 
that there is no direct authority to support this view, only the "related, but not 
strictly analogous"365 issue of reservations to the Optional Clause (Article 
36(2)) of the Statute of the ICJ. 
In the Norwegian Loans366 and Interhandel3 67 cases, Judge Lauterpacht, in his 
dissenting opinions, like Bowett, considered that the best approach is to treat 
the matter of conflicting expressions of will as one of construction of the 
State's intent. In the Norwegian Loans case, Judge Lauterpacht considered 
the issue of severability after finding that a French reservation to its 
declaration recognising the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court under Article 
36(2) of the Statute of the Court was incompatible with the Statute. He 
decided the question of whether it was possible to sever the reservation from 
the declaration by examining the intention of the parties and the nature of the 
instrument concerned. 
In Interhandel the Court considered the US reservation to Article 36(2). After 
examining US State practice over a long period, Judge Lauterpacht found that 
the reservation was not severable. He said: 
If that reservation is an essential condition of the Acceptance in the sense that 
without it the declaring State would have been wholly unwilling to undertake the 
principal obligation then it is not open to the Court to disregard that reservation and 
at the same time to hold the accepting State bound by the declaration.368 
contradiction only arises when the State "purports to accept two inconsistent legal obligations." Ibid. 
362 Ibid, at 76. 
363 Ibid. 
364 According to Bowett, this fact means that the problem of incompatible reservations can be 
construed "as a 'mistake of law' and, in principle, a mistake of law as opposed to a mistake of fact will 
not operate so as to invalidate the treaty, however fundamental the mistake of law is" ibid; Article 48, 
Vienna Convention, above n. 2; Compare Greig, above n. I at 54. 16S ~ 
· · Bowett, above n. I, at 76. 
166 Case of Certain Norwegian Loans (Fr. v Nor.) !CJ Rep. 1957, 9. 
167 lnterhandel Case. (Switz. v US) !CJ Rep. 1959, 6. 
168 !CJ Rep. 1959, 6 at 117; Bowett, above n. I, at 76-77. 
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For obvious reasons, the US might prefer to rely on Lauterpacht' s conclusions 
in Norwegian Loans and Interhandel in relation to its reservation to Article 6. 
However, in the light of more recent judicial consideration of the severability 
of reservations it is difficult to predict whether the Lauterpacht view would 
prevail in the unlikely event that an authoritative judicial body was required 
-to decide the matter. In some recent cases, the European Court of Human 
Rights has adopted the opposite approach to deciding the severability of 
invalid reservations to the Convention it oversees, disregarding the statements 
of intent by States parties. The Human Rights Committee's Comment reveals 
that it, at least, finds these recent European Court decisions more persuasive 
than the Lauterpacht view. 
In Belilos v Switzerland369 before the European Court of Human Rights, the 
Swiss Government clearly stated during oral pleadings that it intended to be 
bound by the European Convention irrespective of any finding that its 
reservations to Article 6(1) 370 of the Convention were inadmissible.371 The 
intention of the party here was beyond doubt and the Court was able to sever 
the reservation in accordance with the Lauterpacht "test".372 However, the 
case of Loizidou v Turkey373 was different. In this case, Turkey had made 
reservations to its declaration accepting the individual petition mechanism 
under the European Convention.374 Unlike Switzerland in Belilos, Turkey 
argued before the European Court that if its reservations were found to be 
invalid, its declaration was inoperative.375 Turkey also asserted that it had 
made statements upon accepting the individual petition mechanism 
emphasising that 
it had to be clearly understood that the conditions built into the Declaration are so 
essential that disregarding any of them would make the entire Declaration void and 
369 See Belilos, above n. 118 
370 Article 6(1) enshrines the right to a hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal established by 
law. 
371 Council of Europe, Belilos Case: Notes of the Public Hearing 45-58 ( 1987) at 45. 
372 Although the European Court did not discuss the Lauterpacht decisions nor the issue of 
severability. It just assumed that the reservation, once held to be invalid, was severable and severed 
from the Swiss ratification of the Convention. This is not to suggest that because of the Swiss 
declarations this aspect of the decision has not been without its critics. See Imbert, "Temeltasch and 
the Strasbourg Commission", above n.3. See also Weber, above n. 119 in which the European Court, 
after finding the reservation in question to be invalid, simply said that the provision that had been the 
subject of the reservation applied as if the reservation had not been made. ibid, at para 38. 
373 Loizidou v Turkey, above n.157. 
374 Articles 25 and 46. Turkey's reservations purported to limit its acceptance of the individual 
complaint mechanism so that it applied in territory "to which the Constitution of the republic of 
Turkey is applicable" or to the "national territory of Turkey'', 1987 Yearbook, Eur. Conv. on H. R., 8. 
375 Ibid at 27. 
60 
lndira Rosenthal 
T CHAPTER3 
thus lead to the conseCJ.Pence of a complete lapse of Turkey's acceptance of the right 
of individual petition. 6 
But the Court dismissed the Turkish statements and said that Turkey "must 
have been aware"377 that State practice revealed a consistent pattern by 
parties to the European Convention of unconditional acceptance of lhe 
competence of the European Commission and Court, and thus, that its 
reservations "were of questionable validity under the Convention and might 
be deemed impermissible by the Convention organs." 378 The Court 
concluded that "the ex post facto statements by Turkish representatives 
cannot be relied upon to detract from the respondent Government's basic, 
albeit qualified, intention to accept the competence of the Commission and the 
Court. "379 
The decision in Loizidou indicates that the European Court is unlikely to be 
persuaded by governmental intentions, even those emphatically expressed, to 
deviate from its decision to sever and then ignore an invalid reservation. The 
Court has not said that a State's intentions are irrelevant in determining 
whether an invalid reservation is to be severed from a State's declaration of 
acceptance of the Convention, but it is arguable that expressions of such 
intentions will not override the State's expression to be bound by the 
Convention. This approach is favoured by Schabas,380 who, after examining 
US state practice, concludes that the subsequent US statements that its 
reservations to Articles 6 and 7381 of the ICCPR are indivisible from its consent 
to be bound by the ICCPR, do not affect its first expression of intent to be 
bound by the Covenant.382 Under his analysis, the US is bound by these 
Articles, and is also in breach of them.383 
376 Statement of Turkish Delegate to the Committee of Ministers to the Council of Europe, in 
Council of Europe, European Court of Human Rights, Doc. Cour/Misc (94) 271, 35. 
377 Loizidou, above n. 157 at 28. 
378 Ibid. In fact a number of States had objected to the Turkish reservations and the Court had found 
reservations of a similar nature invalid in two earlier cases. (See Belgian Linguistics Case, I ECHR 
(Ser. 8) 432 (1962) and Kjeldsen v Netherlands, 21 ECHR (Ser. 8) 119 ( 1978)). The Court said these 
objections and earlier decisions meant that Turkey was well aware of its fragile position prior to 
making its declarations. Loizidou, ibid, at 28; See Schabas, "Invalid Reservations", above n. 271 at 
321. 
379 Loizidou, ibid. 
380 Schabas, "Invalid Reservations", above n. 271. 
381 Below at pages 71-76. 
382 Ibid, at 324. 
383 Ibid. He asserts that the US is in breach of Article 6(5) on the basis of several juvenile executions 
since the Covenant came into force for the US. He also states that the US is in breach of Article 7 
because of the use of gas chambers in carrying out the death sentence. He says that the Committee has 
"ruled" that the gas chamber constitutes torture, or inhuman treatment or punishment. See Views of 
the Human Rights Committee: Communication No. 46911991, Ng v. Canada, UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/49/D/469/ 1991 ( 1993 ). 
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Like the Bowett view384 the European Court seems to be of the view that 
Turkey's first expression of will, to be bound by the Convention, prevailed 
over its second expression of its will, its reservation. A difficulty with this 
approach is that, in this case, as in the case of the US reservations to Articles 6 
and 7 of the ICCPR,385 the two expressions of will appear to occur _ 
simultaneously and to be indivisible. States are likely to fiercely resist such an 
approach as they are always anxious to defend against any real or perceived 
encroachment on their sovereignty, and they will rightly point out that none 
of the treaty supervisory bodies have the power to effect severance of 
reservations, or to ignore the lack of a State's consent to be bound. If a State 
declares at the time of accession or ratification that its reservations are integral 
to its ratification and cannot be severed, such an approach will be even less 
acceptable. Thus, it is difficult to see how severance, as envisaged by the 
Committee, and implemented by the European Court, could be an acceptable 
method of dealing with incompatible reservations to the UN human rights 
treaties. 
Greig386 says that, "unless some objective factor is introduced into the 
equation"387 the difficulties in making determinations about the effect of 
incompatible reservations cannot be resolved. The Human Rights Committee 
and its supporters assert that General Comment 24 purports to introduce such 
an objective element. The Committee openly acknowledges the failure of the 
subjective system to regulate the making of reservations and attempts to 
devise an objective means ( i.e. its own judgement) to alleviate the problems 
caused by this subjectivity. But not only will the Committee probably have to 
battle States' unwillingness, possibly justified, to accept any determinations it 
may make about the validity of reservations, it may have to overcome any 
perception of its own want of objectivity. Bayefsky asserts that the 
Committee suffers a lack of credibility because some of its members have been 
ill-qualified or clearly not independent of their governments.388 If the 
Committee is to increase its authority, even symbolically, so that its Comment 
can be accepted, even as a document worthy of discussion, if not as a 
384 See above at page 66 & n. 152. 
385 See discussion below at pages 63-68. 
386 Greig, above n. I. 
387 Ibid, at 171; Greig suggests applying the principles of equity and reasonableness to the making of 
determinations about reservations. For a more detailed discussion of Greig's view see below at page 
73-76. 
388 Bayefsky, above n. 259 at 430. Although she suggests that these problems are not limited to the 
Human Rights Committee, ibid at 432-433 in relation to the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination [hereinafter Race Convention]. 
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prescription for change, it will need to be very careful about its own image 
and ensure it is not, and does not appear, biased. 
There is no ready answer to the seemingly insurmountable obstacles to 
devising a more effective reservations framework. The single most obstructive 
factor is the decision by the negotiating parties to the ICCPR and the other 
UN human rights treaties to choose to establish a supervisory body with no 
binding authority to interpret, and ensure compliance with, the treaty 
provisions. This is, of course, a factor that cannot be resolved by tinkering 
with procedure. Overcoming it may require States to adopt an entirely 
different attitude to human rights and to reservations to human rights treaties. 
Some other ways of governing reservations to human rights treaties are 
suggested in the next chapter. 
The US Reservations To Article 6 Of The IC CPR: A Case Study 
The following discussion examines the US reservations to Article 6 of the 
ICCPR in light of the above discussion on the Human Rights Committee's 
views on the compatibility test and the effect of making an incompatible 
reservation. 
Article 6 guarantees the right to life, and is non-derogable under Article 
4(2).389 Article 6 is as follows. 
1. Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected 
by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life. 
2. In countries that have not abolished the death penalty, sentence of death may 
be imposed only for the most serious crimes in accordance with the law in force 
at the time of the commission of the crime and not contrary to the provisions of 
the present Covenant and to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide. This penalty can only be carried out pursuant to a final 
judgement rendered by a competent court. 
3. When deprivation of life constitutes the crime of genocide, it is understood that 
nothing in this article shall authorise any State party ... to derogate in any way 
from any obligation assumed under the provisions of the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. 
4. Anyone sentenced to death shall have the right to seek pardon or commutation 
of the sentence. Amnesty, pardon or commutation of the sentence may be 
granted in all circumstances. 
5. Sentence of death shall not be imposed for crimes committed by persons below 
eighteen years of age and shall not be carried out on pregnant women. 
389 Article 4(2) prohibits derogation from Articles 6 (right to life), 7 (prohibition on torture), 8( I) & 
(2) (prohibitions on slavery and servitude), 11 (no imprisonment for debt), 15 (11111/11111 cri111e11 sine 
lege), 16 (right to legal personality), and 18 (freedom of thought, conscience and religion). 
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6. Nothing in this article shall be invoked to delay or prevent the abolition of 
capital punishment by any State party to the present Covenant.390 
The US reservation to Article 6 states: 
That the United States reserves the right, subject to its Constitutional constraints, 
to impose capital punishment on any person (other than a pregnant woman) duly 
convicted under existing or future laws permitting the imposition of capital 
punishment, includin~ such punishment for crimes committed by persons below 
eighteen years of age. 91 
Eleven European States parties have objected to the US reservation to Article 
6 on the ground that it is incompatible with the object and purpose of the 
Covenant.392 For example, the Netherlands stated in its objection that "it 
follows from the text and the history of the Covenant that the [US] 
reservation is incompatible with the text, the object and purpose of Article 
6" .393 Finland went further, claiming that "the right to life is of fundamental 
importance in the Covenant and the ... reservation therefore is incompatible 
with the object and purpose of the Covenant".394 Some other objecting 
States parties395 referred to the fact that Article 6 was non-derogable and 
therefore could not be the subject of a reservation.396 The reservations also 
generated considerable academic literature. 
The principal objection to the reservation to Article 6 is that it is incompatible 
with the object and purpose of the Covenant, but it has also been criticised for 
its breadth and lack of clarity.397 Schabas398 in particular, criticises it on this 
ground. He observes that, although the US reservation appears to deal only 
with the subject matter in paragraph 6(5) of the Covenant, because of its 
failure to specify that its reservation is limited to this paragraph, it is possible to 
read it as reserving the whole of Article 6. Its failure to specify which 
390 Article 6, ICCPR above n. 8. 
391 Multilateral Treaties, above n. 190. 
392 Ibid, at 123. 
393 Multilateral Treaties, above n. 190, reproduced in Markus Schmidt, "Reservations to United 
Nations Human Rights Treaties - The Case of the Two Covenants", in Gardner, above n. 3, at 21 & 
26. 
394 Ibid. 
395 For example, Spain, Italy and Finland. Ibid. 
396 Although not necessarily because a reservation to a non-derogable treaty provision would 
automatically be incompatible with the object and purpose of the Covenant and therefore, invalid, but 
because they did not want a precedent of tolerating reservations to non derogable provisions to be set. 
ibid. For a discussion of the link between non-derogable provisions and incompatible reservations see 
above at pages 33-34; Buergenthal, above n. 146 at 24-25; Schabas, "Reservations Reform", above 
n.67 at 50-53; note that, in relation to a reservation to the comparable provision in the Inter-American 
Convention on Human Rights (Article 4), the American Court of Human Rights said that a reservation 
to a non-derogable provision would be invalid as incompatible if it sought wholly to exclude the 
o~ration of that provision. Restrictions to the Death Penalty Opinion above n. 144 at para 61. 
3 7 Refer to above discussion of ambiguity and breadth of reservations as a ground for their 
incompatibility, above pages 35-36. 
398 Schabas, "Invalid Reservations", above n.271at283. 
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domestic laws it intends to protect with its reservation makes its scope difficult 
to determine. He says that this means the reservation "must be assessed with 
reference to the worst possible hypotheses."399 According to him, such an 
assessment leaves open the possibility of the US allowing execution of very 
young children and the insane. Interestingly, Stewart400 gives this p~t of the 
reservation the opposite interpretation. He says that the reservation allows 
US legislatures to adopt legislation prohibiting the imposition of the death 
penalty for crimes committed by those under 18. Strictly speaking, the 
reservation could be given this interpretation, but an ordinary reading of it 
suggests that the opposite is meant. It is more likely that it allows for the 
possibility that US legislatures may impose the death penalty on people under 
the age of 18. In fact, the US Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality 
of state laws permitting the imposition of the death penalty for especially 
serious crimes committed by juveniles aged 16 and 17.401 
According to Schabas, the worst possible interpretation of the reservation 
would also allow the US to introduce capital punishment for crimes other than 
the "most serious crimes", including political crimes and crimes without 
violence, and to arbitrarily deprive people of their life.402 Although this 
interpretation seems extreme and is likely to be denied by the US at this time, it 
is not inconceivable that it could be relied upon by the US in the future to 
extend its use of capital punishment. Any judicial body required to interpret 
the reservation403 as part of a dispute resolution404 would have to consider if 
399 Ibid. 
400 Stewart above n. 357 at 81. 
401 Ibid. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 US 361 (1988); Thompson v. Okalahoma, 467 US 815 
(1987). The Human Rights Committee criticised this in its consideration of the US initial report on 
the Covenant. Consideration of /st US Report, at 4, para 9. 
402 Ibid. at 282-284. 
403 The Vienna Convention has its own treaty interpretation provision in Article 31 (I). Note that, as a 
reservation forms part of the treaty text, at least once it is accepted, it is appropriate to apply the same 
rules of interpretation to it. Analyses of treaty interpretation principles and practice abound. I do not 
propose to discuss this complex area here. See generally, McNair, above n. 22 at 364-392; Oppenheim, 
above n. 67 at 1267-1284; Thirlway H, "The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice 
1960-1989" Part Three, 1992 British Yearbook of /11temational Law, 1-72; Elias, above n. I, at 71-84; 
Rosenne, Developments, above n. I (particularly on good faith in treaty interpretation at 135-173). 
~04 Such an occasion is unlikely ever to arise. The effect of the US withdrawal of its acceptance of the 
compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ is that there is no forum in which it could be considered. Even if 
the US did accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ and did not limit its acceptance by reservations 
to exclude matters arising under the ICCPR, it is extremely unlikely that another State party would feel 
sufficiently aggrieved by an alleged US violation of the Covenant to seek resolution of the resultant 
dispute in the ICJ. A US ratification of the First Optional Protocol is unlikely to change this 
situation. An adverse finding against the US by the Committee under this Protocol might be 
politically embarrassing for the US, but of limited practical effect given that its findings are 
recommendatory only. 
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the norm in Article 6 prohibits the extension of the use of the death penalty 
before pronouncing the reservation incompatible with that Article. 
Lijnzaad, 405 in assessing whether reservations to Article 6 would 
automatically be incompatible with the object and purpose of the Covenant, 
considers whether Article 6 requires the abolition of the death penaTiy and 
whether the Article is part of the object and purpose of the Covenant. She 
concludes that the drafting of the Second Optional Protocol406 proves that 
Article 6 is not abolitionist in intent.407 On this basis, a reservation to Article 6 
that stresses the permissibility of the death penalty408 probably would not be 
invalid as incompatible with the object and purpose of the Covenant. 
Nevertheless, she further observes that Article 6 does contain "a general 
tendency to abolish the death penalty."409 Therefore, she concludes, 
"[i]ncreasing the number of cases in which the death penalty may be imposed 
is contrary to the spirit of the provision, and is in general contrary to the 
obligation to implement the CCPR."410 
Schmidt411 agrees with Lijnzaad's conclusion on Article 6, but goes one step 
further. He states that current developments and State practice appear to be 
moving in the direction of outlawing the death penalty at international law.412 
In support, Schabas,413 states that the issue of the death penalty has always 
been central to the purpose of Article 6. 414 According to him, "[i]n keeping 
with the general purpose of the right to life provision in the [Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights415], the Covenant's drafters provided a more 
explicit definition of the limitations of the death penalty ... with a view to its 
eventual abolition."416 He believes State practice and Committee activity 
405 Lijnzaad, above n. 3 at 205. 
406 Second Optional Protocol, above n. 250. 
407 The Human Rights Committee's General Comment 6( 16) on Article 6, UN GAOR, Hum. Rts. 
Comm. 16th Sess., 378th mtg, at 2-3, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Add. l (1982) reiterates that the Article 
does not abolish the death penalty. 
408 The US reservation to Article 6 assumes that Article 6 does not prohibit capital punishment. 
409 Lijnzaad, above n. 3 at 205. 
410 Ibid. 
411 Schmidt above n.393 at 21. 
412 For example, he cites the conclusion of the Second Optional Protocol and the fact that 28 States 
had ratified or acceded to it as of I May 1995, ibid, at 26. Multilateral Treaties. above n. 190. 28 States 
is not very many, though perhaps more than expected given the prevalence of the use of capital 
ru nishment. 
13 Schabas, "In valid Reservations'', above n. 27 I. 
414 Ibid, at 298-299. 
415 Universal Declaration of Human Rights ( 1948), (Article 3) reproduced in UN Doc. ST/HR/Rev. 5 
~vol I/Part I) I, at 2. 
16 The Committee has prepared two General Comments on the right to life. The first one reveals that 
the Committee considers the death penalty issue to be central to the general purpose of Article 6. See 
General Comment 6( / 6) on Article 6, UN GAOR, Human Rights Committee 16th Sess., 378th mtg, 
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under the Covenant, primarily under Article 40, supports this conclusion.417 
States parties report on the use of the death penalty in their country and the 
Committee routinely questions States parties about the use of the death 
penalty and measures taken by the State to further limit its use, urging them to 
abolish it altogether.418 Evaluated in this light, the US reservation "fil_Jpears to 
run counter to the purpose and object of the Covenant and is thus 
unacceptable. "419 
The Human Rights Committee appears to agree with the conclusions of 
Lijnzaad, Schabas and Schmidt. In its consideration of the US initial report,420 
the Committee, after noting the "concerns" expressed by the US in its 
Observations on the General Comment, 421 itself expressed concern about the 
excessive number of offences punishable by the death penalty in a number of 
states in the US and the number of death sentences handed down.422 Further, 
"[i]t deplores the recent expansion of the death penalty under Federal law 
and the re-establishment of the death penalty in certain States."423 The 
Committee then declared the US reservation to Article 6(5) to be invalid as 
incompatible with the object and purpose of the Covenant424 and 
recommended that it be withdrawn.425 
Given that the weight of opinion suggests that the death penalty is not 
outlawed at international law, the issue that seems to have occupied much of 
the discussion is whether a reservation, like the US reservation to Article 6, 
that purports to 'extend' the use of the death penalty, including contrary to 
the minimalist requirements set out in paragraph 5 of Article 6, is incompatible 
with the object and purpose of the Covenant? However, even allowing for 
at 2-3, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Add. I (1982); The second relates to the right to life and issues relating 
to war and nuclear weapons. See General Comment 14(23) of Article 6, UN GAOR, Human Rights 
Committee 14th Sess., Annex VI, Supp. No. 40, at 162, UN Doc .. A/40/40 (1985). 
417 Ibid. 
418 Ibid. 
419 Schmidt, above n. 393 at 26. 
42
° Consideration of /st US Report, above n. 284. 
421 Ibid,at3,para13. 
42 2 Ibid, al 3, para 16. 
421 Ibid. According to Schabas, the Comment also suggests that the US reservation to Article 6(5), to 
the extent that it frees the US from any obligation to refrain from imposing capital punishment on a 
person under 18 years of age, is illegal for violating a customary norm. Schabas, "Invalid 
Reservations'', above n. 271 at 296. 
424 Ibid, at 3, para 14; The Inter-American Court of Human Rights supports this view to some extent. 
It has held that there is a customary norm prohibiting the execution of children. However, it also held 
that the norm only extends to an unspecified age under eighteen years. "Application of Death Penalty 
in the US: Violation of Human Rights Obligation Within the Inter-American System" ( 1987) 8 
Hu111a11 Ri1thts Law Jou ma/ 355; Schabas, ibid. 
425 Consideration of /st US Report, above n. 284 at 5, para 27. 
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the difficulties of determining object and purpose, the US reservation appears 
to be invalid as it is patently incompatible with paragraph 5 of Article 6. Thus, 
according to the Committee's own conclusions in the Comment,426 it is to be 
treated as severed from the US instrument of ratification. Although the 
Committee failed to make this point in its consideration of the US initial report, 
one can only assume that it will adhere to its views in the Comment and thus, 
consider the US to be bound by the whole of Article 6. 
Conclusion 
The US reservation to Article 6 highlights the practical implications of the 
Committee's General Comment. While it may prove to be a useful guide to 
States considering ratifying with reservations,427 its conclusion as to the effect 
of an incompatible reservation is clearly problematical. Given that the issue is 
likely only to arise in the Committee's consideration of future US reports,428 
the fact that, presumably in the mind of the Committee, the US reservation is 
severed from its instrument of ratification and is bound by all of Article 6, is 
likely to have a minimum impact. However, the Committee may not always be 
able to avoid the implications of its Comment, and the inevitable stand-off 
between the Committee and the US over this issue may weaken the authority 
of the Committee's views on this and other matters it may address in the 
future. This would be an unfortunate outcome, given that the Human Rights 
Committee is the body of experts directly responsible for ensuring, to the best 
of its ability and within the limits of its competence, that the object and 
purpose of the ICCPR is met. Its view of the effect of incompatible 
reservations is clearly one that will need to be addressed by the work of the 
ILC, which is discussed in the next chapter. 
426 The Comment, above n. 17 at 129, para 21; above discussion at pages 48-58. 
427 As suggested by Higgins, above at page 54, n. 291. 
428 Rather than in a contentious case before the ICJ or under the First Optional Protocol. 
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Introduction 
Although the Human Rights Committee did not present its General Comment 
24(52) as a reform proposal, the Comment, in describing what is arguably a 
new role for the Committee, is clearly about change. The change is aimed at 
improving the operation of the Vienna Convention reservations regime in 
respect of the ICCPR. The Committee was prompted to make the Comment in 
a climate of increasing concern amongst the human rights treaty supervisory 
bodies and writers about the impact that reservations were having on the 
efficacy and authority of human rights treaties.429 There is a strong feeling 
that something needs to be done to improve the situation, and most critics of 
the reservations regime offer some suggestions for change along with their 
criticisms. The International Law Commission,430 has once again entered the 
discussion on reservations rules and is now devising means to address the 
identified gaps and ambiguities in the rules.431 
The reform proposals include legislative and procedural alterations. Some 
would require abandonment of the existing regime and others only 
adjustments of it. Like the General Comment, all are directed towards 
improving the efficacy of the regime and re-balancing the rights of all treaty 
parties. They also reveal, once again, the extremely complicated, and difficult 
nature, legally and politically, of this area of international law. 
The following chapter will examine a sample of some of the most commonly 
suggested reform proposals and will measure their likely effectiveness against 
their ability to overcome the problems at which they are aimed, and against 
the likelihood of States accepting and implementing them. 
429 Personal Communication from Elizabeth Evatt, member of the Human Rights Committee, 2 
August 1996; also Effective Implementation, above n. I 0. 
430 See SR Preliminary Report, above n. 108; Second Report on Reservations to Treaties by Alain 
Pellet, Special Rapporteur, UN Doc. A/CN.4/477 [hereinafter SR Second Report]. Note that the 
Committee of Legal Advisers on Public International Law (CAHDI) of the Council of Europe has also 
been considering the rules on reservations. Its work is not considered here in the interests of space. 
See Meeting Report of 21-22 March 1995, CAHDI (95) 5, and Issues Concerning Reservations, 
Summary and Suggestions by the Delegation of Austria, CAHDI (95) 24. Note also that it will 
consider this issue again at its next meeting in early September 1996. 
431 See below at pages 79-82 for a discussion of the ILC' s current work on this issue. For a history of 
its previous work on reservations see Ruda, above n. 1 at 156-179; Rosenne, Guide to Vienna 
Co11ve11tion, above n. 1; Rosenne, Developments, above n. l. 
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Proposals For Procedural Reform: Role of the Supervisory Bodies 
The most common procedural reform relates to the work of the human rights 
treaties' supervisory bodies. Suggestions for reform include enhancing the 
role of the supervisory bodies to enable them to assess the validity of 
reservations, determine the effect of invalid reservations and provide guidance 
to state parties, existing and potential, in relation to the making of reservations 
to their respective treaties.432 This is what the Human Rights Committee has 
done in its General Comment 24. Calls have also been made for the 
supervisory bodies to tackle the questioning of States parties on their 
reservations in a more consistent and probing fashion,433 to prepare guidelines 
on the making of reservations,434 and to approach international human rights 
law in a more coherent fashion when considering the effect of a State party's 
reservation on its general human rights treaty obligations.435 To this end, the 
supervisory bodies could look at the extent to which States have accepted 
the same or similar obligations under other human rights instruments. 
However, as most reservations are admissible and a legitimate method by 
which States can limit the extent to which they are bound by a treaty, such 
questioning should focus on reservations of doubtful compatibility with the 
object and purpose of the treaty. These reforms would be relatively easy to 
implement, requiring action by the supervisory bodies only. 
Tougher questioning of States parties may bring greater pressure on reserving 
States to withdraw their reservations. Or it may just expose the reserving 
State to greater scrutiny of its implementation of treaty obligations. Both 
outcomes would be valuable in ensuring that the issue of reservations to 
human rights treaties maintains a high profile from which may spring the more 
fundamental reforms required. As always, the attitude of States to the 
introduction of such measures from the supervisory bodies is essential to their 
success. Without State party support, any measures the supervisory bodies 
might take to clarify or toughen the reservations process cannot succeed. 
432 For example, Lijnzaad, above n.3 at 412-420; Bayefsky, above n. 259 at 435; D. Shelton, "State 
Practice on Reservations to Human Rights Treaties" ( 1983) Canadian Yearbook of International Law, 
205, at 227; Schmidt, above n. 393 at 33; First Report of the Committee on International Human 
Rights Law and Practice of the International Law Association, [hereinafter ILA Report], at 12-22. A 
discussion of its views is below at pages 78-79. 
ff\ Lijnzaad, above n. 3 at 416 . 
. n.i Ibid, at 415; the General Comment may be viewed as an attempt at guidelines by the Human 
Ri!!hts Committee . 
.t:I:' Lijnzaad, above n. 3 at 420. 
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The suggestions for procedural reform are in essence about substantive reform 
since they necessarily involve a judgement that the subjective regime 
established by the ICJ and, arguably by the Vienna Convention rules, should 
be replaced, or at least, down-graded. 
Proposals For Legislative Reform 
A: Judicialising the System 
The proposals for amendment to the Vienna Convention, or to the human 
rights treaties themselves, are necessarily more radical than those suggestions 
aimed only at the procedure of the supervisory organs. For example, 
Bayefsky436 argues that the "reporting scheme does not work for States that 
are subject to no internal scrutiny".437 Accordingly, it should be scrapped and 
be replaced with country rapporteurs or treaty monitoring bodies, assigned to 
each ratifying State. These rapporteurs or bodies would investigate the 
implementation of the State's treaty obligations and, presumably, report back 
to the relevantsupervisory body.438 She also suggests that individual 
complaint handling be judicialised,439 perhaps in a way similar to the European 
or Inter-American human rights system where courts, with the power to make 
binding determinations, hear and consider individual complaints,440 interpret 
treaty and protocol provisions and resolve inter-State disputes.441 
Such proposals appear to be based on the belief that the UN human rights 
system would have been more effective if the supervisory bodies were 
enforcement bodies with competence to make authoritative determinations in 
relation to disputes, individual complaints and treaty interpretation. However, 
the negotiating parties of all the UN human rights treaties with which we are 
concerned, decided against establishing such a body and it seems unlikely 
436 Bayefsky, above n. 259. 
437 Ibid, at 435. 
438 Ibid. 
439 Bayefsky does not specify her preferred method of judicialisation. However, she does say that her 
suggestion "depends on overhauling the quality and expertise of the players. Without doing that, of 
course, judicialization would not be a positive development." Bayefsky, above n. 259 at 438. 
440 Of course the decisions of the organs under the European and Inter-American Conventions of 
Human Rights under their individual communication mechanisms are binding (but not directly 
enforceable) only on the parties to the dispute who must have explicitly accepted the Court's 
competence to hear and determine individual complaints. See discussion on the role and authority of 
these Courts, above at pages 20-25. 
441 Bayefsky makes a couple of other suggestions for change, such as, drafting a non-optional right of 
individual petition for every human rights treaty, and encouraging TV coverage and press conferences in 
ratifying States. Those States that refused to allow such media coverage would be excluded from the 
treaty. These suggestions are likely to be very unpopular and raise many important issues, including 
questions of consent and sovereignty. 
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that they would now agree to create new, or transform the existing bodies 
into, authoritative bodies.442 
B: A Different Regime for Human Rights Treaties? 
The ongoing discussion about the Vienna Convention reservations wles and 
human rights treaties has often incorporated consideration of whether the 
rules are suited to human rights treaties. It will be recalled that, in its 
Observations on the Human Rights Committee's General Comment 24,443 the 
UK vigorously denied that human rights treaties were "different" and 
therefore did not need, nor were they subject to, a different set of reservations 
rules. In fact, few critics of the Vienna Convention rules suggest that a 
separate, human rights treaty-oriented, regime is required. One of these few is 
Hylton,444 who, it will be remembered, suggests that different reservations 
frameworks are required for different types of treaties.445 For example,446 
Hylton distinguishes those treaties that are legislative or regulate international 
conduct. This is the group of treaties for whom it is most commonly said that 
the Vienna Convention reservations rules are ill-suited. And, it is into this 
category that human rights treaties would most likely fall. 447 Hylton favours a 
collegiate system448 for these treaties as he believes it would reduce 
fragmentation and "sham" ratifications" 449 whereby a reserving State can 
442 There must be serious doubt as to whether even the European Court of, and Commission on, 
Human Rights could be established in their present form if they were being created today. One may 
speculate as to how many European States would have accepted the Court's competence to hear 
individual complaints, or even agreed to giving a supervisory body binding authority if they had 
foreseen the outcome in cases like Loizidou. Loizidou, above n. 157. The Human Rights 
Committee's General Comment is partially aimed at filling in, as best as it is able given its limited 
mandate, the gap left by the negotiating States to the ICCPR when they decided against establishing 
such a body. The Committee clearly states in the Comment that it is the only body able to make any 
consistent decisions, albeit non-binding, on the validity and effect of reservations to the ICCPR. It 
defends its position strongly against the criticisms of States, such as the US and the UK, that it has no 
power to determine reservations on the basis that realistically, in the absence of an authoritative 
decision maker, and given the paucity of State objections to reservations of dubious validity, it is 
incumbent upon it, as the supervisory body, to so determine. The Comment, above n. 17; US 
Observations, above n. 155; UK Observations, above n. 155; Personal Communication with Elizabeth 
Evatt, member of the Human Rights Committee, 2 August 1996; Hylton, above n. 108 at 448. He 
favours establishing an authoritative decision maker to determine the compatibility of reservations, but 
offers no suggestion as to how States' predictable rejection of this suggestion might be overcome. 
443 UK Observations, above n. 155. 
444 Hylton, above n. 108. 
445 Ibid at 446-448. 
446 For a description of the other types of treaty that Hylton identifies and the reservations system he 
prescribes for each see ibid. 
47 They may also be codifying treaties, either at their inception or after a period of State 
im/llementation of, and practice on, them. 
44 Such a system requires a specified majority to object to reservations before they can be considered 
incompatible or inadmissible An example can be found in Article 20 of the Race Convention. See 
below n. 451. 
449 Hylton, above n.108 at 448. 
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have the benefits of being a treaty party without committing itself to 
undertake the treaty obligations. 
Hylton's proposal relies on the Vienna Convention's presumption in favour of 
reserving States being reversed.450 In particular, the 12 month tacit acceptance 
rule requires alteration as it reinforces the underlying presumption tnat, where 
a treaty is silent on reservations, reservations are generally acceptable. The 
collegiate system he suggests for treaties regulating international conduct is 
dependent on reversal of the presumption. The majority of States parties 
would have to accept expressly any reservations made for them to be 
admissible. 451 
By contrast, Greig suggests amendments to the Vienna Convention rules to 
remove some of the ambiguities and introduce more flexibility. 452 His principal 
theme is that the principles of equity and reasonableness should guide all 
determinations of the validity and effect of reservations and the effect of 
objections to reservations. For example, he suggests limiting the application 
of paragraph 20(5), which sets out the 12 month tacit acceptance rule for 
objecting to reservations, to paragraph 20(2). In relation to paragraph 20(4), 
to which 20(5) currently applies, he suggests that a new sub-paragraph be 
inserted which stipulates that "reservations should only be regarded as 
having been accepted if it is reasonable and equitable to do so."453 He also 
suggests that these principles be used to determine the effect of an 
incompatible reservation on treaty relations in the absence of an authoritative 
determination of the matter. 
An approach based on reasonableness and equity454 has an immediate 
attraction. Greig attempts to develop examples of how reasonableness and 
450 Ibid at 445. 
451 The system in Article 20 of the Race Convention is an example of an ineffective collegiate system 
because of its underlying presumption that States will be active in objecting. Article 20(2) states: 
2. A reservation incompatible with the object and purpose of this Convention shall not be 
permitted, nor shall a reservation the effect of which would inhibit the operation of any of 
the bodies established by this Convention be allowed. A reservation shall be considered 
incompatible or inhibitive if at least two thirds of the States Parties to this Convention 
object to it. 
Race Convention, above n.388. Of course, the protection of such a provision diminishes as more 
States join the treaty regime. See Lijnzaad for a detailed description and criticism of the Article 20 
model. Above n. 3 at 131-183, 421. 
452 See Greig, above n. I, generally and at 170. For example, he suggests that the definition of 
reservation in Article 2 to clearly distinguish between interpretative declarations and reservations, ibid 
at 165-6. 
45 ~ Greig, above n. I at 170. 
454 Greig does not define equity here, but Schacter has this to say about the meaning of equity: "No 
concept on international law resists precise definition more than the notion of equity. It is often 
defined by listing approximate synonyms that seem equally elusive: fairness, justice, reasonableness 
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equity would work in practice, for example: in determining the true nature of a 
"declaration";455 allowing greater flexibility in the application of the rule in 
Article 20(5) dealing with the time allowed for making objections;456 the role 
of objections in a regime that has an authoritative decision maker457 or where 
third party dispute resolution is envisaged;458 and, where there is no dispute 
-
resolution mechanism available, application of the test to decide on the 
compatibility of a reservation.459 His suggestions go some way toward 
correcting the present imbalance in favour of the reserving State460 on a 
number of issues. However, it is not clear that his suggested approach on 
incompatibility, which continues to see the role of objecting States as 
relevant,461 would overcome the problem he has identified himself,462 of 
drawing conclusions from, or relying on, the erratic behaviour of States as 
objectors. In the absence of a fully developed, practical and predictable 
method of applying reasonableness and equity in this case it is difficult to see 
how Greig's general thesis can solve the fundamental problems of 
reservations. It appears that, at least in relation to human rights treaties, 
Greig's equity and reasonableness "test" would prove equally as difficult to 
apply, and be as subject to the whimsical and inconsistent interpretations of 
States parties, as the existing test of compatibility with the object and purpose 
of the treaty. It is arguable that such a "test" is more subjective than the 
object and purpose test which, at least, provides some limitation on States' 
interpretation of the test via the treaty text and is generally understood.463 
His suggestion that, if the validity of a reservation is challenged, the reserving 
State should have the opportunity of modifying its reservation to comply with 
the Article 19 requirements, may prove useful. It will be recalled that Article 
19 allows States to make reservations at the time of "signing, ratifying, 
and good faith. Apart from the imprecision of these terms, they are not adequate to convey the full use 
of equity in legal reasoning." Schacter, above n. 224 at 255. 
455 Ibid, at 165-166. 
456 Ibid, at 167. 
457 Ibid. 
458 Ibid, at 168 & 171. 
459 Ibid, at 171. 
460 Ibid. Greig says the "Notions of equity are called in aid to redress the balance between States in a 
~articular advantage in their dealings with those in a situation of disadvantage." ibid, at 23. 
61 Ibid, at 115 & 171. 
462 Ibid, at 89 & 132. 
463 Jennings, referring to the application of equitable principles in a different context, has said that "la] 
structured and predictable system of equitable procedures is an essential framework for the only kind of 
equity that a court of law that has not been given competence to decide ex aequo et bona may properly 
contemplate." R.Y. Jennings, "Equity and Equitable Principles" (1986) 42 Annuaire Suisse de Droit 
International 27, at 32. Higgins makes a similar point. See R. Higgins, Problems and Process. 
International Law and How We Use It 1994 at 219-238 
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accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty".464 Thus, it may not be contrary 
to this Article to allow States to modify reservations they made when ratifying 
etc. Each modification would need to be assessed to determine if it amounts 
to a new reservation. 
In Chorherr v Austria, 465 Judge Valticos, in his dissenting opinion, recognised 
the possibility of subsequent amendment of reservations to the European 
Convention.466 He said that although reservations can only be made at the 
time of ratification etc., it is unreasonable to prevent a State from amending its 
reservation when the reservation has been held to be in breach of Article 64 
of the Convention and, therefore, null and void, sometime after its 
ratification. 467 
Two matters are worth noting about Greig's and Valticos' proposal in the 
context of human rights treaties. The first is that allowing subsequent 
modification of reservations may add another avenue by which States can 
avoid their treaty obligations and further undermine the objectives of the 
treaty. States would be able to amend their reservations to exclude "new" 
interpretations of the treaty468 and their obligations under it, with the effect 
that progressive development of the law governed by the treaty may be 
stymied.469 
The second matter is that the most problematic reservations, those that are 
most clearly incompatible, are unlikely to be able to be amended in such a way 
as to bring them into line with Article 19(c). For example, Iran's reservation to 
the Children's Convention has been criticised as incompatible with the 
464 Vienna Convention, Article 19, above n. 2. 
465 Chorherr, above n.120. 
466 In the Belilos case before the European Court of Human Rights, Switzerland produced a revised 
declaration after the Court decided its original declaration was invalid. No other State party to the 
European Convention has yet objected to the amendment. This may be because Switzerland amended 
an interpretative declaration rather than a reservation, which, strictly speaking, is not governed by the 
European Convention's reservation making provision, Article 64. Article 64 allows reservations to be 
made at the time of ratification etc. Belilos, above n.118 and accompanying text; Schabas, 
"Reservations Reform", above n. 67 at 77; ( 1988) 31 Y.B. Eur. Conv. H.R. 5. 
467 Chorherr, above n.120 at 42. 
468 For example the US, in relation to its reservations to Articles 6 and 7 of the ICCPR, said they 
were a "reaction to the views of the Human Rights Committee about the length of judicial proceedings 
and the consequences this could have in cases involving capital punishment." Lijnzaad, above n.3 at 
205. 
469 It is interesting to note the Syrian Arab Republic replied to the German objection that its 
reservation to the Children's Convention did not "meet the requirements of international law" 
(Multilateral Treaties, above n. 190) because of its indefinite nature. The reply spelt out in some detai 1 
the way the reservation was intended to operate and the Convention provisions is was intended to 
exclude, ibid. Strictly speaking, this is not a subsequent modification of a reservation. However, it is 
arguable that it is not very different to a subsequent modification that merely clarified the intention of 
the original reservation. 
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Convention470 on the ground that its effect is potentially so broad as to render 
Iran's ratification meaningless. It will be recalled that the reservation states 
that Iran "reserves the right not to apply any provisions or Articles of the 
Convention that are incompatible with Islamic laws and the internal legislation 
in effect.".471 It is difficult to see how such a reservation could be tr~sformed 
into a compatible form. This reservation and a number of others472 made to the 
Children's Convention are similar to reservations made to the Women's 
Convention473 which are non-specific and frequently invoke national laws, 
customs and religion to limit their treaty responsibilities.474 While it may be 
possible to make some incompatible reservations compatible, it is unlikely that 
the above extreme examples could, or would, be made compatible. Thus, 
allowing modification of reservations is unlikely to contribute much to 
preserving the integrity of those human rights treaties that are the subject of 
such reservations. 
It is also worth mentioning that Greig has suggested that the conciliation 
mechanism in the Annex to the Vienna Convention, which deals with the 
procedures for the termination and suspension or invalidation of a treaty 
(Articles 65 and 66) be applied to contested reservations. It is hard to see 
what incentive there would be in the case of human rights treaties for an 
objecting State to invoke these procedures.475 
470 Schabas, "Reservations to CROC", above n. 205 at 478; Kuper J, "Reservations, Declaration and 
Objections to the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child", in Gardner, above n.3, at 105. 
471 Multilateral Treaties, above n. 190. 
472 For example, see reservations and declarations of Afghanistan (declaration), Algeria (declaration), 
Bangladesh (reservation), Brunei Darussalam (reservation), Djibouti (reservation), Egypt (reservation), 
Holy See (reservation), Indonesia (reservation), Iraq (reservation), Jordan (reservation), Kuwait 
(reservation), Maldives (reservation), Mauritania (reservation), Morocco (reservation), Pakistan 
(reservation), Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syrian Arab Republic and Tunisia (declaration). Reservations by 
these countries may be incompatible because of their breadth, uncertain scope, exclusion of 
fundamental principles such as freedom of religion for children or because they assert that their national 
law is paramount. Objections have been made to the reservations of Indonesia, Pakistan, Qatar, Syrian 
Arab Republic, Iran, Myanmar (withdrawn), Tunisia, Jordan, Kuwait, Thailand, Turkey and Malaysia. 
Objections were made by Sweden Norway, Portugal, Finland, Ireland, Germany, Czech Republic, Italy 
and the Netherlands, although not all objected to all of the same reservations. Some objecting States 
specified that they were objecting because they believed the reservations in question to be incompatible 
and others because they believed that the reservations revealed a lack of commitment by the reserving 
State to the object and purpose of the Convention. All of the objecting States specified that the treaty 
remained in force between it and the reserving State. Multilateral Treaties, above n. 190. 
473 For example reservations by the Maldives, Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and Morocco. Ibid; Chinkin, 
"Reservations to the Women's Convention", above n.214 at 69-76. 
474 See discussion of these kinds of reservations as incompatible, above at Chapter 2. 
47) . 
· Greig, above n. I at 172. 
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C: Model Clauses on Reservations 
Lijnzaad476 suggests that negotiating parties of future human rights treaties 
should avoid replicating the faults of those already in existence, they should 
negotiate their own reservations provision for inclusion in the treaty.477 She 
suggests a draft clause with three principal features. The first is that, given the 
absence of a "tight supervisory structure",478 the article should be simple 
enough to be applied by the depositary. Such simplicity will require States 
parties to identify the core obligations to be protected by the reservations 
provision so that the depositary can monitor the admissibility of reservations. 
In determining these provisions, States must take into account the object and 
purpose of the treaty. They should also protect any non-derogable provisions 
and those provisions that establish the supervisory mechanism from 
reservations. Thus, she suggests that the clause specify either which 
provisions can or cannot be reserved.479 In order to reduce the ambit of 
reservations, Lijnzaad's second suggestion is that the reservations clause 
should limit the type of reservations that can be made as well as the provisions 
of the treaty to which they can be made. Only reservations that deal with 
"matters of existing legislation conflicting with the standards set in the human 
rights instrument"480 would be allowed. Under this scheme, the US 
reservation to Article 6 of the ICCPR would be invalid as it reserves the right 
of the US to introduce in the future, national laws that are incompatible with 
the Article.481 
Lijnzaad's final recommendation is designed to strengthen the clause as a 
whole. She proposes a mechanism to ensure that reservations have a 
temporary life and are withdrawn as soon as possible. Under her model 
reservations clause, reservations would be time limited.482 Thus, reservations in 
respect of existing conflicting internal laws could not be relied upon 
indefinitely to avoid treaty obligations. However, in order to cater for genuine 
instances when States parties have been unable to amend national laws in 
time, Lijnzaad provides an option for renewal. But States who wanted to 
continue to rely on the reservation after its initial life had expired would be 
476 Lijnzaad, above n. 3 at 421. 
477 In 1951 the ILC recommended the same. See ILC Report 1951, UN GAOR 66th Sess. Supp. No. 
9 UN Doc. A/1858, at para 27. GA Res. 598 (VI) of 12 January 1952. 
478 Lijnzaad, above at 421. 
479 Ibid at 422. 
480 Ibid at 421. 
481 See discussion of this reservation above at pages 63-68. 
482 Lijnzaad, above n.3 at 422. 
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required to take action to ensure that the reservation did not lapse. 
'Renewal' of reservations would focus attention on the reserving State 
whose reservation would be the subject of renewed scrutiny. 
Lijnzaad's model clause appears quite watertight and practicable. It combines 
flexibility to allow for reservations in genuine cases of need, with checks to 
ensure that only admissible reservations can be effective. Her suggestion 
shows that it is possible to craft a precise and effective reservations provision. 
However, where it might fail is in the fact that it requires States negotiating 
treaties to include it in the text and thus give up the Vienna Convention 
reservations regime. This will require States to forego the relative freedom to 
make reservations that the ambiguity of the Vienna Convention regime 
provides. 
Nonetheless, a model reservations clause would be of great use to States, and 
if included in a treaty would allow States parties to bypass the Vienna 
Convention rules, which, as has been shown, are less than satisfactory and 
rather ambiguous.483 It may also reduce the likelihood of disputes on 
interpretation as the parties would have consented to an agreed set of, 
hopefully straightforward, rules on reservations in respect of their treaty. 
Lijnzaad's draft clause may prove simple enough for State's to consider 
adopting it, but first it would be necessary for them to overcome their lack of 
agreement as to what the content of the reservations rules should contain. 
The Work Of The International Law Association 
At its most recent meeting,484 the Committee on International Human Rights 
Law and Practice (ILA Committee) of the International Law Association (ILA) 
considered the issue of reservations to human rights treaties as part of a wider 
discussion on the "implementation crisis facing the principle human rights 
legal standards".485 The ILA Committee was strongly critical of the number of 
incompatible reservations it considered were allowed to be made by States 
parties to these treaties. It referred to the "many Islamic and Asian States 
[that] only ratify the treaties with the caveat that any obligation sustained 
must first be compatible with Islamic law or a similar broad reservation."-186 It 
said "[s]uch reservations are inconsistent with international law which 
requires reservations to conform to the object and purpose of the treaty, and 
48
' See discussion of the Vienna Convention reservations regime above at Chapter 2. 
-1 8 -1 1996 meeting in Helsinki. 
-18' 
· ILA Report, above n. 432 at 11. 
-1 86 Ibid at 12. 
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in the case of human rights treaties means identifying and applying overriding, 
universal standards. Nevertheless, few states are prepared to challenge other 
states on the legitimacy of their reservations."487 The ILA Committee 
concluded its discussion on reservations with some provocative, but not 
novel, reform proposals: 
The treaty bodies should decide the issues of the compatibility of reservations ... 
States parties should accept that the treaty bodies should decide the issue of the 
compatibility of reservations ... 
States parties should withdraw reservations that are incompatible ... 
States parties should object to reservations that are incompatible ... 
States parties should support moves by the treaties bodies to conduct a dialogue with 
a state party that has made reservations that are incompatible ... and moves to extend 
questions to areas covered by such reservations.488 
The Work Of The International Law Commission 
In December 1993 the General Assembly endorsed the decision of the 
International Law Commission (the ILC) to include in its programme of work 
the topic "The Law and practice relating to reservations to treaties."489 Alain 
Pellet was appointed Special Rapporteur for this topic. His first report490 (the 
Preliminary Report) was considered by the Commission at its forty-seventh 
session in 1995. 
After discussing the problems associated with the law of reservations, the 
Special Rapporteur, in the Preliminary Report, suggested several routes the 
Commission might take in its consideration of these problems and possible 
solutions. The principal issues requiring the Commission's attention derive 
from the gaps and ambiguities in the Conventions' rules. They include the 
question of how to determine the permissibility of a reservation,491 the effect of 
an impermissible reservation492 , the effect of objections on reservations,493 and 
the reservations regime and human rights treaties.494 On this latter point, the 
487 Ibid. 
488 Ibid, at 19. 
489 GA Res. 48/31 of 9 December 1993. 
490 SR Preliminary Report, above n. 108. 
491 As stated, there are at least two principal schools of thought on this: the "permissibility" and 
"o,pposability" schools. See discussion above; Also SR Preliminary Report, above n.108 at para 97. 
49 Ibid, at paras 97-1 14. 
493 Ibid, at paras I 15-125. 
494 Ibid, at paras 138-142. Other problem areas identified by the Special Rapporteur included 
reservations to provisions codifying customary rules. reservations to bilateral treaties, the effect of 
reservations and objection on entry into force of a treaty, State succession and reservations and 
reservations to peremptory norms. Sec SR Preliminary Report, ibid, generally & at paragraph 148. 
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Special Rapporteur asked whether the existing regime of reservations and 
objections to reservations were satisfactory for human rights treaties given 
that the "main consensual element that permeated the whole regime laid 
down under articles 19 to 23 of the Vienna Convention [had been] challenged 
not only by certain writers but also by international bodies concern~d with 
the protection of human rights."495 In particular, the "revival of controversy 
by international human rights bodies, in particular, the Human Rights 
Committee, the European and Inter-American Courts of Human Rights, by 
their adoption of a bold new stand on the special problems of reservations to 
human rights treaties"496 was considered by the Rapporteur to have "added 
to the complexity of the topic to such a point that the question arose whether 
a uniform legal regime governing reservations to treaties was necessary or 
possible."497 
When considering the scope and form of the Commission's future work on 
this topic, the principal concern of the Special Rapporteur was that the past 
achievements in this area of international law should be neither abandoned 
nor undermined.498 Thus he did not favour rewriting the Vienna Convention 
rules which, in his opinion, had acquired some customary force and were 
generally workable. 499 He hoped that the Commission would try to determine 
additional rules to complement the three Vienna Convention treaties, and, 
where possible, remove ambiguities and fill gaps. 
In keeping with his view that the Vienna Conventions' reservations rules be 
treated by the Commission as well established, Pellet suggested several 
approaches available to the Commission. The first two options involve 
drafting new treaties. The first would require the preparation of three draft 
protocols to the existing conventions. The protocols would supplement and 
refine, but be consistent with, the three existing treaties on the law of 
reservations.500 The alternative drafting option would be to consolidate the 
reservations provisions in each treaty into one draft treaty.501 The 
495 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its 47th Session, GAOR, 50th Sess. 
Supp. No. I 0, UN Doc. A/50/I 0, [hereinafter 1995 ILC Report], at 244, para 427. For example, the 
Human Rights Committee in its General Comment 24. The Special Rapporteur also considered if 
other types of treaties, such as environmental and disarmament treaties, should also be recognised as 
re~uiring special treatment. ibid, at 245, para 428. 
49 Ibid, at page 241 para 418. 
497 Ibid. 
498 . Ibid, at para 153-169. 
499 Ibid, at 245, para 432 
500 SR Preliminary Report, above n.108 at para 175. page 77. 
50 I . Ibid, at 77, para 176. 
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consolidation also would provide an opportunity to refine the rules. The 
General Assembly would then decide whether to adopt the draft. Either 
option would produce the same result. 
The non-treaty based approaches canvassed by the Special Rapporteur 
involved producing a guide on State and international organisational" practice 
relating to reservations.502 The Special Rapporteur envisaged that such a 
guide might be in the form of an article by article commentary on the relevant 
provisions in each of the three treaties. It could detail developments in the 
law and in practice since the conclusion of the first Vienna Convention in 
1969. It could be accompanied by various model reservations clauses to be 
adapted as necessary, and inserted into future treaties. "This approach would 
allow the specific features of certain types of treaties to be taken fully into 
consideration".503 The Special Rapporteur concludes by acknowledging that 
any, or a combination, of these approaches would achieve the Commission's 
goal of fill in the gaps and remove the ambiguities in the treaty texts while 
paying "due regard for the flexibility that facilitates the broadest possible 
participation in multilateral conventions, while simultaneously safeguarding 
their basic objectives. "504 
After considerable debate and discussion of the Preliminary Report and the 
Special Rapporteur's suggestions, the Commission and the majority of 
representatives to the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly endorsed the 
Report. 505 There was consensus that the reservations provisions in the Vienna 
Conventions should not be altered. Instead, the Commission would progress 
consideration of the topic by developing and adopting a guide to practice in 
relation to reservations in the form suggested by the Special Rapporteur.506 
The guidelines could be transformed into a convention or protocol in the 
future if it was decided that this was a better and a viable approach to take. 
The guide "is intended to indicate to States and international organizations 
'guidelines for [their] practice in respect of reservations'. "507 To this end it 
will consist of general rules that can be applied to all treaties that are silent on 
502 Ibid, at 78, para 178. 
503 Ibid. 
504 Ibid. 
505 See respectively Topical Summary of the discussion held in the Sixth Committee of the General 
Assembly during its fiftieth session prepared by the Secretariat and General Assembly Resolution 
50/45. at para 4. 
506 1995 ILC Report, above ri. 495 at 260, para 491. See also Sixth Committee's consideration of the 
Preliminary Report and ensuin~ discussion of it in the ILC, in UN Doc A/CN.4/472/Add. I. 507 ~ 
SR Second Report, above n.430 at para 26, page I I; 1995 ILC Report, above n. 495 at para 491, 
page 260. 
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reservations.508 To be useful, the guide must interpret each of the reservations 
provisions. Such clarification is long overdue and would be of the greatest 
assistance in educating States about the complicated rules. It may be that, as a 
result, a more consistent pattern of State practice on reservations will emerge. 
Under authorisation from the Commission,509 the Special Rapporteur prepared 
a detailed questionnaire designed to elicit information from States on their 
practice in respect of reservations. The questionnaire was sent to States 
members of the United Nations or of a specialised agency, or parties to the 
Statute of the ICJ in December 1995.5 ' 0 Eight States have responded thus 
far.511A similar questionnaire has been prepared for international organisations 
which are depositaries of multilateral treaties. 
Conclusion 
As stated, draft clauses will no doubt be very useful to States and international 
organisations negotiating new treaties. And the model clauses provided by 
the ILC probably will be seen as "good" examples as they will be drafted by 
"experts" after careful consideration of all the relevant issues. Thus, they may 
enjoy considerable approval. More challenging is the proposed guide to 
practice on reservations. Given the extent of disagreement, and the 
longstanding debate about the law of reservations, it is likely that it will be 
extremely difficult for the Commission to reach consensus on correct 
interpretations. States may continue to act according to their own 
interpretation if it is not the one favoured by the ILC's guide. Like the 
Human Rights Committee's General Comment 24, its success is entirely 
dependent on States, and it may not be any more acceptable to States parties 
than the Comment. As the Special Rapporteur acknowledged, " ... like the 
actual rules of the Vienna Convention and the customary norms which they 
enshrine, [the rules in the guide] will be purely residual where the Parties 
508 SR Second Report, ibid, at para 26, page 11 
509 1995 ILC Report, above n.495 at para 493, page 261. 
510 See SR Second Report, above n. 430 at 4. 
511 As of 21 May 1996 Canada, Chile, Denmark, Ecuador, Estonia, Finland, San Marino, Slovenia, 
Spain, Switzerland, the UK and the USA had responded. See SR Second Report, ibid, at note 8, page 
4. 
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concerned have no stated position; they cannot be considered binding and 
the Contracting Parties will naturally always be free to disregard them."512 
512 Ibid. 
J_ .. __ I.nd•i•ra-R•o•se•n•th•a-1--------------- 83 
I 
CONCLUSION 
The conclusion of the Vienna Convention may be viewed as the beginning of 
a relatively quiet period in the history of debate on the law of reservations. 
However, the large volume of recent writing on this issue, the intere~ in 
reform of the law and practice evident in this writing, the measure of attention 
the issue is currently receiving by international organisations such as the ILA, 
the ILC and by the General Assembly, is testament to fact that, once again, the 
question of reservations is hotting up. 
Further, it appears as if the current debate is focused on the same issues as the 
debate in the period between the Reservations Opinion and the conclusion of 
the Vienna Convention. For example, the lack of consensus about the 
content of the relevant international law still dominates the debate. In 
addition, the struggle for paramountcy by the two conflicting aims of the 
international community: to achieve universal participation in multilateral 
treaties, particularly, human rights treaties; or to preserve the integrity of the 
adopted text, is still very much a live issue. However, unlike the debate 
leading up to the adoption of the Vienna Convention, we have now 
experienced a significant period in which the universality aspirations of the 
UN have taken priority. It is clear that the resultant imbalance is as 
-
unsatisfactory as the imbalance evident under the unanimity regime. 
Dissatisfaction with the effect of the ambiguities in the law and the favouritism 
shown to reserving States appears to be the impetus for much of the renewed 
debate, particularly in relation to human rights treaties. 
The argument,513 that the imbalance needs to be righted, that "the half-a-loaf 
doctrine must prove detrimental to what is the most desirable course of all, 
namely that countries should accept Conventions as they stand",514 is 
attractive from the point of view of strengthening implementation of human 
rights. Bayefsky has said that: 
the emphasis placed on universal ratification of the major human rights treaties is a 
mistake ... priorities ought to be reordered. Universal ratification ought to be 
secondary to the ultimate goal of safeguarding the integrity of the treaty system ... 
Disrespect for international law is exacerbated by sustaining the false claim that 
ratification is laudable in itself.5 15 
However, such a reordering is unlikely to be acceptable to States. What is 
needed is another attempt to reach an effective compromise between these 
511 For example, see ILA, ILA Committee Report, above n. 432 at I I. 
51
" Fitzmaurice, above n. I at 17. 
m Bayefsky, above n.259 at 435. 
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CONCLUSION 
prionties. Unfortunately there is little to suggest that this compromise, which 
has thus far proved elusive, can now be attained. Those reform proposals that 
tackle the imbalance,516 are unlikely to gain support from States. Similarly, the 
ILC proposed guide517 is likely to encounter strong resistance from those 
States that disagree with the conclusions it must make if the guide is.Jo 
contribute to the resolution of som~ of the identified problems in the existing 
law of reservations. 
Lijnzaad writes that: "[r]estoring the ruins" 518 created by the failure of the 
reservations regime to regulate adequately the making of reservations, 
particularly incompatible ones, "is possible to a certain extent."519 She argues 
that this restoration "will largely depend on the agility of the supervisory 
organs" ,520 and that they are the mechanism by which the impact of 
incompatible reservations can be limited. The Human Rights Committee's 
General Comment 24(52) can be viewed, not as an assertion of a formal 
authority it does not have, but as an indication that it is cognisant of the fact 
that realistically, it and the other supervisory human rights treaty bodies,521 are 
the only mechanisms in the human rights system currently available to keep 
States parties alert to the fact that half a loaf may not be enough. Through 
their questioning of States parties on reservations they may pressure States 
parties to adopt new reservations practices. As any change to the 
reservations regime is wholly dependent on the co-operation of States, it 
seems that this may be the only way forward. 
516 For example, Lijnzaad's draft clause on reservations, above n. 3 at 421. 
517 See above discussion of this proposal at pages 79-82. 
m Lijnzaad, above n.3 at 424. 
519 Ibid. 
5211 Ibid. 
521 Note that the Human Rights Committee does not refer to the other UN human rights treaty 
super\'isory bodies in the Comment. However, it seems reasonable to assume that it would welcome 
any moves by those bodies to follow its lead. 
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